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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I show how the challenges of producing a philosophy of history responsive to 
the negativity of the world benefits from working through the difficulties of G. W. F. Hegel’s 
systematic philosophy. By revealing the powerful and intricate ways that Hegel gives an 
illegitimate primacy to thought (or the concept) we can better appreciate the obstacles that 
face a philosophy which places new emphasis on the nonconceptual whilst recognising the 
genuine role of the concept. In the first half of this thesis I reconstruct the important 
criticisms levelled at Hegel by F. W. J. Schelling and Theodor W. Adorno. I argue that both 
their criticisms illuminate our understanding of the metaphysical status of Hegel’s thought 
and expose the surreptitious means by which Hegel overextends the concept. The value of 
Adorno’s and Schelling’s reading of Hegel is also due to the fact that they do not cast aside 
Hegel’s ambitions as mere fantasy. Rather, they provide important insight into the goals 
philosophy should be striving towards—even if we cannot be as confident as Hegel in their 
imminent achievement.  
In the second half I reconstruct Schelling’s and Adorno’s philosophies of history in light 
of their criticisms of Hegel. The core problem addressed is how unwarranted optimism – 
entailed by the idealistic operation in Hegel’s theoretical philosophy – is to be eschewed 
whilst also avoiding a lapse into unwarranted pessimism. I argue that, while both Schelling 
and Adorno make important advances in this direction, Adorno’s philosophy of history is 
better able to make sense of both the prevalence of unfreedom in history and the ways in 
which we can respond to this situation.  
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Introduction 
 
Hegel follows Aristotle in taking philosophy to have reached its pinnacle when thought 
thinks itself.1 For Hegel, it is the investigation of the concept (Begriff) which carries this out; 
or, more accurately, it is the concept investigating itself.2  This is what Hegel means by 
logic—something more akin to Kant’s transcendental logic than a study of the rules of valid 
argument or inference. 3  The difficulty that then faced Hegel is how the pure part of 
philosophy relates to the non-pure part, namely the natural and human world. Many lines 
from Hegel can be quoted which seem to make short work of this difficulty. A typical way of 
talking for Hegel is to say that the study of nature and spirit (Geist) – which forms the 
Realphilosophie – is still the study of thought, but thought in its externality or otherness.4 But 
this names the problem rather than solving it. It presupposes that the concept is the ground of 
everything (whether an ideal or real ground is a question we will take up in the course of this 
study). Nevertheless, there have been many interpreters that have essentially affirmed this 
strategy and found new ways to present the basic claim that the process of self-differentiation 
or self-determination found in the concept is also found in the world.5   
A worry with this strategy is that history – which is an object of Hegel’s Realphilosophie – 
is known in advance to unfold in a certain way. Marx expressed this when he highlights that 
dialectical logic takes its own movement (the negation of the negation) to be the ‘true and 
only positive,’ the ‘self-realizing act of all being.’ From this Marx then claims that Hegel 
only grasped the ‘abstract, logical, speculative expression for the movement of history,’ but 
                                                          
1
 EL §236a 
2
 EL §28a, §41a; cf. SL 34, EL §163 
3
 Cf. SL 44 
4
 E.g. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature ; Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences (1830), trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), §247. 
5
 This strategy is primarily found in a certain strand of the French reception of Hegel. Starting with Jean 
Hyppolite’s landmark 1952 interpretation of Hegel where he reinvents Hegel’s concept as ‘sense.’ See Logic 
and Existence, trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997). A 
similar strategy can be found more recently in Catherine Malabou’s concept of ‘plasticity’ in The Future of 
Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, trans. Lisabeth During (London: Routledge, 2005). 
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‘not yet the real history of man.’6 Manfred Frank has argued that these kinds of worries were 
first expressed by one of Hegel’s contemporaries, F. W. J. Schelling, and that Marx in fact 
drew from the latter in his criticisms of Hegel.7  Schelling is peculiar in the history of 
philosophy for having been a rare example of someone instrumental in instigating an 
influential philosophical orientation, only to then be one of the foremost critics of this 
orientation, especially as it appeared in its most famous representative. Schelling’s youthful 
attempt to respond to the limits of transcendental philosophy led him to formulate an 
objective idealism which subsequently paved the way for Hegel’s absolute idealism. 
Schelling was then overshadowed and his place in the history of philosophy was seen as a 
stepping stone for Hegel. But not long after Schelling’s transitional role was completed, he 
began to question his own earlier idealism, producing increasingly pointed criticism of Hegel 
which reached a wide audience when he gave his inaugural lectures at Berlin in 1841-2.  
 One reason to look back at Schelling’s criticism of Hegel is for historical purposes: to 
trace the influence of his thought on subsequent criticisms of Hegel which might give us 
insight into the nature and value these criticisms. As important as this is, this is not my 
concern here. I think there are more intrinsic reasons to look back at this apparently obscure 
episode in the history of philosophy. I will attempt to show that Schelling’s philosophy can 
offer resources for contemporary philosophy, specifically where his philosophy is a 
competitor to Hegelian forms of the philosophy of history. One of the principle reasons why 
Schelling’s mature philosophy retains this relevance is because his work was more than a 
mere reactionary response to Hegel—Hegel’s advances are taken seriously, which Schelling 
subsequently recasts.  
                                                          
6
 Karl Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,’ in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-
Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, trans. Martin Milligan, 2nd ed (New York: Norton, 1978), 108. 
7
 Manfred Frank, ‘Schelling’s Critique of Hegel and the Beginnings of Marxian Dialectics’, Idealistic Studies 
19, no. 3 (1989): 251–68. 
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The fact that Schelling takes Hegel’s work seriously can be seen as a narcissistic reception 
on Schelling’s part. Schelling points out that he had already set the path which Hegel merely 
carried on down. Nevertheless, credit is given for the way that the purely logical nature of the 
science of reason is drawn out in the Hegel’s Science of Logic.8 Although Schelling thinks 
Hegel’s way of doing the purely rational part of philosophy – which Schelling also calls 
negative philosophy – is flawed, he thinks its greatest value lies in the fact that a philosophy 
which completes its analysis of the concept in pure thought will immediately call for the 
move beyond the thinking of thought alone, to knowledge of actual existence and freedom—
which for Schelling occupies positive philosophy. But, of course, the way that a philosopher 
responds to this call varies. Schelling thinks that Kant and Hegel represent two distinct ways 
that philosophy distortedly responds to his call.  
Schelling praises Kant above all for sharpening the distinction between the realms of 
negative and positive philosophy and – despite Kant’s intentions – for showing the way for 
philosophy to pursue the positive. 
 
Whilst he thought that he had brought all knowledge of the supersensuous to an end for 
all time by his critique, he really only caused negative and positive in philosophy to have 
to separate, but precisely because of this the positive, now emerging in its complete 
independence, was able to oppose itself, as positive, to the merely negative philosophy as 
the second side of philosophy as a whole. Kant began this process of separation and the 
resultant process of transfiguration of philosophy into the positive. Kant's critique 
contributed to this all the more because it was in no way hostile towards the positive. 
Whilst he demolishes the whole edifice of that metaphysics, he always makes his view 
clear that in the last analysis one must want what it wanted, and that its content would in 
fact finally be the true metaphysics, if it were only possible.9 
 
With all the restrictions that Kant placed on philosophy he nevertheless affirmed the 
possibility for philosophy to actually go beyond its native realm—the realm of pure thought. 
The way that Kant actually followed up that possibility was, for Schelling, a loss of nerve. 
                                                          
8
 GPP 151 
9
 HMP 95 
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After showing that reason on its own could not get to the positive, he ended up introducing it 
again ‘through the back door of the practical.’10 In particular, Schelling is disappointed with 
the restriction of the positive to a postulate, to a demand which has ‘significance for action, 
for the ethical life, but none for science.’11  
For anyone acquainted with Hegel’s criticisms of Kant, this will seem very familiar. But 
Schelling thinks Hegel does no better than Kant because, although he saw the need to know 
the positive, he did not actually leave negative philosophy and go out to the positive—instead 
he reduced the latter to the former. It might seem that we have exhausted the options. 
Schelling thinks that the reason we might think this is the case is due to the ‘prejudice’ that 
restricts theoretical philosophy to the ‘mere science of reason.’ 12  Both Kant and Hegel 
subscribe to this restriction, but then take different views on how philosophy should 
accommodate the positive. Schelling thinks that there is a type of theoretical philosophy 
which is not a mere science of reason and can pursue knowledge of the positive (this he 
sometimes calls ‘metaphysical empiricism’).13 Whatever else this might mean, it manages to 
express the strange position Schelling holds between the limits set by Kant’s philosophy and 
the violation of those limits in Hegel’s philosophy. 
 
This strange position could also characterise a significant part of Adorno’s philosophy. Like 
Schelling, Adorno has an ambivalent relation to Kant. This similarity is continued into the 
nature of this ambivalence itself. Adorno thinks Kant’s philosophical limitation of knowledge 
expressed the desire to not let the mere thinking of thought (negative philosophy in 
Schelling’s terms) be the last say on knowledge; but Kant had no way to properly turn his 
philosophy towards this end. Instead, it had to manifest in ‘contradictions’, most famously in 
                                                          
10
 GPP 148 
11
 GPP 191 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 GPP 171-91 
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the claim that there is an unknowable thing-in-itself which ‘exist[s] outside the sphere of 
consciousness,’ but ‘impinge[s] on us nevertheless.’14  
 
…on the one hand, the Critique of Pure Reason contains the elements of an identity 
philosophy since it attempts to derive authoritative, universally valid knowledge from the 
analysis of reason. On the other hand, however, it strives with equal vigour to bring the 
element of non-identity to the fore. This means that Kant is conscious of a problem that 
was not perceived so clearly by his successors precisely because of their greater 
consistency. This is the problem of knowledge as a tautology, that is to say, the problem 
that if everything that is known is basically nothing but a knowing reason, what we have 
is no real knowledge but only a kind of reflection of reason. That we are confronted here 
with Kant’s own philosophical decision – and not, as is frequently imputed to him, the 
mere vestiges of a position not properly thought through – is evident. It was 
demonstrated as a matter of historical fact by his impassioned resistance to the 
interpretations placed on his critique of reason by his first great successor, Fichte, who 
regarded himself, not without cause, as a consistent Kantian.15 
 
So, even though the thing-in-itself really did create problems or inconsistencies in Kant’s 
philosophy, it was kept because ‘one must want’ to go out to what is not identical to thought 
without thereby sucking it into the science of reason—that is, without then making this 
knowledge a tautology. This is a good point to note that, while the structural place Adorno 
and Schelling find for the positive or the non-identical is the same, they differ radically on the 
exact content of this. As indicated in the previous quote from Schelling, he thinks of the 
positive content as supersensible—this is not the case for Adorno.16 (I flag this for clarity, but 
will be explored in more detail in chapter 3.) 
Just like Schelling, Adorno’s praise for Kant’s somewhat indirect acknowledgment of the 
need for a philosophy geared towards something beyond the science of reason is tempered by 
Adorno’s claim that Kant does not follow through on this. In fact, Adorno makes his point 
even stronger by saying that Kant disallows this project by affirming as theoretically 
necessary the ‘great chasm [that] yawns’ between human beings and the world—Adorno calls 
                                                          
14
 KC 69 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 In this way I disagree with Franck Fischbach’s too quick identification of the non-identical with Schelling’s 
positive. See ‘Adorno and Schelling: How to ‘Turn Philosophical Thought Towards the Non-Identical,’ British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no. 6 (2015): 1167–79. 
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this the ‘Kantian block.’17 Adorno thinks that such a chasm has its basis in reality—it is 
objectively caused by universal exchange relations. Although there are reasons beyond the 
control of the philosopher which block our experience, Adorno still thinks we need to pursue 
knowledge of the world not already captured in the self-investigation of thinking. This is a 
large part of the project of Negative Dialectics: ‘The cognitive utopia would be to use 
concepts to unseal the non-conceptual with concepts, without making it their equal.’18  
Much like his assessment of Kant, Adorno thinks Hegel’s philosophy expresses a truth 
which is subsequently covered over by the official or literal story of his philosophy. That we 
could know the world purely through reason – an identity philosophy as Adorno calls it, or 
negative philosophy as Schelling has it – is ultimately the objectionable part of Hegel’s 
philosophy for Adorno. But the megalomania of the concept nevertheless registers the hope 
that the current limitations on experience are not necessary and that, pace Kant, we should 
aim to overcome them.19 This highlights the fact that Hegel does not just represent a set of 
philosophical views which are found to be simply false—leaving no impact upon what might 
be true (which, incidentally, echoes Hegel’s core conviction that the truth is not arrived at by 
casting off falsity as ‘dross’ which would leave us with ‘pure metal.’20). Adorno, just like 
Schelling, has a lot more at stake in his criticisms of Hegel than a straightforward dismissal. 
This much might be obvious, but what is less obvious – and hopefully has become clear 
through these introductory remarks – is that it is not the case of a simple appropriation of 
Hegel either; the kind of ‘toolbox’ approach to the history of philosophy which picks and 
chooses which bits it likes and leaves the rest.  
                                                          
17
 KC 174 
18
 ND 10 
19
 HTS 41 
20
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Arnold V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1977), 34. Adorno quotes this approvingly (with qualifications) at HTS 38. 
7 
 
Michael Rosen points out that Adorno reads Hegel’s against the grain when finding the 
‘truth’ of Hegel’s Geist in the ‘false subject’ of the system of exchange relationships.21 This 
kind of mining for truth in a philosopher is obviously not a case of isolating a particular 
doctrine or argument from a work which we find agreeable. Rather, it is showing how a 
philosophical account registers a reality, even if this account then tries to represent it as being 
something purely self-contained within reason. It is all the more surprising, then, that Rosen 
should claim that Adorno must have ‘failed to take…into account’ Hegel’s official story 
about the concept (that its dialectic unravels in a pure narcissistic dialogue with itself) when 
claiming that his (Adorno’s) account of the concept (where the dialectic is with the 
nonconceptual) owns a debt to Hegel.22 In order for Adorno’s dialectic to owe something to 
Hegel it does not need to accept Hegel’s account at face value. Adorno’s point is that, despite 
Hegel’s party line, the dialectic functions otherwise, even in Hegel’s own thought.    
 
Without this supposition [of identity; i.e. that what is emphatically known is the concept 
again], according to Hegel, philosophy would be incapable of knowing anything 
substantive or essential. Unless the idealistically acquired concept of dialectics harbours 
experiences contrary to the Hegelian emphasis, experiences impendent of the idealistic 
machinery, philosophy must inevitably do without substantive insight, confine itself to 
the methodology of science, call that philosophy, and virtually cross itself out.23    
 
Adorno’s account of dialectics is indebted to Hegel in the sense that it was Hegel’s 
idealistically distorted dialectics which points in the direction of a dialectics not self-enclosed 
in pure thought. In this way Adorno both wants to recover an experience of the concept from 
Hegel and transform the guise it takes in Hegel idealistic dialectical logic. In this way it could 
be said that Adorno also holds that the concept follows a dialectical logic, but a logic which is 
                                                          
21
 Michael Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and Its Criticism (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 156-57. 
22
 Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and Its Criticism, 159-60 
23
 ND 7-8 
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not limited to thought’s self-dialogue.24 Of course, part of what might worry commentators 
like Rosen is the issue of how Adorno’s account of dialectics can work without Hegel’s 
system. This is a complex and large issue, but we can indicate at least one of the ways that 
Adorno thought this would work: the world itself comes to form a system outside the 
confines of a science of reason.25 Whether or not Adorno can maintain a dialectical logic – a 
determinate negation – without the ‘idealistic machinery’ (i.e. the self-dialogue of reason), it 
should be clear that Adorno is in principle capable of claiming a resource in Hegel while also 
rejecting Hegel’s systematic presentation.   
By presenting some of the ways that Schelling’s and Adorno’s own hopes for philosophy 
– which keeps an important place for the concept even while rejecting its restriction to pure 
thought, on the one hand, and digestion of all heterogeneity, on the other – are articulated 
through their criticisms of Hegel (with the aid of Kant) I have tried to introduce some of the 
key themes and problems which will animate this study. Also, this has hopefully shown why 
it makes sense to pursue the problems of Hegel’s account of the concept through Adorno and 
Schelling. One reason I have brought these two critics together is because I think they are – 
despite their sometimes unjudicial handling – nuanced and insightful readers of Hegel (this 
will be shown in detail in chapters 1 and 2). More plausibility has been brought to the 
consideration of Adorno and Schelling in this light through drawing parallels in the 
alternatives they want to offer to Hegel’s philosophy. Thus far I have mostly considered their 
alternatives in terms of how they think the concept should be used by the philosopher. We 
need to add a complication to this. For both Schelling and Adorno, a rethinking of the 
concept for philosophical knowledge also requires us to reconsider the way that the concept is 
in the world. In this way both Schelling and Adorno meet eye to eye with Hegel on at least 
                                                          
24
 Alison Stone addresses the way in which Adorno can be considered to belong to the tradition of logic begun 
in Kant and which passes through Hegel. See Alison Stone, ‘Adorno and Logic’, in Theodor Adorno: Key 
Concepts, ed. Deborah Cook (Acumen, 2008), 47–62.  
25
 ‘Philosophy retains respect for systems to the extent to which things heterogeneous to it face it in the form of 
a system. The administered world moves in this direction.’ (ND 20) 
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one central point: logic and history – the philosophical investigation of the concept and the 
existing concept – are inseparable. Despite the differences in the way each thinker 
understands this inseparability, I think this already indicates a ground for fruitful dialogue. 
Before outlining the arguments of each chapter I would like to say one more thing about the 
proximity (and distance) between Schelling and Adorno in terms of how their own projects, 
specifically their philosophies of history, relate to Hegel’s. 
Schelling’s 1809 work, the so-called Freiheitsschrift, situates itself within a now largely 
forgotten intellectual debate which nevertheless was an animating force in Germany towards 
the end of the 18th century.26 Although this debate was sparked over a controversy regarding 
Spinoza – and, moreover, Spinoza continued to be central to German intellectual culture 
during this time – the philosophical issues involved have a broader significance. In short, the 
worry – voiced perhaps most strongly by F.H. Jacobi – was that the philosophical attempt to 
attain a comprehensive rational grasp of the world, including ourselves, would reduce 
everything to just another element enmeshed in necessary connections, thus annulling all 
freedom.27 Jacobi not only held this to be the case with Spinoza and his followers, but with 
all philosophy that consistently carried out its task of total rational comprehension. The fate 
of philosophy, then, is the denial of freedom (nihilism) and the commitment to complete 
determinism (fatalism). This is what led Jacobi to claim that, if we want to avoid these 
consequences, then we must turn to faith.  
Now, Hegel’s philosophical endeavours, as much as Schelling’s, can be seen as an attempt 
to avoid having to choose between a rational nihilism on the one hand, and an irrational 
                                                          
26
 The lengthy introduction to the Freiheisschrift consists in a detailed engagement with the pantheism debate 
(FS 217-36). It is also worth noting that Schelling takes this issue to antecede the debate in Germany: 
‘According to an ancient, but by no means silenced myth, the concept of freedom is supposed to be incongruous 
with any system, and every philosophy that lays claims to unity or totality should lead to the denial of freedom.’ 
(FS 220). For a helpful overview of the pantheism debate see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German 
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987), chapters one and two. 
27
 It is not just freedom that would seem to suffer here. The general thrust of the Enlightenment to replace all 
authorities with that of reason has the result that religion and morality are also threatened with absorption into a 
rationally necessary system.  
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fideism on the other.28 What separates the Freiheitsschrift from Hegel’s philosophy is the 
way that a unity between system and human freedom is maintained. In short, whereas Hegel 
bases all genuine freedom in the necessary activity of the concept (most adequately 
displayed, for Hegel, in his Logic), Schelling takes human freedom to be an intelligible deed 
which does not follow the logical necessity of the concept. Just how Schelling makes this 
deed compatible with system will be addressed in chapter 4. For now, we can highlight the 
fact that this intelligible deed captures an important aspect of freedom which Hegel’s theory 
of the concept cannot: that things could in principle always have been otherwise. At the time 
of the Freiheitsschrift Schelling was not yet explicitly targeting Hegel, but this earlier work is 
remarkably prescient. These same points would later form the core of his criticism of Hegel. 
For Schelling there are two main advantages of this approach compared to Hegel’s. First, he 
thinks that this can properly capture divine freedom. That is, is can explain the creation of a 
world in the way that purely logical connections cannot. Second, the unpredictable dimension 
introduced means that there is room for the fact that history might go wrong (which, for the 
Schelling of the Freiheitsschrift, this meant a genuine confrontation with the existence of 
evil).29   
Adorno also reacts against the optimistic account of history which results from the 
idealistic understanding of the concept. But the philosophical context is far removed from 
that of the Freiheitsschrift. Schelling’s concern – which only intensified throughout his 
carrier – was to find ways in which philosophy could reassure itself about the meaningfulness 
of existence. The Freiheitsschrift wants to oppose the way that the worst parts of existence – 
                                                          
28
 See Frederick C. Beiser, Hegel, Routledge Philosophers (New York: Routledge, 2005), 25-27. 
29
 Peter Dews focuses on a different problem with Hegel from Schelling’s perspective. This is the fact that 
Hegel’s philosophy, which is supposed to provide reconciliation between all oppositions, fails to reconcile the 
perspective of finite human agents (embedded in activities to try to bring about the good) and the perspective of 
the concept (which has always already accomplished the good. See EL §212a). Peter Dews, ‘History and 
Freedom in Hegel and Schelling’ (unpublished manuscript, 2015). 
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evil – are down-played by the ‘philanthropism’ he finds in Kant and Fichte.30 And, I will 
argue, Schelling’s efforts here are of lasting significance. However, this effort is embedded in 
a theodicy. Ultimately, Schelling wants to reassure us that the truly horrific aspects of 
existence cannot undermine the meaningfulness of the world. The main difference between 
Hegel and Schelling on this score – which becomes more prominent in Schelling’s later 
thought – is that Hegel thinks this can be logically grounded, and Schelling thinks that it 
cannot. Adorno certainly opposes Hegel’s way of justifying the world through logical means 
(i.e. through the pure concept). But he also thinks that we should avoid construing any 
meaning in history at all. Adorno was less concerned about the ability of philosophy to grasp 
the nature of the existence of freedom, than he was about the ability of philosophy to grasp 
the nature of the existence of unfreedom. This was clearly informed by historical events, most 
obviously the rise of fascism in 20th century Europe. Part of the philosophical context was the 
inadequacies of Marxist philosophy of history, particularly in terms of the inability to account 
for the failures of humanity to liberate itself from domination. The specific set of problems 
Adorno was responding to, then, was quite different to Schelling’s, but hopefully we can see 
that these differences will encourage, rather than hinder, a dialogue over the possibilities for 
the philosophy of history.   
 
In the first part of the thesis I analyse and compare Schelling’s and Adorno’s criticism of 
Hegel’s theoretical philosophy. In chapter 1 Schelling’s interpretation of Hegel’s systematic 
philosophy is contrasted with the major trends in Hegel scholarship. The issue of the 
metaphysical status of the Logic takes central place in this discussion. Although it sometimes 
appears that Schelling takes Hegel to be involved in transcendent or pre-critical metaphysics, 
I argue that the heart of Schelling’s criticism actually targets a different form of metaphysics. 
                                                          
30
 FS 248, 262 
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This form of metaphysics is not as excessive or obviously objectionable as the pre-critical 
kind, but it is more robust than the account of Hegel’s Logic which claims that it is an 
ontology (i.e. an account of the structure of being). Schelling’s criticism picks out that part of 
Hegel’s Logic which aims at proving the existence of an activity within pure thought. Since 
this is still immanent to thought, it shares the critical status with the ontological reading (i.e. 
both follow the lesson of Kant’s critique by refusing to presuppose an object to which our 
knowledge would approach). But since the self-movement of the concept is supposed to 
establish the existence of an activity – which will ultimately take the role of God in Hegel’s 
philosophy – the Logic proves to have philosophical ambitions beyond that of an ontology. In 
Schelling’s terms, Hegel tries to get a negative philosophy to do the work of positive 
philosophy. I reconstruct Schelling’s criticism of the beginning of the Logic and separate out 
invalid and valid parts of this criticism and argue that the later reveal the way that Hegel 
surreptitiously animates the concept so that it appears as though it has its own immanent 
activity.  
In chapter 2 some of Adorno’s attempts at an immanent criticism of Hegel’s idealism are 
considered. It is easy to think that Adorno’s objection to the way that idealism limits the 
independence of what is other than thought to be solely an objection regarding the desirability 
of such a position on ethical or political grounds. But Adorno also thought it important to 
show that such a position was flawed on theoretical grounds—that is, that Hegel’s idealism 
can be shown to fail by its own lights. I argue that Adorno fails at this task when he directs 
his criticisms at the Logic, but that he succeeds when directed at Hegel’s arguments for the 
totality of conceptual mediation. Hegel’s arguments for the latter necessarily precede the 
Logic since the latter already starts from the standpoint of science; that is, from the standpoint 
where the distinction between the concept and something outside the concept has been 
abolished. There is no room for an immanent criticism to gain purchase in this case. But 
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Hegel also tried to prove the necessity of the standpoint of science, his primary strategy being 
to show that anything that appears to be outside the concept is actually within it. I argue that 
Adorno can immanently expose the flaw in this strategy. And he does so through a 
refashioning of Kant’s account of transcendental illusion. More specifically, I reconstruct 
Adorno’s criticism to show that he successfully uncovers illicit moves in Hegel’s argument 
which perform a hypostatization on the concept.  
In chapter 3 Schelling’s and Adorno’s criticism of Hegel are further defended by showing 
that the metaphysical character each attributes to Hegel is more sophisticated than might first 
appear. In particular I nuance the sense in which Schelling and Adorno – in their different 
ways – claim that Hegel makes the concept total. I take this clarification to provide the 
opportunity to show some of the crucial differences in Schelling’s and Adorno’s conception 
of what Hegel illegitimately absorbs into the concept. Both think Hegel reduces something to 
the identity of a self-knowing reason, but in Schelling’s case this something is freedom and in 
Adorno’s case this is the nonconceptual as such. How Schelling and Adorno then go on to 
formulate their own philosophies of history follows from their analysis of the flaws in 
Hegel’s account of the concept. For Schelling this means constructing an account of history 
which does not reduce freedom to the movement of the concept. Adorno does not focus on 
providing a philosophy of history more adequate to the nonconceptual as such. This is 
because, in a certain sense, the nonconceptual really has been reduced to the concept in 
history. Thus his correction to Hegel is more focused on the proper understanding of how the 
nonconceptual has been swallowed by the concept rather than a shift to the nonconceptual as 
such. In short, this means rejecting the appearance of a harmonious – and therefore rational – 
unity of the conceptual and the nonconceptual which Hegel’s argument for complete 
mediation tried to establish, and revealing the antagonistic unity of conceptual and 
nonconceptual.  
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In chapter 4 Schelling’s mature philosophy of history is investigated. In particular, the 
philosophy of history found in the Freiheitsschrift and, to a lesser extent as found in the final 
period of Schelling’s development (see below regarding the issue of Schelling’s intellectual 
development). I argue that both manage to combat the unwarranted optimism entailed by 
Hegel’s equation of freedom with the logically necessary movement of the concept. But that 
it is only in the resources of the Freiheitsschrift that philosophy is able to countenance the 
possibility of pervasive unfreedom. Unfortunately, Schelling is not able to account for this in 
historically effective terms without absorbing it into an account of the self-revelation of God. 
In this way a true move beyond the idealistic account of the self-development of the absolute 
has not been affected.31  
In chapter 5 I argue that a philosophy of history, which achieves what the Freiheitsschrift 
could not, can be reconstructed from Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
with the aid of Adorno’s mature thought—especially as found in his 1964-65 lectures on 
History and Freedom and the section of Negative Dialectics dedicated to dealing with 
Hegel’s philosophy of history, ‘World Spirit and Natural History.’ Specifically, I argue that 
this account of the philosophy of history is able to avoid all forms of unwarranted optimism 
whilst avoiding the other extreme, unwarranted pessimism. The picture of human 
development that arises is not a rosy one, but it is one based on constructions which do not 
erroneously enlist metaphysical principles or posit patterns which are necessarily insensitive 
to actual events or occurrences.   
 
                                                          
31
 Incidentally, some commentators believe this same problem plagues Schelling’s later attempts at the 
philosophy of history also. Ernst Cassirer, for instance, claims that Schelling’s philosophy of mythology makes 
an advance over objective idealism by giving mythology an objective significance beyond its rational content 
(i.e. in the way that Hegel interprets religion and myth as inadequate representations of the content that 
philosophy will grasp more adequately), but that it is ultimately ‘a necessary factor in the self-development of 
the absolute.’ Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans. Ralph Manheim, vol. Two: Mythical 
Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 8. 
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Before moving on to the substance of the thesis a quick note needs to be made regarding the 
development of Schelling’s thought. Schelling’s career is long and goes through many 
changes. There is no consensus on how to carve up Schelling’s thought, and even when 
periods of development are attributed, the level of the continuity or discontinuity between 
them is an open question. 32  But the most common way of distinguishing Schelling’s 
development is to identify four periods. This has been reproduced in the editor’s introduction 
to a recent volume of essays which ‘systematically traces the historical development’ of 
Schelling’s thought: ‘from Transcendental Philosophy and Naturphilosophie of his early 
period (1794–1800), through his Identitätsphilosophie (1801–9), and then Freiheitsschrift 
and the Weltalter of his middle period (1809 –27), and, finally, his Positive and Negative 
Philosophy and critique of Hegel in his late period (1827–54).’33 I draw upon the middle and 
late period which I will occasionally refer to collectively as Schelling’s ‘mature’ thought. 
This is mainly for convenience, but there are some intrinsic reasons to do so. It is with the 
appearance of the 1809 work, the so-called Freiheitsschrift, that the limits of idealism – 
including his own earlier objective idealism – become a central focus.34 But even within this 
broad theme, there are important difference between the middle and late period (and, indeed, 
within the middle period itself), some of which are central to my arguments regarding 
Schelling’s philosophy of history.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 For a recent example which stresses the continuity in Schelling’s development see G. Anthony Bruno, 
‘Freedom and Pluralism in Schelling’s Critique of Fichte’s Jena “Wissenschaftslehre”’, Idealistic Studies 43, no. 
1/2 (2013): 71–86. 
33
 Lara Ostaric, ed., Interpreting Schelling: Critical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
34
 The Freiheitsschrift is generally taken to mark the decisive break with Schelling’s earlier idealist position. For 
example, see Michelle Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 87. 
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PART I THE CRITICISM OF HEGEL’S IDEALISM: 
LOCATING THE LIMIT OF THE CONCEPT  
 
 
1 Schelling’s criticism of Hegel: illicit animation of the concept  
 
Three broad characterisations of the metaphysical status of Hegel’s philosophy can be 
distinguished: (i) transcendental philosophy, (ii) ontology, (iii) transcendent (or pre-critical) 
metaphysics.35 A first pass at defining these characterisations is provided by specifying the 
primary object of Hegel’s philosophy: (i’) conceptual conditions of cognition of objects, (ii’) 
the determinations which are simultaneously the determinations of being and thinking, (iii’) 
objectively existent supersensory objects (God, the soul, and the world as a whole). I argue 
that, although the ontological reading grasps part of Hegel’s philosophy, there is a certain 
aspect which is not captured in these three options; this aspect is found in Hegel’s attempt to 
rescue the ontological proofs of the existence of God (1.1). Despite initial impressions, this 
aspect does not belong to (iii). I argue that this is the case because of the unique way in which 
the Logic attempts to prove the existence of an activity (the self-determining activity of the 
concept), rather than a transcendent object. This type of metaphysics avoids the charge of 
being dogmatic or pre-critical because it does not presuppose an object – “out there,” as it 
were – to which we then claim that our concepts can reach out and grasp. This activity finds a 
closer approximation in the kind of existence which post-Kantian thought located in self-
consciousness or subjectivity: an existence that only is in its activity of self-making.36  
                                                          
35
 I discuss the various approaches to this issue primarily at 1.1.3 and 2.5. 
36
 Richard E. Aquila makes a similar point, but about Hegel’s metaphysics in general rather than the reinvention 
of the ontological proof of the existence of God. See ‘Predication and Hegel’s Metaphysics’, in Hegel, ed. 
Micheal Inwood, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1985, 67–84. 
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As a midpoint between the second and third options outlined above (between ontology 
and transcendent metaphysics) this interpretation can be called ‘critical metaphysics.’ This 
way of interpreting Hegel has the virtue of being able to make two of Hegel most pronounced 
commitments compatible with each other: to remain within the immanence of thought (i.e. 
not regress behind Kant’s ban on transcendent metaphysics) and attain knowledge of God. 
The history of the reception of Hegel has struggled with these, apparently conflicting, 
commitments. It has usually been assumed that if we take immanence seriously, then Hegel 
cannot be a (pre-critical) metaphysician; and if we take ‘God-talk’ seriously, then Hegel must 
have regressed behind Kant. I hope to show that this is a false opposition.  
I take this interpretation to accurately capture Hegel’s metaphysics. But I also think it is 
particularly suited to frame Schelling’s criticisms of Hegel. I do not say this because I think it 
perfectly coincides with Schelling’s interpretation of Hegel. Schelling’s interpretation does 
include the one I propose, but it also attributes something like transcendent metaphysics to 
Hegel. Where Schelling objects to Hegel’s transcendent metaphysics I defend Hegel. This is 
for the purpose of showing that Hegel is still guilty of a fundamental metaphysical flaw, even 
where we give him the benefit of the doubt and identify his position with critical metaphysics 
rather than transcendent metaphysics. The flaw I talk of here is the flaw of taking an analysis 
of the concept to yield knowledge of existence (the existence of an activity which Hegel 
equates to God). More specifically, it is the fallacious introduction of movement into the 
concept which I claim – via a reconstruction of one of Schelling’s criticisms – Hegel exploits 
in order to claim such knowledge (1.4). 
The importance of Schelling’s mature criticism of Hegel for the reception of Hegel and 
the subsequent development of European philosophy, from Marx and Kierkegaard to 
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Heidegger and Adorno, has been well established.37 But, if there is a growing consensus on 
the influence of Schelling’s criticisms of Hegel, there appears to be less confidence in the 
philosophical merits of these criticisms. Indeed, some recent commentators have been quick 
to dismiss them (at least as regards the criticisms found in the Munich lectures).38 This is 
understandable since Schelling is not the most judicious critic and the tone often betrays a 
defensiveness or even resentment. Where a more substantive engagement with Schelling’s 
criticisms are offered, he is often charged with failing to meet fundamental standards of 
critical appraisal; perhaps the most severe failings identified are the misrepresentation of 
Hegel and the use of question-begging arguments.39  I defend Schelling against both these 
charges. I argue that Schelling’s criticisms in the Munich lectures are more nuanced than 
usually recognised and that they offer insight into significant flaws in Hegel’s Logic (1.3). I 
also offer a qualified defence of Schelling’s understanding of the theological dimensions of 
Hegel’s work in line with my interpretation of Hegel’s metaphysics (1.2). Finally, I consider 
Stephen Houlgate’s attempt to explain the immanent logical movement of the concept in the 
Logic (1.5).  
 
                                                          
37
 On the inheritance of core themes from Schelling’s criticism of Hegel and Schelling’ mature thought more 
generally see Manfred Frank, “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel and the Beginnings of Marxian Dialectics,” 
Idealistic Studies 19, no. 3 (1989): 251–68; Jürgen Habermas, “Dialectical Idealism in Transition to 
Materialism: Schelling’s Idea of a Contraction of God and its Consequences for the Philosophy of History,” in 
The new Schelling, ed. Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman, trans. Nick Midgley and Judith Norman (New 
York: Continuum, 2004). Regarding Kierkegaard see Michelle Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, 
and Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Regarding Heidegger (and much of European 
philosophy more generally) see Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction 
(London: Routledge, 1993). A detailed account of Adorno’s debt to Schelling’s mature thought see Peter Dews, 
“Dialectics and the Transcendence of Dialectics: Adorno’s Relation to Schelling,” British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 22, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 1180–1207. 
38
 Markus Gabriel thinks we must turn away from the ‘superficial discussion’ found in the more explicit 
criticism of Hegel in the Munich lectures and instead reconstruct Schelling’s challenge to Hegel from the ‘richer 
material’ of the Spätphilosophie. Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism (London: 
Continuum, 2009), 20. Fred Rush takes a similar tack, announcing that Schelling’s criticism fails to be 
immanent (offering little support for this claim). “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel,” in Interpreting Schelling: 
Critical Essays, ed. Lara Ostaric (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 216–37, 225. 
39
 Stephen Houlgate makes both charges in “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel’s ‘Science of Logic,’” The Review of 
Metaphysics 53, no. 1 (1999): 99–128. Alan White also claims Schelling misrepresents Hegel by attributing to 
him a theological aim. Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 1983), see especially 74, 145-46. 
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1.1 The ontological proof of the existence of God in Schelling and Hegel 
 
In this section I present Schelling’s and Hegel’s different evaluations of the ontological proof 
of the existence of God (1.1.1 and 1.1.2). Both philosophers find serious metaphysical errors 
here, but both also believe there is something important to be salvaged. For Schelling this 
means grasping the fact that the ontological argument allows a much more modest conclusion 
that is usually thought. Whereas for Hegel the argument is to simply be cast aside as an 
argument; what is to be retained is the insight that the proofs register the fact that spirit has 
been elevated to God, even if the philosophical acumen needed to properly – i.e. rationally – 
grasp God is lacking. The crucial difference in evaluation, then, is that, for Schelling, the 
shortcomings of the ontological proof indicate the limit of science as such (i.e. the systematic 
study of the concept, which Schelling refers to as ‘negative philosophy’ or ‘reinrationale 
Philosophie’), whereas for Hegel, they only indicate the need for an improved science (a 
Science of Logic and the study of the concept in its externality, the Realphilosophie).  
I consider two of the key ways in which Hegel attempts to improve his science (1.1.3). I 
argue that the first is primarily aimed at restoring objectivity to science (1.1.3.1), and the 
second at acquiring scientific knowledge of God (1.1.3.2). What this amounts to is that, in the 
first case, concepts grasp the essence or ‘in itself’ of things, and, in the second case, reason 
becomes aware of the immanent movement in the concept which is the free activity of the 
absolute idea (or God). Ultimately I argue that the latter cannot yield a proof of God on its 
own, but that Hegel has still claimed more than Schelling would allow.  
 
1.1.1 Schelling: the overextension of negative philosophy 
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Schelling’s 1833-34 Munich lectures, On the History of Modern Philosophy,40 plot a path 
through some of the key figures of the modern period, from Descartes and later rationalists to 
Kant and the radical reception and transformation of Kant in German Idealism. In some 
respects this account is familiar. It is observed that Descartes sets the scene for modern 
philosophy through the new emphasis on subjective certainty. Perhaps just as often noted is 
the ambiguity of this achievement: on the one hand, a new freedom is found for philosophy, 
whilst, on the other hand, philosophy also becomes ensnared in the confines of 
consciousness.41 What is more striking in Schelling’s account is the claim that this is actually 
only one part of the story. The decisive point for the development of modern philosophy 
should be specifically located in the way that Descartes advances the ontological proof of the 
existence of God.42 At first this seems like a strange suggestion; surely the ontological proof 
is a parochial issue in comparison to the modern shift to subjective certainty. But Schelling 
highlights the fact that the ontological proof is advanced precisely to restore to philosophy 
what was lost in that retreat into thought or subjectivity. Descartes is said to be motivated by 
the need to ensure that our representations match up to how things really are, which is 
satisfied by a guarantor—God.43 The philosophical need for God in this context, then, is 
epistemological and ontological—rather than strictly theological or ethical. Schelling’s 
evaluation of Descartes’ ontological argument is subtle and sets up several distinctions 
important for the current study. 
Schelling first points out that Descartes argument can be taken in two different ways. The 
first – inadequate way – is found in Kant’s criticisms of it. The inadequate understanding of 
the proof is reconstructed by Schelling as follows: ‘I find in me the idea of the perfect being, 
but existence is itself a perfection, therefore existence is also of its own accord included in 
                                                          
40
 Hereafter referred to in the text as the Munich lectures. 
41
 HMP 45 
42
 HMP 49 
43
 HMP 48 
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the idea of the perfect being.’ 44  The minor premise is denied, since the attribution of 
existence does not make an idea any better or worse, it only says that it is. Schelling does not 
deny that this criticism is effective against this way of understanding the argument. But he 
claims that Descartes’ argument is actually different from this one. The minor premise does 
not specify that existence belongs to a perfect being, but that necessary existence does. But 
even when we do Descartes the justice of fixing the minor premise, we find that the reasoning 
goes awry. From the premises ‘God is the perfect being’ and ‘necessary existence belongs to 
the perfect being’ Descartes concludes that God necessarily exists. Schelling claims that 
Descartes can only reach this conclusion by misunderstanding what it means to say that 
necessary existence belongs to the perfect being. It should not be interpreted, as Descartes 
appears to do, to mean that the perfect being must exist; rather, it should be interpreted to 
mean that, if the perfect being exists, then it can only exist in the mode of necessary 
existence. In short, we are only justified in asserting the modality of a perfect being (what 
Schelling refers to as ‘manner of existence’) and not its quality (that it does actually exist).45 
Schelling claims that Descartes actually proceeds as he should on some occasions, but we are 
not told why there should be this inconsistency. In place of such an explanation there is a 
suggestion as to what might lead us to the proper understanding. The reason we would 
consider necessary existence a modality of the perfect being is because we find it absurd to 
attribute to God the opposite modality, contingency (presumably it is not absurd to say that 
God does not exist): it would ‘contradict the nature of the perfect being to exist just 
contingently’ which would be ‘precarious and for this reason doubtful in itself’.’46 It seems 
that what Schelling means here is that, following the conception of God as causa sui, God 
could not exist as a conditioned existence (i.e. contingently), but only as an unconditioned 
one.  
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So, the ontological argument does succeed in one sense: it tells us something about the 
nature or being of God.47 But it fails when it is said to yield knowledge of the existence of 
God. In Schelling’s terms, it tells us ‘what’ (Was) God is, but not ‘that’ (Daß) God is. For 
Schelling, philosophy which moves in the realm of the ‘what’ – essence (Wesen) or potency – 
is negative, and philosophy which moves in the realm of the ‘that’ – existence (Existenz) or 
actus – is positive.48 Both parts of philosophy are essential for Schelling. The problem he 
diagnoses in Descartes and subsequent philosophy is the pretension that negative philosophy 
sometimes displays in its attempt to secure the positive exclusively by its own means.49 In the 
case of Descartes’ ontological proof of the existence of God, this transition was provided by a 
syllogism. But this is not the only way that negative philosophy can overstretch itself and 
claim to grasp the positive or the that. Hegel’s science of reason provides a much more subtle 
and sophisticated understanding of God and, with this, a more sophisticated slip into the 
positive. In short, whereas the traditional ontological proof tries to infer existence from the 
concept, Hegel bestows a unique kind of existence upon the concept. The latter is achieved 
by claiming an inner activity or life for the concept. By showing that this is where Hegel 
makes the negative yield a positive, we reveal the significance of Schelling’s targeting of the 
apparent immanent movement of the concept in the Logic. 
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 ‘God as such is, of course, not just the necessarily or blindly existing being (Wesen), He admittedly is it, but 
as God He is at the same time that which can negate (aufheben) this His own being which is dependent upon 
Him, can transform His necessary being into contingent being, namely into a being posited by itself […]’ (HMP 
55). This will be important for the discussion of Schelling’s positive philosophy later (see 4.1.3). 
48
 These distinction are more clearly brought out in the Berlin lectures of 1841/42, especially the lectures ‘Kant, 
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1.1.2 Hegel: the defective demonstrations of the understanding 
 
Like Schelling, Hegel takes the uncommon view that the most significant contribution of 
Descartes to philosophy is his claim that the concept of God contains its own existence; this 
is, according to Hegel, ‘Descartes’ sublimest thought.’50 Despite Hegel’s more unreserved 
praise he nevertheless expresses ambivalence about the ontological proof. Hegel criticises the 
proofs of the existence of God (in its different forms, including the ontological) for their 
abstract or formal method, but claims that they register a genuine elevation to God, an 
‘inward journey of the spirit.’51  What is more, he also aims to ‘restore the fundamental 
thoughts of these proofs to their worth and dignity.’52 The problem with the proofs was not 
that they occupied themselves with the supersensible, but that they were methodologically 
inadequate and, as a result, falsify their object of study. These points can be seen clearly in 
Hegel’s criticisms of the ‘metaphysics of the understanding’ in the preliminaries to the 
Encyclopaedia Logic.53 
In these preliminaries Hegel presents three different orientations in philosophy, primarily 
in terms of the scope and role they give to thought—he calls them different ‘positions of 
thought with respect to objectivity.’ This is done to pave the way for the orientation found in 
his philosophy. The first position is simply titled ‘metaphysics’, but is qualified in many 
different ways; for clarity I borrow one of these qualifications and refer to this position as 
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‘naïve metaphysics.’54 Naïve metaphysics is indexed to a historical period and school of 
thought—namely, modern rationalism, especially as associated with Christian Wolff 
(Spinoza, and likely Leibniz, is given the honour of being exempted from the metaphysics 
criticised here).55 Importantly, Hegel also notes that this is not restricted to a school or period, 
but is an ever present possibility. This is because the operation behind this type of 
metaphysics is based in the misuse of the understanding. Hegel credits Kant with the clear 
separation of the understanding from reason, where the former has ‘the finite and conditioned 
as the subject matter’ and the latter has ‘the infinite and unconditioned.’56 The misuse comes 
when the understanding tries to get to the infinite while sticking to its own finite mode of 
comprehension; or, as Hegel puts it, the misuse is found in ‘the way in which the mere 
understanding views the objects of reason.’ 57  Although we have just said that the 
understanding and reason have different ‘objects’ or ‘subject matters’, they still move in the 
same medium, namely, the determinations of thought. But they do so in different ways.58 The 
understanding takes them up as they are found in consciousness and fixes them, whereas 
reason critically interrogates them and allows their limitations (their ‘one-sidedness’ or 
finitude) to be confronted, calling for more adequate determinations to take their place.  
The uncritical or dogmatic attitude towards thought-determinations – or categories, in the 
more familiar Kantian language – not only means that the content of these determinations 
goes unquestioned. Also unquestioned is the very predicative procedure which assumes that 
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we could know about the Absolute by ‘attaching’ concepts to it.59 Hegel argues that, if we 
keep thought-determinations in their separateness or isolation from one another in the way 
that the understanding does, we will forever be stuck in the finite, struggling vainly to reach 
the infinite from this limited point.  
This clearly has implications for a philosophical comprehension of God. When the 
understanding strives to prove the existence of God it not only fails to reach the infinite, but 
also has the further consequence of depriving God of infinitude.60   
 
Thus, the older metaphysics was concerned with the cognition of whether predicates of 
the kind here mentioned could be attached to its ob-jects. However, these predicates are 
restricted determinations of the understanding which express only a restriction, and not 
what is true.—We must notice particularly, at this point, that the metaphysical method 
was to “attach” predicates to the ob-ject of cognition, e.g., to God. This then is an 
external reflection about the ob-ject, since the determinations (the predicates) are found 
ready-made in my representation, and are attached to the ob-ject in a merely external 
way. Genuine cognition of an ob-ject, on the other hand, has to be such that the ob-ject 
determines itself from within itself, and does not acquire its predicates in this external 
way. If we proceed by way of predication, the spirit gets the feeling that the predicates 
cannot exhaust what they are attached to.61 
 
Hegel’s intention, then, is not to reject the project of proving the existence of God, but merely 
shed an inadequate approach to speculative philosophy. He tries to correct the approach to 
God offered by the proofs of the understanding by advancing a model of ‘genuine cognition’ 
in opposition to ‘external reflection’. This model of cognition is precisely what is presented 
in the Logic— it is the exposition of the self-determining concept. Moreover, Hegel explicitly 
claims that the Logic is the exposition of God.62 But at this point it might be wondered: once 
God has been made coextensive with the self-determining concept (and thus no longer 
“outside” us), in what sense are we talking about God in any recognisable sense? A closely 
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related question is: since the determinations of the concept in the Logic do not establish the 
existence of particular things (i.e. entities or objects), in what way could the Logic prove the 
existence of anything, let alone God? The answer to both these questions hinges on how we 
understand the significance of ‘self-determination’ in Hegel’s system. Not only does this 
inform our answer to these questions, but also informs how we understand the metaphysical 
character of Hegel’s philosophy more generally. 
 
1.1.3. Metaphysical status of self-determination in the Logic  
 
Three ways in which self-determination is significant for Hegel’s philosophy can be 
specified. First, Hegel believes it secures the critical status of his enterprise because it allows 
him to produce a metaphysical deduction of the categories without any presuppositions. This 
point is attractive to readers of Hegel who want to stress Hegel’s Kantian heritage and save 
Hegel from metaphysical excess. 63  Restricted to this methodological significance, self-
determination becomes a harmless refinement of transcendental philosophy. Second, Hegel 
further claims that the self-determination of thought in his science of reason means that 
thought is no longer contaminated by subjective interference and is thus now ‘objective.’ This 
point is attractive to readers of Hegel that want to stress that the categories are no longer 
limited to conditions of intelligibility, but actually tell us the way things really are in 
themselves.64 Third, self-determination is understood as a self-propelling power or activity in 
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its own right. I argue that this activity is supposed to have an independent existence, and that 
the Logic attempts to prove this existence. This is Hegel’s modification of the ontological 
proof. I now elaborate on the second and third ways to understand the significance of self-
determination.  
 
1.1.3.1 Self-determination qua objectivity of the categories   
 
Use of the term objectivity is very precarious, especially in this context. Fortunately, there is 
a helpful clarification of this in the second addition to §41 of the Encyclopaedia Logic.65 An 
account of three different ways objectivity can be understood is presented. First there is the 
common sense use of the term – as we find it in ‘ordinary language’ – which refers to what is 
‘externally present’ and ‘come[s] to us from outside through perception.’ The second is 
attributed to Kant’s reversal of the common sense understanding of objectivity. To be 
objective here is to be universal and necessary as opposed to what is contingent and 
dependent upon individual circumstances of perception. In this way it is actually our thoughts 
that are objective and the sensibly perceptible is subjective. This reversal or inversion is 
defended by Hegel against the charge of ‘linguistic confusion’ and indeed praised for 
drawing our attention to the fact that what was supposed to be registered in the term 
objectivity is that something ‘subsists on its own account,’ is independent or self-standing. If 
this is accepted, then it certainly is the case that the transitory nature of externality is not 
objective, and universal thoughts are. But, according to Hegel, this too falls short of what 
should be understood as objectivity. For Kant restricts these objective thoughts by claiming 
that they are ‘only our thoughts, and are cut off from what the thing is in-itself by an 
impassable gulf.’ One of Hegel’s strategies for dealing with this limitation of thought is well 
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known. This consists in showing that any attempt to draw such a restriction undermines itself 
(this is largely what the Phenomenology of Spirit aims to show); more specifically, that limit-
concepts necessarily overstep their limits. This gets us the primarily negative result that our 
thoughts cannot in principle be barred from knowledge of things in themselves.66 With this 
result Hegel can then give a more substantive account of what constitutes objective thought, 
namely, self-determination (which the Logic aims to show).  
The basic claim Hegel makes is that though-determinations remain merely ‘our thoughts’ 
when the investigation of thought itself fails to get rid of all presuppositions. According to 
Hegel, Kant’s criticism of the ‘forms of the understanding’ was not thorough enough.67 Kant 
showed that naïve metaphysics did not investigate whether categories could yield knowledge 
of things-in-themselves, but ‘this criticism did not consider these forms on their own merits 
and according to their own peculiar content, but simply took them as accepted starting points 
from subjective logic: so that there was no question of an immanent deduction of them as 
forms of subjective logic, still less of a dialectical consideration of them.’68 The reason why 
thought-determinations lack objectivity (in Hegel’s sense) is not that there is an unbridgeable 
gulf between thought and being, but because they only have a subjective status when their 
introduction into philosophical science depends upon the unjustified choices made by an 
individual philosopher (in this case, famously, Kant gets the categories from the logical 
functions of judgment – the so-called ‘metaphysical deduction’ – which does not satisfy 
Hegel’s standard of an immanent, or presuppositionless, deduction from pure thought). Pure 
thought, without any interference from us or other factors, needs to give itself its own 
content. 
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This point is made more explicit when Hegel is considering the problem of how to begin 
science in an introductory essay to the Logic. If we are to avoid the influence of arbitrary 
factors when determining the content of science (the thought-determinations) – and therefore 
becoming subjective – then the starting point for that science takes on an extreme importance. 
Those that begin by presupposing a ‘concrete object’ (i.e. something that already contains 
determinations) and then proceed to analyse its content must guide the exposition in a way 
that is external to the science itself and thus rob categories of truth.  
 
…with a concrete object, the analysis and the ways in which it is determined are affected 
by contingency and arbitrariness. Which determinations are brought out depends on what 
each person just finds in his own immediate, contingent idea. The relation contained in 
something concrete, in a synthetic unity, is necessary only in so far as it is not just given 
but is produced by the spontaneous return of the moments back into this unity—a 
movement which is the opposite of the analytic procedure, which is an activity belonging 
to the subject-thinker and external to the subject matter itself.69 
 
It is only by this spontaneous movement that the content of thought is guaranteed to not be 
contingent upon a specific thinker. Spontaneous movement or self-determination is supposed 
to be an objective process, independent of any foreign influence, thus providing knowledge 
which is not merely limited to us, but attains to the in-itself. Thus presuppositionlessness is 
here not accorded only methodological significance, but also ontological significance. 
More needs to be said, however, about what it means to say that we have knowledge of the 
in-itself of things. We already know the in-itself cannot be considered something outside of 
our thought: naïve metaphysics was criticised for illegitimately pursuing knowledge of 
transcendent entities. The strict immanence Hegel accords philosophical science also means 
that these categories cannot be said to be confirming the existence of externally present 
sensuous entities any more than they could be confirming the existence of intelligible ones. 
To this extent the ontological and Kantian or transcendental readings of Hegel agree. But, as 
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we have seen, Hegel does not think the categories are only ‘ours’; they really grasp the truth 
in-itself. What it means to say that the determinations demonstrated in the Logic are the 
determinations of things also, is that the categories grasps the structure of the world, provides 
knowledge of the being of things. Here, Hegel is sticking within the limits of negative 
philosophy, as Schelling conceives it: the categories of the Logic are intended to say what 
things are, not that they are. In this way contemporary commentators like Frederick Beiser 
and James Kreines are correct to reject the terms of the debate about the metaphysical status 
of Hegel’s philosophy.70 As Beiser puts it, we are presented with a ‘false dilemma: either 
Hegel is a dogmatic metaphysician or not really a metaphysician at all. The crucial 
assumption behind the dilemma is a very narrow notion of metaphysics as speculation about 
transcendent entities.’71 The metaphysical knowledge produced by the Logic is not of the 
naïve or pre-critical variety, but is metaphysical nonetheless.  
 
1.1.3.2 Self-determination qua activity of God 
 
But if Hegel’s Logic is best understood ontologically, how does Hegel’s claim to rehabilitate 
the proofs of God’s existence fit in?  It seems that the most the exposition of the concept can 
establish is what God is, not that God is. Perhaps this is all Hegel had in mind. After all, there 
are many formulations which indicate that the knowledge of God found in a science of reason 
is knowledge of the ‘content’ or the nature of God, not God’s existence as such. For instance, 
in the Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel claims that the logical determinations can be understood as 
‘definitions of the Absolute, as the metaphysical definitions of God’.72  
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There is a problem with this, however. It overlooks the central way in which Hegel 
claimed to have overcome the deficiencies in the formal approach to the proofs of God’s 
existence. The deficiency lay in the fact that the predicates (or determinations) of God were 
applied by external reflection to an assumed substratum (the subject in the propositional 
approach). The problem is not simply that the determinations are uncritically taken up, but, 
more importantly, that the determinations do not result from the concept’s own immanent 
movement. To adequately describe God, these determinations must be God’s own work—
they must be self-given.  
 
God, as the living God, and still more as absolute spirit, is known only in his activity; 
man was early instructed to recognize God in his works; only from these can proceed the 
determinations, which are called his properties, and in which, too, his being is contained. 
Thus the philosophical cognition of his activity, that is, of himself, grasps the Notion of 
God in his being and his being in his Notion.73 
 
What has been gained by saying that God is both the set of determinations and the activity 
which accumulates these determinations? Could we not say that this has merely added a 
further definition? In which case Hegel would still be left with knowledge of what God is, but 
not that God is.  
At this point the distinction between what and that, being and existence, is put under 
strain. If the nature of God is self-determining activity, and the philosopher observes this 
independent activity when doing logic, then this activity does indeed exist, albeit only as a 
purely intelligible existence. In other words, whilst unfolding what God is through the 
exposition of a series of determinations, we have shown that God is in the fact that we could 
only have produced a scientific derivation if there were an independent activity attributed to 
the concept itself, as distinct from an activity which merely belonged to us, to our external or 
subjective reflection. I take it that Quentin Lauer has something like this in mind when he 
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claims that Hegel’s proof of God is unlike the ontological proof insofar as the latter tries to 
prove the existence of God by establishing a transition from reason to God, whereas Hegel 
simply shows that reason is the proof. As Lauer puts it, ‘the being of thought is the self-
manifestation of God’.74  
I think this suggestion is very illuminating. On the one hand, it makes sense of Hegel’s 
general, and repeated, claims to be offering a genuine knowledge of God, and his more 
specific claim to have restored the proofs to ‘their worth and dignity.’ On the other hand, it 
resists making God a transcendent entity and therefore sticks to the thorough immanence 
demanded by Hegel’s project. But even if it is conceded that Hegel really manages to prove 
that there is an objective activity or process which the philosopher witnesses while doing 
logic, can this activity really be called God? One reason to raise this question is that this 
activity does not resemble what is usually understood by God.75 But we do not need to appeal 
to an external standpoint to find this question compelling. This is because some of Hegel’s 
most entrenched philosophical commitments speak against God’s existence being constrained 
to the realm of pure thought. Perhaps most familiar is Hegel’s professed Aristotelian 
emphasis on the immanence of the form or universal in things. 76  
Does this mean that Hegel cannot have proven the existence of God without proving 
God’s existence in the world? It might be tempting to make a distinction between the 
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methodological status of a proof God and the substantive status of the existence of God. This 
would mean that a proof of God in pure thought would not preclude the possibility that God 
cannot exist apart from the world. But Hegel cannot make such a distinction precisely 
because, as we have seen, the proof is God—the existence of God cannot be detached from 
the way reason “proves” God (this is in line with Hegel’s characteristic commitment to the 
inseparability of truth from the process of arriving at truth). If Hegel is committed to the 
inseparability of substantive and methodological issues (and he surely is), then any proof of a 
God that is immanent to the world must proceed through the world. Indeed, Hegel suggests 
this is the case.  
 
The basic content of reason is the divine Idea, and its essence is the plan of God. In the 
context of world history, the Idea is not equivalent to reason as encountered in the 
subjective will, but to the activity of God alone. We conceive of reason as a means of 
perceiving the Idea, and even its etymology suggests that it is a means of perceiving of 
something expressed, in other words, of the Logos – the true. The true acquires its truth 
in the created world. God expresses himself, and himself alone; he is that power whose 
nature is self-expression and whose expression can be perceived by reason.77 
 
In the realm of history then, just as with the realm of pure thought, it is reason (as opposed to 
the understanding) that is equipped to perceive ‘something expressed’ or the true. But this 
leaves us with a puzzle: how does the study of the true in Logic and the study of the true in 
Realphilosophie relate to each other? If God is only genuinely proven in the latter, why did 
we bother with the former? The question of the systematic status of Hegel’s philosophy and 
the relation of the various branches within it is a large issue, which cannot be addressed here. 
But, on the face of it, there are three possible ways to construe the relation between the 
different parts of Hegel’s system, at least insofar as this relates to the different ways of 
knowing God: (1) the Logic and the Realphilosophie present equally valid alternatives (i.e. it 
is up to the philosopher which route is taken to knowledge of God’s existence); (2) only one 
approach, either the Logic or the Realphilosophie, is the proper – or at least the more 
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adequate – location of the proof of God; or (3) the Logic and the Realphilosophie form a 
continuous proof. If we go for (1) we cannot make sense out of Hegel’s (admittedly 
enigmatic) formulations like the one above, namely, ‘the true acquires its truth in the created 
world.’ This indicates that we could not grasp the full truth of God without the 
Realphilosophie. If the Realphilosophie takes this role, and we take into account Hegel’s 
insistence that the Logic is a rescue of the ontological proof, then (2) seems unlikely. Thus (3) 
looks to be the best bet. This is especially the case since this is the only option that would 
make sense of the talk of ‘the true’ (which is the proper object of the Logic), which then 
undergoes further development in the world (the object of Realphilosophie).  
So, how can the Logic and the Realphilosophie form a continuous proof? One way Hegel 
addresses this is by arguing for a kind of passage from one realm to the other; where God’s 
activity in pure thought ends, God’s activity in the world begins.  
 
[…] logic as the formal science cannot and should not contain that reality which is the 
content of the further parts of philosophy, namely, the philosophical sciences of nature 
and of spirit. These concrete sciences do, of course, present themselves in a more real 
form of the Idea than logic does; but this is not by turning back again to the reality 
abandoned by the consciousness which has risen above its mode as Appearance to the 
level of science, nor by reverting to the use of forms such as the categories and concepts 
of reflection, whose finitude and untruth have been demonstrated in the logic. On the 
contrary, logic exhibits the elevation of the Idea to that level from which it becomes the 
creator of nature and passes over to the form of a concrete immediacy whose Notion, 
however, breaks up this shape again in order to realize itself as concrete spirit.78 
 
Although the confirmation of the continuation of the self-determining process lies outside the 
scope of logic, Hegel assures us that the content of nature and spirit is only the concept 
developed in new ways. The real world of nature and spirit, then, are not to be considered as 
outside God, but as the further differentiation of God.  
The problem, however, is how this creation is supposed to have happened. The self-
determining activity in the Logic is driven by the immanent progression to higher forms of 
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the concept, but once the concept achieves completeness in the absolute idea, it appears that 
there is no need to progress any further. This problem is one of the prime targets of 
Schelling’s criticisms of Hegel.79 If the difficulties of explaining an immanent transition from 
the Logic to the Realphilosophie prove insurmountable, then the realisation of God in the 
world is equally threatened. In Schelling’s terms, Hegel’s attempt to get positive content into 
his logical philosophy receives a blow if he cannot show that the movement of the concept 
necessarily brings about the transition to nature. But, as argued above, Hegel already 
manages to get positivity into the negative science through the claim to have established the 
self-determining activity of the concept. It has been seen that this is not sufficient to prove the 
existence of God, insofar as God’s existence is tied to self-expression in the world also. But, I 
will argue, granting the existence of activity in pure thought already gives Hegel enough to be 
confident of God’s existence, if not prove this existence.  
 
1.2 Theological status of self-determination 
 
At times it looks as though Schelling only finds fault with Hegel’s philosophy to the extent 
that it has pretension to establish the existence of the concrete world (of nature and spirit) 
from within logical thought. As noted, Schelling targets Hegel’s attempts to show a transition 
from the logical idea to nature (to show that the idea is the ‘creator of nature’ and ‘freely 
releases’80 itself into nature). If Hegel intends to explain the existence of the concrete or 
external world through the logical understanding of the idea, then this is a prime example of 
the pretension to get a positive content (the existence of a created world) from a merely 
negative investigation (logical analysis of thought-determinations). Schelling argues that, if 
Hegel’s Logic were to be honest and remain only as negative, then the transition to nature 
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should be only hypothetical.81 I now offer an argument on Hegel’s behalf which would retain 
certain core theological convictions (namely, that the idea or God – as the freely self-
determining concept – is the substance of history) without needing to attribute to him an a 
priori proof of the creation of the world. 
 
1.2.1 Self-determination qua guarantee of God’s realisation in history  
 
One of the key strategies used to defend Hegel against Schelling’s attack has been to claim 
that Hegel is far more of a negative philosopher that Schelling supposes. Alan White, for 
instance, has argued that we should not interpret the Logic as providing a ‘creation 
doctrine.’82 Supposing we ignore those statements where Hegel indicates a transition from the 
idea to nature, how much has Hegel’s metaphysical or theological ambitions been thwarted? 
Not that much. He could no longer claim to have secured the rational comprehension of 
central parts of Christian doctrine, primarily the Trinity. As the above quote from the Logic 
indicates, the idea (God, the Father) is supposed to be the ‘creator of nature’, thus revealing 
divinity (the Son), only to return as spirit.83 In more secular language, if the transition to 
nature was only hypothetical, Hegel could not establish that the emergence of a universe and 
human life and freedom is necessary.  
Even conceding these losses, Hegel’s Logic still lays claim to a great deal. The activity of 
the concept may not yet be God in a fully revealed sense, but it is still supposed to be an 
independent process with an existence of its own. If Hegel manages to keep this claim, then 
he does not need to also provide an account of the transition to nature in order to be confident 
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that nature and spirit will follow the rational path set out in the Logic (that God will be 
revealed in the world). For this to be the case, we only need to assume two things: (1) that a 
determinate world exists, and (2) that the determinations of this world are knowable in reason 
(i.e. the being of determinations, not their existence). If these are accepted and we grant that 
the Logic proves the existence of an activity native to the concept, then we also commit 
ourselves to the view that the concept will develop in the temporal realm of the real world 
just as it developed in the atemporal realm of logic. Thus Hegel would have warrant to his 
claim – albeit in a more circuitous route than he intended – that the self-determining activity 
of the concept is the ‘life-pulse’ or animating spirit of things.84  
Indeed, some of Hegel’s most robust claims regarding progress still stand on this limited 
foundation. For instance, when contrasting a merely subjective approach of interpreting 
history (i.e. from the perspective of the understanding or external reflection) to the properly 
rational approach (i.e. from the perspective of reason), Hegel claims that philosophy has the 
assurance that ‘a divine will rules supreme’ and that ‘reason governs history…that the events 
will match the concept.’85 Hegel can still have this claim, then, even when we concede two 
major points to his defenders: first, that the Logic does not establish the creation of the world; 
second, that the Logic does not claim to have knowledge of a transcendent or supersensible 
entity (cf. 1.1.2.). Without attributing a ‘metaphysical theology’ to Hegel, we can see that his 
thought retains a theological dimension which requires adequate justification.86 History is 
guaranteed to follow a self-determining or free course via the immanent dynamism of the 
concept. Grounding our hope that the world is meaningful and free is not as fantastical as 
grounding more specific Christian doctrines (a personal God, divine creation, etc.), but it is 
                                                          
84
 SL 37; cf. SL 43, EL §24a2 
85
 LPHI 30 
86
 White, Absolute Knowledge, 74. White argues that his transcendental ontological reading of Hegel means that 
the Logic is not a special or theological metaphysics in that it does not posit the absolute as a real ground (80). 
As I have argued, the activity of the concept is certainly not an entity (1.1.3.2.), and need not be considered a 
real ground in order to secure something more than a mere account of the structure of being. 
39 
 
only a wilful myopia that would want to deny the theological dimension of these less 
fantastical claims. 
Of course, not everyone will accept both assumptions. Presumably the first assumption – 
that there is a world – does not cause any problems (excepting an extreme scepticism or 
solipsism). The second, however, would not be accepted by everyone. Those that follow 
Hegel qua ontologist (see 1.1.3.1) would accept that, if there is a world, then it will be 
immanently conceptual; that the determinations of the world and the determinations of 
thought form one and the same content. Of course, even if the interpretive part of this claim is 
accepted (i.e. that Hegel claims the being, or in-itself, of things is conceptual), the substantive 
part may not. But what is important here is that Schelling accepts the substantive part. I now 
argue that this is the case. 
 
1.2.2 Schelling’s criticism: personification of the idea 
 
Schelling’s own negative philosophy is also supposed to be an ontology—to tell us about the 
being of things. He has no problem with the claim that things are conceptual; so long as we 
realise the extent to which they are also nonconceptual.87 Schelling is perhaps most explicit 
on his stance in the 1841/42 Berlin lectures.88 There he responds to those that believe his 
distinction between negative and positive philosophy – between what is and that something is 
– entails the view that reason does not deal with being.89 Schelling claims that it would ‘be a 
pathetic reason, which had nothing to do with being, thus only concerning itself with a 
chimera.’ But this distinction was not meant to have this result.  
 
Reason is, properly speaking, concerned with nothing other than just being and with 
being according to its matter and content (exactly this is being in its in itself). 
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Nevertheless, reason does not have to show that it is since this is no longer a matter of 
reason, but rather of experience. Admittedly, if I have grasped the essence, the whatness 
of something, for example, of a plant, then I have grasped something that is real […] it is 
true that what is real does not stand in opposition to our thinking as something foreign, 
inaccessible, and unreachable, but that the concept and the being are one: that the being 
does not have the concept outside itself, but rather has it within itself.90  
 
This highlights the fact that Schelling still thinks reason can tell us what things really are, 
even if it cannot tell us that they are. And Schelling certainly can accept that there is a 
world—even if this can only be known through experience, rather than through reason 
alone.91 Thus, if he wants to reject Hegel’s claims about the necessary realisation of God, he 
needs to refute the proof of the existence of a life or activity in the concept. Although it is not 
as ostensible as his objection to the transition to nature, he does just that.  
Schelling praises Hegel for fully bringing out the purely logical nature of the science of 
reason, but says that it is nevertheless more ‘monstrous’ that preceding philosophy for the 
fact that it then tried to give these logical relations the appearance of an ‘objective and real 
process.’92 Part of what Schelling means here is that Hegel tried to show that the concept is 
responsible for all creation. But Schelling also objects to the way that the idea, before 
creation (or, rather, considered independently of creation), is illegitimately given the 
appearance of existence through the way that the Logic surreptitiously presents the concept as 
developing via an objective process. In the Berlin lectures Schelling contrasts Hegel and Kant 
on the ways that they attempted to get to the idea of God.93 Whereas for Kant this was 
assumed (or postulated), Hegel claimed to have attained it objectively through the logical 
movement of the concept. According to Schelling, this effort gave rise to ‘wrongful and 
improper expressions of a self-movement of the idea, words through which the idea was 
personified and ascribed an existence that it did not and could not have.’ (mißbräuchlichen 
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und uneigentlichen Ausdrücke von einer Selbstbewegung der Idee, jene Worte, wodurch die 
Idee personificirt, und ihr eine Existenz zugeschrieben wurde, die sie nicht hatte und nicht 
haben konnte.)94 This clearly indicates that the idea does not need to be the creator of the 
finite world in order to have been attributed an existence; to be ascribed a self-movement 
already does this.95  
That Schelling thinks an immanent movement or life to the concept, were it to be so, 
would provide a positive content (i.e. knowledge that God is, not just what it is) is also 
revealed through the critical application of his understanding of the nature of cognition or 
knowledge (Erkenntniß). Despite much of the terminological variance in Schelling’s 
philosophy, the specific significance and role of Erkenntniß and erkennen remains 
remarkably consistent in the Spätphilosophie. In the Munich lectures Schelling states that 
cognition (Erkennen) is only found in positive philosophy; in negative philosophy it is ‘just a 
question of thinking and of the concept’ (bloß von Denken und bloß vom Begriff).96 We find a 
similar contrast in the Berlin lectures.  
 
…in everything that is real there are two things to be known: it is two entirely different 
things to know that a being is, quid sit, and that it is, quod sit. The former—that answer 
to the question what it is—accords me insight into the essence of the thing [Einsicht in 
das Wesen des Dings], or it provides that I understand the thing, that I have an 
understanding or a concept of it, or have it itself within the concept. The other insight 
however, that it is, does not accord me just the concept, but rather something that goes 
beyond just the concept, which is existence. This is a cognition [ein Erkennen]97 
 
In thinking about a concept I grasp the essence (or ‘what’) of a thing, but I do not cognise 
anything.98 Cognition requires something that exists. This contrast is drawn in the very same 
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lecture in which Schelling compares Kant and Hegel on the idea as God. And there Schelling 
says that Hegel, ‘by virtue of an objective method,’ ‘provided it [the idea] with the semblance 
of cognition (Schein eines Erkennens).’ Since we can find in both this lecture and the Munich 
lectures the consistent claim that cognition has existence or the positive as its object, it can be 
seen that Schelling holds Hegel’s false attribution of self-movement to the idea to be the false 
attribution of existence, since this is what allows Hegel a cognition rather than a mere 
thought.  
So, we have found independent arguments in Schelling’s lectures to support the claim that 
the Logic intends to be cognising something existing—it intends to show that there is an 
activity native to the concept (i.e. not reducible to an individual’s activity). This shows that 
Hegel is still open to Schelling’s criticism even if he drops the claim that the idea creates 
nature. In the next section I argue that the Logic can be shown – under pressure of Schelling’s 
interrogation – to fail to prove that there is an activity or immanent movement in the concept.  
 
1.3 Schelling’s attempt to expose the surreptitious movement of the concept 
 
Schelling pursues two lines of criticism in the Munich lectures in order to contest the 
apparent self-generating or immanent movement of the concept: (1) he argues that the 
concept is immobile and thus does not generate its own movement; and (2) advances two 
accounts of how movement gets into the Logic: through (2a) the existential subject, and (2b) 
Hegel’s surreptitious analysis. Stephen Houlgate argues that both strands make use of 
unjustified premises drawn from Schelling’s mature views regarding the nature and 
relationship between negative philosophy and positive philosophy. I concede that the 
argument Schelling advances for (1) makes use of unjustified premises, but argue that 
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Houlgate runs together two different strands in (2), only one of which makes use of an 
argument with unjustified premises, namely (2a). Although the strand I defend (2b) avoids 
the question-begging change, I acknowledge it could still be found wanting in other respects. 
The point, however, is to dispute Houlgate’s suggestion that, ultimately, what Schelling’s 
critical reading of Hegel is little more than an expression of conflicting views and thus fails to 
enter into a genuine dialogue. A proper understanding of the non-question-begging argument 
for (2) is instructive because it demonstrates an immanent or internal approach to the 
criticism of Hegel’s Logic and thus gives us reason to take seriously Schelling’s engagement 
with Hegel.  
 
1.3.1 Immobility of the concept 
 
Houlgate frames his discussion of Schelling’s criticism of Hegel by calling attention to its 
situation within Schelling’s philosophical development. Schelling’s criticisms of Hegel, 
found in the Munich lectures, belong to Schelling’s Spätphilosophie (from the late 1820s 
onwards). Houlgate reminds us that Schelling’s philosophy of this period revolves around the 
elaboration of the distinction between negative and positive philosophy. Houlgate dedicates 
roughly a third of his article to spelling out this distinction and what this tells us about 
Schelling’s philosophical commitments in this period.99 At the centre of Houlgate’s article is 
his direct exposition and evaluation of Schelling’s criticisms in the Munich lectures. 100 
Before looking at Schelling’s criticisms (and Houlgate’s treatment thereof), a brief account of 
what is actually supposed to be happening at the open of the Logic is needed.   
One of the primary tasks of the Logic is to provide a critical account of the forms of 
thought. This means showing how they arise in a necessary way within thought, as opposed 
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to them being given in advance or taken up in an arbitrary way (say, as we find them 
embedded in language or consciousness). As we know, this is to be achieved by letting the 
concept generate the determinations itself. But if all forms must be given to thought by its 
own activity, there can be no features of thought with which we could explain the force or 
efficacy of this activity in the first place.101 The challenge Hegel faces, then, is to begin with 
the completely indeterminate being of thought – or, as he also calls it, pure being – and show 
that something springs forth from out of this indeterminacy or emptiness; moreover, is 
compelled to do so precisely in virtue of this indeterminacy itself.  
The following presents how Hegel needs the transitions to work if the above restrictions 
and critical demands are to hold. The first move is to show that, since the being which we 
begin with is completely indeterminate, it has no resources within itself to be able to maintain 
its own identity as being; it therefore loses its character as being and becomes nothing. The 
next move is to show that, since this most abstract nothing is not to be considered the absence 
of any particular thing but rather is nothingness as such, it ‘is (exists) [existiert]’ 
immediately; so, it is the same kind of indeterminacy which pure being is—i.e. an 
indeterminacy which is. Finally, it is because being and nothing do not stay what they are – 
but vanish into one another – that Hegel claims they have no self-subsistence upon which we 
could ground what each term actually is. Rather, the truth of each is found in their perpetual 
vanishing into one another—what Hegel calls becoming. Becoming is the first appearance of 
a determinate concept in the Logic102  since there are distinguishable moments within it, 
whereas being and nothing had only indeterminacy. It is in this way that the occurrence of a 
determinate thought (becoming) is necessitated by the nature of the abstract thought of the 
indeterminacies of being and nothing. So, Hegel gets a movement, a becoming, into the 
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completely indeterminate starting point by showing that pure being and nothing turn out to be 
the same. It is because they effect this vanishing solely of themselves that Hegel can claim to 
have traced a genuinely immanent progress where thought is self-determining. Now, this is 
little more than a brief restatement of how the Logic should progress, if it is to demonstrate 
that indeterminacy, by being what it is, logically entails the emergence of determinacy.  
Houlgate believes that the Logic does follow this path, and that Schelling fails to 
appreciate what is really happening in the thought of pure being. Before directly considering 
Schelling’s two criticisms, Houlgate suggests that these criticisms rely upon a basic 
conviction of Schelling’s, namely, that pure thought cannot grasp being. This conviction is 
said to come through in the claim that, in the beginning of the Logic, Hegel does not think 
being, but actually failed to think anything at all. For Houlgate, Schelling’s claim here (call it 
the ‘vacuity claim’) is just an expression of Schelling’s views about being and thought.103  
Schelling does not, however, offer the vacuity claim with no attempt at support 
whatsoever. The argument he gives in support of this claim, schematically presented, goes as 
follows: (i) being is always determinate (here Schelling claims that begin either takes the 
determination of ‘objective being’ or ‘essential being’); (ii) the being at the beginning of the 
Logic is indeterminate; therefore, (iii) no being (i.e. nothing) is thought and thus the opening 
thought of the Logic is actually an ‘un-thought.’104 Although Houlgate does not address this 
particular argument it is still vulnerable to the question-begging charge. The major premise 
assumes the exhaustiveness of the distinction between two different modes of being that is by 
no means self-evident. Thus Hegel could assert the contrary and say that the thought of pure 
being shows that there is a mode of being different to what Schelling specifies. So, although 
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the vacuity claim is not simply imported without further commentary, the argument offered 
still requires crucial assumptions to be made.  
Now, Schelling’s failure to make a convincing case for the vacuity claim already casts 
doubt on his interrogation of Hegel. More specifically, Houlgate argues that Schelling’s 
criticism that the pure concept is a lifeless product of thought, which is unable to generate 
movement from out of itself, makes use of the unjustified vacuity claim and thus falls with it. 
Before presenting Houlgate’s account of Schelling’s argument in detail some background is 
needed. The strategy Schelling takes here is not to provide independent reasons for thinking 
that the concept is necessarily immobile; rather, he challenges the means by which Hegel 
attempts to demonstrate that the concept is self-moving. Hegel aims to demonstrate this 
movement through an analysis of a proposition. Hegel believes the proposition ‘pure being is 
nothing,’ properly understood, shows that being and nothing are simultaneously the same and 
yet also different. In short, such a unity in difference is supposed to yield an oscillation, a 
constant movement of one into the other. In this way, for Hegel, pure being has generated the 
category of becoming. Schelling has a different way of understanding this proposition. ‘Pure 
being is nothing’ does not contain two distinct yet inseparable terms; rather, it is nothing 
more than a tautology which merely ‘contains a combination of words, and therefore nothing 
can follow from it.’105  
So, we appear to have a stand-off: Hegel and Schelling interpret this proposition is 
contrary ways; one interprets it as demonstrating the inherent dynamism of the concept, the 
other interprets it as demonstrating the inherent lifelessness of the concept. Houlgate attempts 
to undermine Schelling’s alternative interpretation by presenting Schelling’s argument for 
this interpretation as resting on the vacuity claim: ‘From Schelling’s point of view, indeed, 
the Hegelian thought of pure being is one in which nothing is actually thought; it is an “un-
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thought.” The proposition advanced by Hegel himself that “pure being is nothing” is thus for 
Schelling really a tautology, because what it actually says is “nothing is nothing.”’106 This is 
not quite how Schelling’s argument goes at this point in the Munich lectures, but the 
argument he does advance is nevertheless guilty of assuming the validity of premises which 
beg the question against Hegel. Rather than calling upon the vacuity claim, Schelling 
proceeds on the basis of a specific understanding of the nature of the proposition. Schelling 
ruminates on the forms that the proposition can take and claims that it must either be a 
judgment or a tautology. He then rules out the possibility that Hegel could mean the 
proposition ‘pure being is nothing’ to be a judgment, before concluding that it must therefore 
be a tautology. This is different to Houlgate’s account, but, again, Schelling nevertheless fails 
to come off any better.107 Much like the argument which was first discussed in this section, 
Schelling assumes a dichotomy which excludes Hegel’s option from the start. This time it is 
the dichotomy of the forms of proposition (judgment or tautology). For Hegel, the 
proposition is speculative and Schelling offers us no reason to prefer his account over 
Hegel’s. Having presented Schelling’s argument for (1) and identified the unjustified premise 
at work within it, we can proceed to the analysis of (2). 
 
1.3.2 The non-immanent source of the concept’s movement  
 
The next way Schelling tries to reveal the lack of immanent movement is by exposing how 
movement gets into the Logic. Unfortunately, Schelling’s attempt to expose the real 
animating force of the Logic is not as clearly presented as it might be. The biggest problem 
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posed by Schelling’s presentation is that he actually offers two distinct accounts of the source 
of the movement in the Logic,108 but does not do enough to draw our attention to this fact. 
Before going on to consider Houlgate’s discussion, then, I will untangle Schelling’s two 
accounts through a reconstruction. With this clarification in place I proceed to show how 
Houlgate confuses these different accounts and consequently conflates different aspects of 
Schelling’s arguments.  
Both of Schelling’s alternative accounts of the movement of the Logic offer the activity of 
the thinking subject as an explanation. However, the specific type of movement they aim to 
explain is different in each case, as is the nature of the intervention of the thinking subject. In 
other words, the object of explanation (the explanandum) and the explanation offered (the 
explanans) changes in Schelling’s two accounts of the movement of the Logic.  
 
1.3.2.1 The ‘proto-existentialist’ argument   
 
In the first account the explanandum is the compulsive force with which a completely 
indeterminate thought moves to a determinate one. 109  When thinking about what this 
compulsive force is, it is important to recall how Hegel thinks of the Logic in relation to its 
subject matter. The subject matter of the Logic is just thought itself. But this is pure thought, 
not the thought of any particular person. As Hegel puts it, the thought which is the object of 
logic ‘is to be taken simply in the absolute sense as infinite thought untainted by the finitude 
of consciousness, in short, thought as such.’110  The Logic qua text is not the immanent 
movement of pure thought itself, but only a chronicle or record of the self-generating 
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progression of pure thought.111 This is not to say that Hegel neglects how movement appears 
in the text; the Logic is supposed to be a demonstration of this movement after all. What 
should be kept in mind is that, while the movement of the subject matter and the movement 
of the demonstration are supposed to match up, the nature of the cogency of each is different. 
The former is supposed to impress upon any mind whether or not they have Hegel’s book in 
front of them, provided they genuinely start with a thought without any presuppositions (in 
this way Hegel takes up Fichte’s strategy of claiming that the philosopher’s job is not to 
fashion an artefact, but to observe the object of science).112 The latter can act as a guide to 
that activity, but it also aims to provide a proof for those unwilling or incapable of such an 
activity.113 I bring up this distinction to highlight that we are dealing with the universal nature 
of thought which appears to any individual when trying to think an indeterminate thought. As 
we will see, Schelling challenges Hegel’s understanding of this experience of thought. But 
the important point is that Schelling – in his first account at least – accepts Hegel’s demand to 
just observe what happens when anyone tries to think indeterminacy and, further, even 
accepts that there is indeed a necessary movement when taking up this activity. Where 
Schelling departs from Hegel is in his explanation of why this movement occurs—that is, he 
offers an alternative explanans. 
As we know, for Hegel, the explanation for this movement is that the concept generates 
its own movement when left to its own devices (i.e. without any subjective interference). 
Schelling argues that this movement only happens because anyone who tries to think 
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indeterminacy will feel dissatisfied with such a ‘meagre diet of pure being’ and thus it is the 
existing subject which drives the compulsion to a more determinate thought, not the concept 
itself.114 This feeling of dissatisfaction in turn is explained by Schelling as resulting from 
other aspects of the subject’s existence. It is because thinking subjects have always already 
had richer, more determinate experiences which remain in our memory that the 
indeterminacy of the first thought of the Logic shows up as deficient. In other words, the 
existential subject’s experience yields a norm, standard, or goal which reveals the poverty of 
an indeterminate or abstract thought. So, in order to explain the compulsion to leave an 
indeterminate thought (explanandum) Schelling offers the existential subject (explanans). 
 
1.3.2.2 The diagnostic argument  
 
With the second account Schelling shifts gears. Rather than considering the compulsive thrust 
of thought as such, it is Hegel’s analysis which is under scrutiny. More specifically, it is 
Hegel’s analysis of the notion of beginning that Schelling now tackles. 115  In the 
Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel responds to those that would claim the unity of being and nothing 
incomprehensible by saying that everyone has access to notions which prove they already 
make use of such a unity—one of which is the notion of beginning. Hegel claims that we 
could begin logic with the notion of beginning as beginning and see that this contains the 
representation of something to come. Hegel’s explanation of this point is difficult and 
compressed. If we use an illustration that he is fond of using in other contexts we can get a 
better grasp of it. The seed is the beginning of the plant, but the plant is not already there in 
the beginning. Yet we cannot say that the plant is straight-forwardly not there in the way that 
an animal or an emotion is not there in the seed. To move back to more abstract language, we 
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start with being which is also nothing since in the beginning we are dealing with a being 
which it is not yet what it is to become; nevertheless, it is not simply nothing – without any 
being– since it is the beginning of something. So, we have a unity of being and nothing which 
indicates a progression or movement. That this movement is demonstrated through an 
analysis undertaken by the philosopher, and not though the simple witnessing of the 
unfolding of pure thought, is significant. When Schelling challenged the latter he needed to 
offer an alternative account of the experience of compulsion. With the former he can simply 
challenge the validity of Hegel’s analysis. Schelling does challenge the validity of Hegel’s 
analysis and the explanation he offers for the apparent success of Hegel’s argument will now 
be addressed. 
Schelling argues that the reason Hegel seems to get an immanent emergence of becoming 
from an analysis of beginning is because Hegel sneaks in a content into the supposedly 
indeterminate beginning. For Hegel, if this movement is going to be immanent, then the 
philosopher cannot introduce any external content or influence the process in any way. 
Unlike Schelling’s previous explanation he is not claiming that the external influence comes 
from the nature and activity of the existential subject as such. Rather, he now points to how a 
specific individual – namely, Hegel – has brought in a movement. An important consequence 
of this is that, whereas Schelling’s previous account uncovers a necessary influence, he now 
claims to only expose an avoidable influence. So, what is the nature of this avoidable 
influence? Essentially, this influence is introduced by Hegel’s use of illicit or surreptitious 
moves.  
Schelling argues that the only reason Hegel manages to get a movement here is because 
he snuck in a determination through the use of the word ‘yet’ when he describes beginning by 
saying that ‘the matter is not yet in its beginning.’ Hegel wants this notion of beginning to 
reveal the unity of being and nothing that necessarily generates a becoming. Schelling 
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suggests unity is guaranteed by this ‘yet’ since the proposition ‘pure being is nothing’ now 
becomes ‘being is here – from this point of view – still nothing.’ Implicitly, through a subtle 
use of language, Hegel has slipped a potential into being, the potential to become something 
more. If Hegel had not determined being as ‘still nothing’ or ‘not yet real being’ he would not 
have been able to demonstrate the immanent generation of becoming. We can see that 
Schelling locates the movement in an illicit move made by an individual thinker and exposes 
this source of movement through a close reading of Hegel’s text.  
This explanation is thus very different to the previous one. Most notably, Schelling no 
longer appeals to general features of our existence (e.g. experience of concrete being, 
memory, desire, and dissatisfaction) to explain movement and thus avoids taking on the 
burden of a theory of the subject. Thus, not only is the object of explanation and the 
explanation advanced different in each case, but the argumentative strategy is also different. 
The first is an external criticism and the second an internal criticism. The external criticism 
utilises what might be called – following Houlgate’s designation – a ‘proto-existentialist’ 
argument; whereas the internal criticism only utilises what can be called a ‘diagnostic’ 
argument.  
 
1.3.3 Houlgate’s conflation of Schelling’s arguments  
 
As noted at the beginning of this exposition, Schelling does little to alert us to these crucial 
differences. Before looking at how Houlgate fails to distinguish between these two 
explanations I want to briefly consider some general interpretive issues that might lead us to 
overlook this distinction. The first has already been touched upon, namely, the flaws in 
Schelling’s presentation such as the lack of signposting. Not only does the reader have to 
make their own way through much of these lectures, but the terrain itself is difficult to 
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navigate. In particular, the two explanations share fundamental characteristics which could 
throw the reader of the sent. The explanandum in both cases is movement, but in one it is the 
compulsion experienced by thought as such when faced with indeterminacy, and in the other 
it is the becoming which is supposed to be demonstrated in Hegel’s analysis of the notion of 
beginning. The explanans looks to be the same in both cases also because both cite the 
activity of the thinker. But, as we have seen, in the first explanation this activity is of thinking 
or subjectivity as such (and thus unavoidable), and in the second this is the activity of only a 
specific thinker (and thus avoidable). These are subtle and easily missed distinctions, but they 
are important to observe if we are to properly evaluate the strength and significance of 
Schelling’s critical engagement with Hegel’s dialectics.  
Finally, a contemporary reader can easily subsume the second explanation under the first 
because the latter resonates so strongly with the subsequent tradition of Hegel criticism in 
European philosophy. Much like Schelling’s first explanation, existentialist and materialist 
criticisms of Hegel advanced from the 19th century onwards point to the practical (whether 
individual or social) conditions of theoretical activity. Houlgate correctly identifies Schelling 
as an early exponent of this kind of criticism. Unfortunately he goes one step further and 
subsumes the entirety of Schelling’s objections to Hegel under the rubric ‘proto-existentialist’ 
(i.e. the first type of account of intervention by the thinker). I now show in more detail how 
Houlgate subsumes the second explanation under the first and thus neglects the internal or 
diagnostic element of Schelling’s criticism. 
In the following passage Houlgate starts by summarising Schelling’s first – proto-
existentialist – account. 
 
First of all, the Hegelian philosopher anticipates the goal of full being (as concept, idea, 
and ultimately nature) and judges that the meagre concept of pure being, with which the 
Logic begins, falls short of that goal.  
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Houlgate then continues by presenting Schelling’s reading of Hegel’s text as though it were 
premised on the above (indicated by ‘…is thus revealed…’): 
 
The proposition “Pure being is nothing” is thus revealed as saying that “Pure being is 
still (noch) nothing” or that “it is not yet (noch nicht) real being.” By being recast as not 
yet real being in this way, pure being is understood not just as nothing but as harboring 
the possibility for real being which is yet to be fulfilled, that is, as being in potentia. 
With the interpolation of the word yet (noch), Schelling maintains, pure being is thus 
understood as lacking, but also as promising, something which has yet to be. That is to 
say, pure being is thought as pointing beyond itself and as heralding real being which is 
to come. In this way, Schelling claims, the transition is made by the Hegelian 
philosopher from the thought of pure being to the thought of coming to be or becoming. 
One moves from pure being to becoming, therefore, not by understanding pure being as 
pure being, but by understanding it as not yet real being and so as pointing forward to 
the future coming of that real being itself.116 
 
This exposition is inaccurate and misleads through omission and equivocation. Houlgate here 
omits Schelling’s close reading of Hegel’s analysis of the notion of beginning. This omission 
is problematic because in Schelling’s reading he shows how Hegel is the one that illicitly 
determines being as ‘not yet real being’ through his analysis of beginning. In place of 
Schelling’s legitimate critical approach Houlgate insinuates the illegitimate use of the 
perspective of a subject familiar with lived experience which finds pure being wanting and 
then apparently judges that being also has the potential to be something more. As the earlier 
reconstruction has shown, Schelling does not claim that being attains an implicit potential 
because it falls short of our other experience but because Hegel sneaks it in through his 
analysis.  
It should be noted that, although Houlgate omits Schelling’s close reading from his 
central exposition, he does address it later in the article. There he claims that Schelling’s 
attribution of the determination of being as being in potentiâ to Hegel is a misrepresentation 
fuelled by a blinkered refusal to entertain the thought that pure being can generate its own 
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movement. 117  But to call Schelling’s interpretation a misrepresentation is an abuse of 
language. Houlgate claims it is a misrepresentation because it does not accurately represent 
Hegel’s view of pure being. But Schelling is not trying to represent Hegel’s view of being; 
instead he aims to uncover the mechanisms or philosophical artifices Hegel actually uses in 
his texts in order to get the result needed to confirm his view of being and its supposed 
immanent transformation. 
Houlgate compounds the impression that there is only one continuous account in 
Schelling’s attempts to reveal the real animating force of the Logic when he fails to 
distinguish between the subject who finds pure being wanting (in comparison to the 
anticipated ‘goal of full being’) and the subject who manages to get a transition from the 
category of being to becoming by understanding being as ‘harboring’ or ‘promising’ 
something yet to be—that is, by determining being as being in potentiâ. Houlgate equivocates 
between these two different subjects by giving them both the same ambiguous designation 
‘the Hegelian philosopher.’ Again, as was shown in the reconstruction, the subject in the first 
case is subjectivity or thought as such; the subject in the second case is a specific individual 
author, namely, Hegel. When we remember this aspect of Schelling’s criticism it becomes 
clear that the designation ‘the Hegelian philosopher’ is inadequate to accurately represent 
what is going on: it is both too specific – to capture the sense of subjectivity as such – and too 
general – to capture the sense of a surreptitious move made by a specific author. Each 
explanation works on fundamentally different registers.  
It is surprising that Houlgate would run together these two different explanations since 
they are not even strictly compatible. The ‘goal’ imposed by subjectivity can only be said to 
drive the movement when faced with a genuinely indeterminate starting point (this is the 
whole point of Schelling’s first explanation); and the ‘promise’ found in Hegel’s being can 
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only be doing the work if the starting point is not indeterminate at all, but in fact determined 
by the philosopher (in this case, Hegel). Now, it might be wondered, if these explanations are 
in competition with each other, Schelling’s criticism at least has serious internal tensions and 
that he must promote just one of these explanations. But they are not really in competition 
with each other since they are explaining different things.  
Now that we have seen how Houlgate’s exposition obscures aspects of Schelling’s 
account of movement in the Logic it becomes clear how he could miss that Schelling 
provides an internal criticism which is not question begging. But just because Schelling’s 
criticism of Hegel’s analysis of beginning does not rest upon assumptions about subjectivity 
does not mean that it necessarily hits the mark. A problem with Schelling’s argument that 
being is determined as being in potentiâ is that this interpretation is based on Hegel’s analysis 
of the notion of beginning that Hegel claims is only a representation or notion (Vorstellung) 
which everyday knowledge is familiar and is distinct form philosophical knowing. Hegel 
does not use this analysis of beginning in the scientific exposition of pure being, only in 
remarks. As Houlgate points out, these remarks are only intended to aid communication of 
the material and not direct the deduction of the categories in the Logic.118 If we take it that 
Hegel’s remarks do not guide the deduction in the science itself, then Schelling’s diagnostic 
reading can be deflected by the Hegelian.  
With this result the question might be asked: if this argument cannot provide the silver 
bullet against Hegel’s Logic, why go to the effort to disentangle it from the question-begging 
argument? The reason is that Houlgate’s conflation not only leads him to overlook some of 
Schelling’s arguments, but, more importantly, also leads him to promote the pernicious view 
that Schelling’s lectures are of no worth to the reader wanting to learn something about 
Hegel’s Logic; that the most that can be gotten from consulting them is a record of 
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disagreements. With this Houlgate can then restrict the reader’s options to an affirmation of 
one philosopher over the other. 
 
Now it is, of course, possible that Schelling is right about the relation between thought 
and being and that as a result the Logic cannot proceed immanently, as Hegel claims it 
does, from the thought of being as such. But there is also another possibility: that the 
Logic does proceed immanently from the thought of being as such and that Schelling is 
incapable of grasping this because he has simply assumed from the outset that thought 
by itself cannot bring being as such before the mind.119 
 
This is a stifling prescription because it makes it seem as though anyone wanting to test 
Schelling’s suspicion that the movement of the Logic is not immanent must first settle the 
question of the nature of being and thought—one of the most perennial and challenging tasks 
in philosophy. Thus Houlgate’s apparently modest proposal – to weigh up the merits of 
Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophy in lieu of a definitive conclusion – conceals the bolder 
injunction to resolve huge philosophical issues before looking to how Schelling can expose 
problems in Hegel’s Logic. It is this tacitly excluded option that I now want to pursue. That 
is, I want to read Schelling’s lectures carefully to mine resources that reveal the Logic to be 
driven by a non-immanent source of movement without needing to first establish that the 
concept is necessarily immobile (i.e. assume Schelling’s views about being and thought) but, 
rather, only show that it is immobile in Hegel’s treatment of it.  
 
1.4 Schellingian immanent criticism  
 
I now explore the potential of another objection Schelling levels at Hegel’s Logic which 
Houlgate does not consider and would be overlooked if we followed Houlgate’s prescription 
for how to approach Schelling’s engagement with Hegel. In the following passage Schelling 
again entertains the role of the thinking subject, but this time does not import assumptions 
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about the nature of thinking or of how our existential conditions influence our theoretical 
activity. Rather, Schelling turns out attention to the minimal fact that someone is doing the 
thinking, rather than being thinking itself anonymously. 
 
…after I have posited pure being, I look for something in it and find nothing, because I 
have forbidden myself to find anything in it precisely by the fact that I have posited it as 
pure being, as mere being in general. Therefore it is not at all being itself that finds 
itself, but rather I find it as nothing, and say this in the proposition: "Pure being is 
nothing".120 
 
This passage seems to be suggesting that the transition from being to nothing occurs because 
there is a drive of the I to find something in being and that it matters that there is nothing for 
the I there. This would imply that Schelling has in mind another account of the subject which 
he is using in order to locate a non-immanent factor. If this is what is happening in this 
passage then Schelling would again be tasked with providing further arguments for why this 
is more persuasive than Hegel’s immanent account. But I think an insight can be gleaned 
from Schelling’s comments here without taking on any of this extra burden.   
 
1.4.1 Exposing the split within pure thought  
 
What is highlighted in the above passage is the difficulty involved in saying that the concept 
somehow investigates itself—i.e. that the concept should ‘find itself’ as nothing. As we have 
seen, Hegel places a high importance on the point that the concept should only get its 
determinations from itself; the philosopher should not be the one to discover the 
determinations, but should ‘simply let the inherently living determinations take their own 
course’.121 To see more precisely what Hegel has in mind it will be helpful to reconsider his 
criticism of Kant. Previously we saw that Hegel claimed Kant was not critical enough in his 
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estimation of naïve metaphysics. Kant certainly questioned how categories could be used to 
yield knowledge, but did not sufficiently ask about the ‘content’ of these categories in 
themselves, nor how philosophy comes across them in the first place (see 1.1.3.1). The 
problem was, according to Hegel, that the way the philosopher chooses the categories is still 
coloured by arbitrariness and contingency. This is a very severe criticism, but Hegel has an 
even more fundamental objection.  
Even before we get to the problem of the content of the categories, Hegel thinks that the 
minimal distinction between what is known (thought-determinations) and the knower (the 
transcendental inquirer) in transcendental philosophy already presupposes too much. Kant 
forgets that the investigation of thought-forms is already a kind of knowing which also 
requires a critical grounding. But if the investigation itself is then subjected to critical inquiry, 
this inquiry in turn needs to be justified, which would then need a further investigation, and 
so on. Hegel’s proposal avoids this infinite regress by rejecting the separation of the object of 
investigation from the investigation itself. Hegel revisits this criticism, which he had 
famously elaborated in the introduction to the Phenomenology, in the Encyclopaedia Logic. 
 
The activity of the forms of thinking, and the critique of them, must be united within the 
process of cognition. The forms of thinking must be considered in and for themselves; 
they are the object and the activity of the object itself; they investigate themselves, they 
must determine their own limits and point out their own defects. … [This activity of 
thinking] is not brought to bear on the thought-determination from outside; on the 
contrary, it must be considered as dwelling within them.122 
 
So, the critique needs to come from the thought-determinations themselves, rather than from 
an external investigator. As suggested, the externality Hegel objects to here in transcendental 
inquiry is not that of empirical consciousness. Hegel can allow that Kant has raised the 
inquiry to the point where it is ‘the ego common to all’ (i.e. not a specific, empirical, 
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individual consciousness) which is related to the categories.123 There is, then, a separation of 
this ego common to all from the categories, and the former investigates the latter, rather than 
the categories investigating themselves.  
Schelling’s passage quoted above suggests that Hegel has fallen into the very separation 
which Kant had done. Even within a realm of pure thinking a subtle gap has been opened up 
between the subject-matter (the categories or thought-determinations) and the knowing or 
investigating of that subject-matter. But this challenge is not in the service of merely pointing 
out that Hegel left something outside of his investigation. What I take this challenge to show 
is that Hegel needs to exploit this gap within thought in order to get movement in the Logic. 
That is, there needs to be a gap between thought qua subject-matter of the Logic (the concept) 
and thought qua what actually thinks this subject-matter (the I) in order for there to be a 
generation of a new content. If an interpretation of the beginning of the Logic along these 
lines can be convincingly made, Hegel can no longer claim that the unfolding of content is 
purely the immanent self-determination of the concept but must be animated by a perspective 
external to the strict subject-matter of the Logic. In short, he would have returned to the 
opposition of consciousness – supposedly overcome at the end of the Phenomenology – 
where the transition or movement would be generated by the tension between the observer 
and what is observed. 
 
1.4.2 Rereading the beginning of the Logic 
 
The description of the opening moves of the Logic given earlier aimed to represent what 
should be happening if the movement is to remain immanent (1.3.1). What I argue now is that 
if we hold Hegel to his own standard of scientific derivation – that the development from one 
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category to another should be self-evident – the movement from being to nothing is 
inexplicable without appeal to an external perspective. Specifically, that Schelling’s insight – 
that being only becomes nothing through our own observation or discovery of it as nothing – 
points us in the direction of understanding how Hegel gets movement into the Logic.  
Hegel has no problem showing the identity of being and nothing. Pure being and pure 
nothing are both characterised as pure indeterminacy. Hegel is right to reject assertions of 
their absolute difference by pointing out that only determinate being is opposed to nothing, 
but being in its purity has no features with which it could be distinguished from nothing. But 
if there is no distinguishing features in being to separate it from nothing it looks as though 
there are no immanent reasons to resist simply collapsing them into one. And, as we know, 
this would be an unwelcome result for Hegel because, if being and nothing are 
straightforwardly the same, he would not have gotten any further in the science since no new 
content would have showed up—we would just have two ways to describe the same thing. 
Conversely, Hegel cannot get around this problem by guaranteeing the difference of being 
and nothing through specifying distinct determinations for each because then the first object 
of philosophy would be merely given or presupposed.  
So, how can Hegel get being and nothing to be the same in the relevant sense? The 
official story is that being, independent of our perspective on it, effects this transition. But the 
details of this transition are thin in Hegel’s description. The only explanation Hegel offers in 
the first section is that, since there is nothing to be thought in pure being (or being is just 
empty thinking), being is in fact nothing. But why this is a movement from being to nothing 
and not a straightforward sameness is left mysterious. The only marker of a transition is when 
Hegel claims that there is ‘nothing to be intuited in it’. Thus it is only when being is 
considered from the perspective of intuition (or thinking) that it can show up as nothing. In 
other words, Hegel needs a moment of discovery in order for being and nothing to be 
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distinguished (the content must be the exact same indeterminacy). Any Hegelian will quickly 
respond that this cannot be what is happening because this implies a temporality – an actual 
duration in the mind of a concrete thinker – and that the vanishing of both terms into one 
another is not a transition from one to the other, but should be understood as an immediate 
vanishing (…‘does not pass over, but has passed over’). Even if we could make sense out of 
what a vanishing without temporality is and, further, if we accept the Hegelians bare 
assurance that this is what is happening in the Logic, this still leaves our question 
unanswered. If the concept is supposed to generate the movement by itself, why does being 
only show up as nothing in Hegel’s demonstration at the point where he enlists the help of the 
perspective of thinking or intuition?  
If Hegel does enlist the perspective of thought to generate the movement, does this 
establish that the movement of the Logic is not immanent? After all, Hegel claims that the 
object of the Logic is just as suitably understood as pure knowing or pure thinking as much as 
it is considered the concept. Is it not the case that thinking or knowing in their pure form is 
just another name for the concept? Even if this is taken into account, this is not sufficient to 
explain the manner in which Hegel appears to use the perspective of thinking to generate 
movement. The problem is not the presence of thinking as such. The Logic claims that it 
begins with the collapse of the subject-object distinction since thought is at once the subject 
and the object. But the problem posed here is that there is a gap between subject and object—
not that the same thing can now be considered the concept, now be considered thought. If 
Schelling’s suggestion is correct, the transition from being to nothing occurs because that 
which is conceptualized is taken to be distinct from the process of conceptualization. In this 
way the Logic would not have collapsed the distinction between subject and object, but 
mobilise the opposition between them (albeit within the realm of pure thought).  
63 
 
The demand for immanence and presuppositionlessness thus appear not to have been met 
in the opening of the Logic. Although Hegel would not welcome this conclusion, we find 
support for it from Hegel himself in the equivalent section of the Encyclopaedia Logic. This 
time Hegel actually emphasises the role that the activity of thinking plays in the development 
of a content in the Logic. Moreover, he even posits a specific kind of activity of thinking, 
namely, a drive. Hegel claims that those empty abstractions that we begin with only attain 
further determination because we try to pin down the meaning of these terms.  
 
[…] the drive to find in being or in both [being and nothing] a stable meaning is this 
very necessity, which leads being and nothing further along and endows them with a 
true, i.e., concrete meaning. This progression is the logical exposition and course [of 
thought] that presents itself in what follows. The thinking them over that finds deeper 
determinations for them is the logical thinking by which these determinations produce 
themselves, not in a contingent but in a necessary way.124 
 
At first it might not be clear how this speaks to our problem of how Hegel intends to get 
being to be equated with nothing without simply collapsing them into one another. It should 
be recalled what is actually entailed in the development of further determinations at the 
beginning of the Logic. Becoming is the first determinate content of the Logic because it has 
distinguishable moments which pure being and pure nothing do not have when addressed as 
pure abstractions. To develop deeper determinations at this first stage, then, requires the 
transition from being to nothing. If, as Hegel claims, the indeterminate thought of pure being 
would not become determinate were it not for our drive then this implies that the attempt to 
pin down a meaning of pure being is responsible for the transition to nothing. So, in order to 
make sense out of the unity of being and nothing we can reread the opening moves of the 
Logic in light of the gap Hegel opens up between what is thought (being and nothing) and the 
way in which we think it. 
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After noting that pure being is completely indeterminate, the first step Hegel takes in 
demonstrating a movement out of pure being is to point out the difficulty faced in trying to 
think this being. The attempt to think the content of pure being – in other words, the attempt 
to find a stable meaning for pure being – fails. This failure is due to the fact that there is 
nothing within it which would allow us to distinguish it from anything else (except its very 
indistinguishability). Our attempt to find a stable meaning, then, is what reveals being to be 
nothing. Faced with this disconcerting instability in what was believed to be the most certain 
and basic thought, we now attempt to pin down the meaning of nothing. But when thought 
tries to keep nothing distinct from being by searching for a meaning peculiar to it, it gives an 
existence to it in this very act125 and thus nothing turns out to have the same affirmative 
indeterminacy as pure being. Thus, to borrow Schelling’s terms, being does not find itself as 
nothing, but the I which needs to understand the meaning of being finds it to be nothing.  
Schelling’s hint, alongside Hegel’s suggestion in the Encyclopaedia Logic, proves to be a 
powerful aid in interpreting the movement of the Logic: that is, it makes sense of an 
otherwise obscure movement from being to nothing in Hegel’s exposition. Although this 
interpretation provides an explanation of how Hegel text gets movement into logic, it 
obviously conflicts with the scientific demand that the derivation of the categories by the 
result of the concept only. Neither the distinction between thought and that which thinks this 
thought, nor the characterisation of this thinking as a drive for stable meaning appear to 
receive a deduction in the Logic. Not only does this mean that there are presuppositions in 
Hegel’s science but, more importantly for Schelling, this means that the life or spiritual 
movement is not inherent to the logical realm; rather it is animated by Hegel’s surreptitious 
use of the perspective of the subject that thinks the concept.  
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1.5 Houlgate’s defence of the beginning of the Logic 
 
Although Houlgate does not consider the possibility of reading the Logic in this way in his 
article on Schelling, he does in his more recent book The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From 
Being to Infinity.126 However, he only gives serious consideration to this reading as it is found 
in authors other than Schelling. 
In a section of his book addressing the problem of how being and nothing move, Houlgate 
rehashes his rejection of Schelling, this time in the company of Trendelenburg and 
Kierkegaard.127 These thinkers are said to have originated the view that being isn’t the source 
of its own movement into nothing, and that, instead, it is the philosopher’s attempt to render 
each term intelligible that generates a movement. At this stage, however, Houlgate is still 
limiting his investigation of the problem of movement to his curtailed understanding of 
Schelling. Schelling’s objection is said to start from the assumption that movement does not 
belong in the logical realm and presupposes a theory of the subject which accounts for how 
we inevitably move from the thought of being to nothing.128 In support of this way of framing 
the objection Houlgate regurgitates a compressed account of his take on Schelling’s criticism 
of Hegel from his earlier article. Schelling’s criticism is supposed to be boiled down to this: 
he first presupposes that the subject must only experience being a posteriori; the memory of 
this experience is what impels us to be dissatisfied with pure being; and thus is the source of 
movement (the concept is immobile). As mentioned before, this is only one aspect of 
Schelling’s criticism. What I have argued is that Schelling has resources to question the 
source of the movement in the Logic without making these kinds of assumptions. The type of 
interpretation of the Logic elaborated on the basis of Schelling’s alternative suggestion 
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manages to propose an understanding of the movement of the Logic as dependent on the 
experience of a thinking subject purely through an immanent criticism of Hegel’s text.  
Once Houlgate has dismissed the originators of this view he goes on admit that the 
general view that the Logic is moved by the activity of the philosopher has some basis. He 
cites one of several passages where Hegel brings in a perspective external to the concept in 
order equate or unify being and nothing. To addresses the apparently more respectable 
version of this worry Houlgate considers contemporary criticism of the Logic which is much 
more closely related to the one I have been advancing via Schelling than the caricature 
Houlgate offers. Wolfgang Wieland claims that the category of nothing only emerges due to 
the effort we make to thematize or determine pure being. As a result, the category of pure 
being would forever remain pure being if it weren’t for our activity in trying to render it 
intelligible. Since Houlgate does not address the Schellingian criticism advanced here – and 
Wieland’s criticisms is broadly in agreement with it – I will investigate Houlgate’s response 
to the latter.  
In response to this challenge Houlgate – refashioning a point from Dieter Henrich – 
reminds the potential critic of the professed aim of the Logic and Hegel’s intentions for this 
science. 
 
…any reading that understands the move from being to nothing to be prompted by the 
activity of the philosopher must be mistaken because it turns speculative logic into a 
phenomenological logic—an account of what happens when pure being is thought by 
us, not an account of the logical character of pure being itself. Hegel states clearly in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic that the categories “investigate themselves” and that dialectic 
dwells “within” them … If this is the case, they must be understood to develop or 
“move” because of their own logical character, not because of the way we think of them 
or experience them.129  
 
The argument here is slightly odd. The force of the ‘must’ in his claim that the alternative 
interpretation ‘must be mistaken’ is ambiguous. We can understand an interpretation of a text 
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to aim to either: represent the declared aims of the author of the text or represent what is 
actually going on in the text. In the above passage Houlgate appeals to the declared aims of 
the Logic and what Hegel would like to achieve. And, of course, the interpretation advanced 
by Wieland (and the reconstruction of Schelling I advance) do indeed fails to match up with 
Hegel’s intentions. But this is not a convincing objection. Houlgate has simply missed the 
point of a critical interpretation: precisely the purpose of a critical interpretation is not to 
represent how the argument should go if the author is going to be as good as their word; 
rather, the point is to show how the author actually does support their claims. In other words, 
a critical interpretation is diagnostic. In this case, then, Houlgate has not managed to prove 
that this interpretation is mistaken (only that it didn’t lovingly repeat Hegel’s own claims). 
If Houlgate wanted to avoid this conclusion, the only other option is to say that he really 
has established that those interpretations are mistaken (and do not merely misrepresent 
Hegel’s intentions). But this route leads to even worse problems. In this case he would have 
rejected the interpretation which uncovers the role of the subject in the movement of the 
Logic merely by citing Hegel’s claim that the movement is all the work of the categories 
themselves. And this would be to beg the question.  
I have argued that the movement in the Logic is made possible by Hegel’s employment of 
a particular activity of the philosopher and the exploitation of a gap between the concept and 
the I. One reason to interpret the Logic in this way is because of Hegel’s account of the drive 
of the subject to find stable meaning in the categories in the Encyclopaedia Logic. However, 
this conflicts with Hegel’s official account in the Logic itself and thus it would be justifiable 
to ask why we should take up the explanation found in Encyclopaedia Logic and not in Logic. 
The main reason is because Hegel’s official story was found to leave the nature of the 
movement obscure. That is, the motivation to take up this alternative account lies in the need 
to make sense of the movement in the Logic. Now, although Houlgate fails convincingly to 
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demonstrate the failure of the alternative interpretation, he does offer his own account which 
tries to maintain the claim to immanence. I will now consider Houlgate’s defence of the 
Logic’s claim that the concept determines itself without any external perspective.  
Houlgate admits that when Hegel says that being turns out to be nothing because there 
isn’t anything to be thought in it, this leaves us with the impression that it is only because we 
think the concept that a transition takes place. Even though Houlgate dispenses with a few 
commentators that take this line, they are rejected because of specific weaknesses in their 
reconstruction rather than the plausibility of this approach as such. When it comes to facing 
this issue head on Houlgate once again contents himself to remind us that such an approach 
would fall short of the ambitions of the Logic. As pointed out, though, this in itself does not 
constitute a refutation.  
Houlgate does finally offer his way of understanding the transition from being to nothing 
in an immanent manner. He cannot find resources within the opening of the Logic itself to 
elucidate this movement; instead he quotes from the third remark: ‘because being is devoid of 
all determination whatsoever, it is not the (affirmative) determinateness which it is; it is not 
being but nothing.’130 This baffling claim to the effect that “it is due to what being actually is 
that it turns out to not be what it is” does not add anything to the bare assurance that being, 
by itself, turns into nothing—it is merely a different way to describe the same mysterious 
occurrence. But Houlgate simply reaffirms this description over and over again without 
further explanation. 131  Thus, without a convincing counter-interpretation the diagnosis 
presented here holds up. And in this way I think we have grounds to take Schelling’s worry 
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seriously and reject Hegel’s claim to have proven that the concept has its source of activity 
within itself.   
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2 Adorno’s criticism of Hegel: hypostatization of the concept  
 
The previous chapter investigated Schelling’s criticism of Hegel’s attempt in the Logic to 
yield a positive result from a merely negative philosophy; that is, to have a logical 
investigation of the concept tell us something about existence. Adorno is also concerned to 
curb the pretensions of the concept in Hegel’s philosophy. Moreover, in both cases it is a 
matter of diagnosing illicit philosophical moves which give the appearance of cognition 
without anything but pure thought. As we shall see, what it is that Hegel is supposed to have 
gained knowledge of within pure thought is different for both. And with this the nature of the 
metaphysical excess is different also.  
Much like Schelling’s encounter with Hegel, Adorno’s evaluation is not the most sober; 
frequently oscillating between the extremes of praise and invective. For this reason it may be 
hard to take Adorno’s criticisms seriously. I will try to present what I take to be the insightful 
and well-considered core of Adorno’s criticisms and argue that he gets Hegel’s measure right. 
Even before the substance of Adorno’s arguments can be evaluated, however, the first hurdle 
is to clarify the nature of Adorno’s accusation against Hegel. Adorno finds as many faults in 
Hegel’s philosophy as he does virtues, but one core objection he has is the identity of being 
and thought which Hegel’s idealist dialectic claims to establish (I will refer to this as the 
‘identity thesis’).  
 It should first be pointed out that the identity referred to here is not supposed to indicate 
an identity between representational thought or consciousness and an externally present 
object. Adorno does not need to ascribe this kind of pre-critical or naïve metaphysics to 
Hegel in order to find his approach to the concept troubling. The concept is made to yield a 
content of its own, independent of anything else—it is self-determining. This content is then 
said to be the truth of things (see 1.1.3.1), securing the fundamental intelligibility and 
rationality of the world. Even once we have seen that the identity invoked by the identity 
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thesis is not a representational one, there are still questions as to the appropriateness of 
calling a claim about the intelligibility of being an identity thesis. Just because – in its basic 
principles or structures – being is fully knowable, does not mean that all the concrete 
manifestations of being can be run-off of reason. Indeed, even while affirming the a priori 
character of being, Hegel acknowledges that there are contingencies, the content of which can 
be known only a posteriori.132 Defenders of Hegel are right to cite this against those that 
would find Hegel’s idealism guilty of positing the exhaustive identity of mind and world—an 
identity which engenders an egregious metaphysics: either as the denial of the existence of a 
mind-independent, external world, or else the attribution of existence with mentality (e.g. 
panpsychism). The defenders are wrong however in thinking that, once they have disabused 
us of such pernicious interpretations, no objectionable metaphysics remain.  
In fact, it is once we stop restlessly pointing out that Hegel does not subscribe to an 
exhaustive identity (and its corresponding fantastical metaphysical views), I argue, that we 
can see he is guilty of holding the kind of identity indicated by the identity thesis. What is 
involved in this kind of identity is not the reduction of all the contingencies of the world to 
thought, but that what is significant in the world (the basic principles of being) is made to 
coincide with thought. Although this identity is not of the exhaustive kind, it still results in 
the affirmation of the essential rationality of the world.133 This metaphysical result might not 
be as obviously objectionable as those outlined above, but this does not mean it is justifiable. 
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Failure to consider Adorno’s critique of the way Hegel’s idealist philosophy sets up the 
identity thesis leaves a blind spot in the evaluation of Hegel’s thought.  
I focus on two works in which Adorno aims to undermine Hegel’s identity thesis: 
Negative Dialectics and the Lectures on Negative Dialectics given in 1965/66. In the relevant 
passages found here Adorno is not content to simply oppose the identity thesis with his 
alternative, in a dogmatic fashion.134 Rather than claim directly that the identity thesis is 
wrong, Adorno aims to uncover a fallacious move in Hegel’s manner of attaining the identity 
thesis, thereby providing an immanent criticism of Hegel’s idealism. Of course, Hegel 
believes he establishes the intelligibility of being legitimately: first, according to Hegel’s 
system, if we simply test the coherence of standpoints which reject the identity thesis (i.e. that 
assume the correctness of the standpoint of consciousness) we will necessarily be led to the 
standpoint of science (i.e. the collapse of the subject-object opposition); second, once 
elevated to the standpoint of science, we need only look on at being to see that it turns out to 
be fully intelligible. Pace Hegel, Adorno argues that being does not simply show itself to be 
intelligible to the speculative philosopher’s gaze; rather, being masquerades as intelligible 
because that aspect of being which is not the same as thought (the nonidentical) is 
surreptitiously expelled so that the philosopher can rest assured that they have hold of 
something that is completely accessible and transparent to thought.  
Adorno often refers to this operation – whereby thought annuls its other – as an act of 
identification or hypostatization. I first distinguish this form of Adorno’s criticism of identity 
from other forms in his thought. This lays the ground for understanding Adorno’s criticism of 
Hegel’s idealism and, I argue, also sheds light on a neglected aspect of Adorno’s criticism of 
identity which is crucial to understanding his relation to the philosophical tradition (2.1). 
Once I have isolated the aspect of Adorno’s criticism of identity which is most pertinent for 
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his critical response to idealism, I further clarify this through a comparison with Kant’s 
account of hypostatization and transcendental illusion more generally (2.2). Then I put this to 
work by seeing if Hegel can be charged with hypostatization in Adorno’s sense. Insofar as 
this criticism is levelled at the beginning of the Logic, I argue that it cannot meet Adorno’s 
demand for an immanent criticism because Hegel has already established the standpoint of 
science by this point and therefore assumes the collapse of the distinction between subject 
and object or thought and being (2.3). But insofar as it is targeted at Hegel’s very attempt to 
prove that the opposition of subject and object must collapse (i.e. establish the standpoint of 
science), I argue that Adorno can provide an immanent criticism (2.4). Finally, I consider one 
of the most prominent approaches in 20th century scholarship to save Hegel from 
metaphysical excess; namely, to read him “non-metaphysically” as a transcendental 
philosopher or a category theorist (2.5). I do not dispute the claim that Hegel is not doing pre-
critical metaphysics—indeed, as highlighted, Adorno already read Hegel in much the same 
way. Rather, I argue that this approach still subscribes to the metaphysical view Adorno 
targets (the identity thesis). Moreover, I point out that the arguments commentators use to 
defend their reading of Hegel (Klaus Hartmann and Terry Pinkard) actually succumb to the 
same surreptitious moves found in Hegel’s hypostatization and thus are open to Adorno’s 
criticism  themselves.  
 
2.1 Adorno on identity-philosophy  
 
Identity is one of the most prevalent and yet most ambiguous terms in Adorno’s critical 
thought.135 As with most of Adorno’s terminological practices, he does not aid the reader 
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with any schematised account of his usage of the term.136 For convenience I distinguish three 
different levels at which Adorno uses the term. Identity can refer to: (1) a condition (the 
existence of identity), (2) a discourse (which takes identity as its principle or theoretic goal), 
or (3) a practice (of identification).137 In this chapter I focus on the relation between the level 
of discourse and the level of practice. Specifically, how an illicit operation (a practice of 
identification) within the Logic underwrites Hegel’s identity thesis (a discourse of identity). 
Part of what is meant by identity at the level of discourse has been clarified in the gloss on 
the identity thesis in the introduction. Thus this section needs to give an account of the 
practice of identification before we can see if Adorno is correct to say that this lies behind 
Hegel’s identity thesis. 
 
2.1.1 Two forms of identification: ‘identity-thinking’ and ‘hypostatization’ 
 
For the purposes of investigating Adorno’s criticism of Hegel’s identity thesis I need to 
further distinguish two different modes of identification: (3a) ‘identity-thinking’ and (3b) 
‘hypostatization’.138 Identity-thinking refers to a set of practices which do an injustice to the 
particularity or uniqueness of things in the process of dealing with objects. Hypostatization, 
on the other hand, refers primarily to a set of philosophical practices which banish the 
nonidentical in the mistreatment of concepts. In other words, whereas identity-thinking 
behaves as though thinking were boundless, hypostatization is the route through which 
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philosophy tries to prove that thinking is boundless. Due to the shared pathos of each strand it 
is easy to run them together. To bring into relief the strand I examine in this chapter I need to 
give a brief sketch of identity-thinking (and the problems of privileging this strand when 
reading Adorno) and hypostatization so that they can be clearly contrasted. 
Identity-thinking entails the use of concepts in such a way as to subsume things.139  This 
can happen in the more primitive context of predicting and controlling nature for the purpose 
of self-preservation. Or it can happen in the more sublimated context of epistemic experience 
where particulars are classified by universals.140 Although the former is more orientated to 
practical interests and the latter to theoretical interests, both are essentially concerned with 
knowledge. Thus, in our knowing relation to the world, we reduce objects to our conceptual 
scheme and strip them of their particularity.  
Hypostatization entails the use of concepts in such a way as to purge the concept of the 
trace of what is not the concept. This does not happen through the use of concepts on things 
that are not concepts; it happens through the use of concepts on themselves. For this reason 
hypostatization usually takes place in philosophy, whose business it is to deal in concepts. 
This also indicates why Kant is the most important reference for Adorno on this issue. The 
transcendental dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason is a relentless attack on philosophical 
attempts to yield knowledge with the use of concepts alone. The force and scope of this is 
registered in Moses Mendelssohn’s epithet: the all-crushing Kant. Adorno similarly saw his 
criticisms of philosophy as trying to correct or resist the tendency for philosophy to believe 
that it possesses something secure in concepts independent of their use in experience.141 
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A crucial difference between identity-thinking and hypostatization is that the normative 
status of each differs. The damage done to the particular in identity-thinking, though ‘wrong,’ 
is a ‘necessary moment in the stage of dialectics’.142 This is because cognition of objects 
requires universals. Though universals fail to grasp that part of the object which is not 
exhausted by classificatory or identificatory thinking, the answer is not to eschew concepts 
altogether. Rather, we need to use concepts in different ways to reveal what insistence upon 
their universal power does not.143 The damage done to concepts through hypostatization is 
not an unavoidable casualty of cognition, but an avoidable illusion of philosophical hubris. In 
fact, as noted above, Adorno’s engagement with the philosophical tradition is largely 
concerned to expose and resist hypostatization.144  
Unfortunately, hypostatization has been largely overshadowed by commentator’s 
emphasis identity-thinking.145 That said, even if the one-sided emphasis on identity-thinking 
is regrettable, it is not itself philosophically suspect. There are many legitimate reasons for 
such a focus. For instance, the topics of interest to contemporary philosophy may dictate 
where a commentator looks in Adorno’s work. Adorno’s concern to show the limits of 
identity-thinking – that experience is deprived in the case of the suppression of the 
nonidentical – is an obvious source of interest for established academic fields such as 
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epistemology. 146  And, although the detection of illicit moves is equally, if not more 
established (informal logic), this is not an area which is likely to appropriate – or, indeed, 
even bother to appraise – Adorno’s analysis of the delusions which make philosophy believe 
it is sovereign.147 So, whatever the reason for overlooking the problem of identification qua 
hypostatization, it is not necessarily the case that this is damaging to this issue as such.  
What we do need to be wary of is the confusion of these two strands. In both strands, the 
object of Adorno’s criticism is the over inflation of the power of the concept. But, as noted, 
the operations in each strand of identification are different: identity-thinking performs a 
subsumption of particulars, whereas hypostatization performs illicit moves in order to give 
the concept an illusory existence or substantiality. It will be noticed, however, that this 
differentiation of operations also allots different results: the former type of identification 
results in the reduction of objects (usually in order to make things more manageable or 
controllable), while the latter functions to ground philosophy by showing that the concept 
needs no basis in anything but itself. When exploring Adorno’s contribution to the criticism 
of philosophy in particular I think it is important to keep these distinctions in mind. But this is 
not to suggest that Adorno believes that each result is exclusive to each operation; each 
operation can generate a different result. For Adorno, subsumption (operation of identity-
thinking) can work to ground philosophy (the primary result of hypostatization) and, 
conversely, the positing of the identity of subject and object via illicit moves (the operation of 
hypostatization) can work to break down experience into more manageable chunks (the 
primary result of identity-thinking). But this possibility for realignment should not detract 
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from the point that each result is primarily established by the appropriate operation (as 
specified above).  
The reason I stress this point is because the dominant approach to Adorno not only 
neglects the issue of hypostatization in favour of identity-thinking , but also frequently falls 
into the trap of assuming that subsumption is not only the prime operation for identifying 
objects in experience but also the prime operation in philosophy’s attempt to prove its 
sovereignty. In particular, Adorno’s criticisms of Hegel are still frequently presented as 
though the identification going on in Hegel’s idealism is an issue of identity-thinking.148 To 
focus on one example, Alison Stone has argued that the fundamental worry Adorno has with 
Hegel’s dialectics is the way that the latter functions as a ‘mechanism for expanding thought 
to cover objects.’149 This mechanism is said to proceed through a process whereby a concept 
(the first moment of the dialectic) confronts an object (the second moment of the dialectic), 
resulting in a supposed reconciliation (the third moment of the dialectic), which is in fact 
nothing but the subsumption of the object under the concept.150 Stone is correct to say that 
Adorno objects to this function of Hegel’s dialectic, but wrong to suggest that this exhausts 
Adorno’s critical appraisal: ‘This shows that what Adorno finds problematic in Hegel’s 
dialectic is – as we saw earlier apropos of the Dialectic of Enlightenment – the way that 
Hegel conceives the dialectic’s third, speculative moment. For Adorno, that third moment as 
Hegel conceives it is not genuinely conciliatory but represents merely the first moment of the 
dialectic expanding to dominate the second’.151 As I will show in this chapter, Adorno’s 
criticism of Hegel goes beyond this regularly repeated account of Adorno’s strategy.  
 
                                                          
148
 Espen Hammer, Adorno and the Political, Thinking the Political (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 100-101; 
Brian O’Connor, ‘Adorno’s Reconception of the Dialectic’, in A Companion to Hegel, ed. Stephen Houlgate and 
Michael Baur (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 537–55, 545; Alison Stone, “Adorno, Hegel, and Dialectic,” British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy, 22:6 (2014):1118-1141, 1133f. 
149
 Alison Stone, ‘Adorno, Hegel, and Dialectic,’ 1133. 
150
 Ibid., 1133-34 
151
 Ibid., 1134 
79 
 
2.1.2 Further clarification of hypostatization  
 
The term hypostatization does not have a fixed meaning in Adorno’s thought. Sometimes he 
talks generally of hypostatization as making or treating something as invariable, immutable, 
or unmediated.152 Hypostatization is then found in a large array of phenomena: affective 
dispositions,153 practices,154 socio-historical situations,155 or even specific opinions.156 When 
Adorno does indicate why these forms of hypostatization take hold, he often points to certain 
damaged or reified forms of consciousness manifested in anything from straightforward 
cognitive incapacity to psychological conditions. 157  Despite this diversity and scope, 
hypostatization also has a more specific meaning. 158  To anticipate the more detailed 
discussion below (2.2), the basic features of this meaning can be sketched. Firstly, 
hypostatization involves the purification of concepts so that the traces of what they refer to – 
what is not the same as the concept – are eradicated, imbuing the concept with an illusory 
substantiality or being of its own. Secondly, hypostatization is found primarily in certain 
types of sophistical or fallacious reasoning. Thirdly, it is the very nature of thought or 
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conceptuality that leads us into thinking that concepts must be primary, which then 
predisposes us into accepting those philosophical errors.  
This final point is not meant to suggest that this process goes on in a vacuum. Historically 
specific social forms (e.g. capital) and associated forms of consciousness do influence 
philosophical practices. Indeed, a prevalent strategy Adorno utilises in his engagement with 
philosophy is to show the social or objective root of tensions or flaws in the edifice of 
philosopher’s texts. For instance, antinomies found in philosophical theories are often said to 
repeat or reflect antagonisms in society.159 But, no matter how prevalent this strategy, this 
does not give us warrant to say Adorno always sees philosophical problems or errors in this 
light. The significant differences in types of philosophical problem Adorno typically focuses 
on – between hypostatization and antinomical theories – should already warn against too 
quickly uniting them under one explanatory frame. But even where social forms of 
explanation figure in Adorno’s account of hypostatization, they are only supplementary to the 
main explanation. 
There is not only a danger of reducing the explanation of hypostatization to the 
explanation of general hypostatization—there is also a danger of so reducing the result. Some 
commentators have distinguished the problem of hypostatization from the problem of 
identity-thinking, only to then lump it into a more general issue of the way that static and 
inflexible thought cuts us off from the world.160 The type of hypostatization I want to focus 
on does indeed result in static or invariant concepts, but the problem is far more troubling 
than this. For instance, in his lecture course titled ‘Metaphysics: Concept and Problems’, 
Adorno discusses the way that philosophy has perennially given concepts a false 
substantiality or positivity and thus bestowed an independent existence upon them.161 This 
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does make concepts appear imperishable or invariant, but what is distinctive about this 
‘universal problematic’ – which is ‘the crucial fallacy in traditional philosophy as a whole’ – 
is that it gives philosophy the pretence to know the truth of things from within concepts 
alone; indeed, to know concepts as the truth, bestowing concepts with a fundamental 
existence.162 Adorno hammers the point home by considering the curious attempt – by the 
‘so-called philosopher named Maximilian Beck’ – to base the existence, and the immortality, 
of the soul on the possession of the concept of the essence of the soul. This is mocked for the 
lack of comfort it would provide those expecting immortality. The invariance or 
imperishability of the concept of the soul certainly distorts reality. But unlike reified 
consciousness, it is the fallacies of philosophy that excel at convincing us our concepts have 
an existence of their own.  
This can be further clarified through Adorno’s evaluation of Kant on this issue. Brian 
O’Connor questions the pertinence of Adorno’s criticisms of philosophical or metaphysical 
hypostatization by showing that the invariance of the a priori categories in Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy does not get in the way of a proper – ‘historical materialist’ – 
appreciation of the social world.163 If Adorno’s concern with philosophical hypostatization 
was only about the invariance of concepts, this would show a significant limit to Adorno’s 
criticism of hypostatization. But, in the same lecture considered in the previous paragraph, we 
can see that the concern cannot be so limited: ‘Kant was the first to avoid this hypostasis, but 
even for him the concept has a moment of autonomy, of hypostasis, since his work contains 
pure forms of an almost pre-Aristotelian kind, which are not required to be the forms of a 
possible content.’164 If hypostatization were just a matter of invariance, how could Kant have 
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been the first to avoid hypostatization? Where Kant does succumb to hypostatization it is not 
found in invariance as such, but when a form or concept can function without that which they 
are the form of.  
This can be seen more clearly in Adorno’s lectures on Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”. 
Kant is accused of hypostatizing the ‘I think’ or transcendental consciousness by giving it a 
meaning independent from the actual individual or empirical consciousness where synthesis 
actually takes place.165 Even though transcendental consciousness is invariant, the problem 
from the perspective of hypostatization only occurs when it is taken to have an independent 
being. Adorno sometimes speaks as though the construction of the transcendental itself were 
the problem. For instance, Adorno claims that ‘the whole doctrine of subjective constitution’ 
commits Kant to the same error he diagnosed in rationalism, namely, ‘an amphiboly of the 
concepts of reflection.’166 But, as Adorno well knows, specifying a constituens only becomes 
an amphiboly when it is made to yield knowledge without the constitutum. 
 
The entire proof of the antinomies, of the paralogisms as well as the amphibolies, all the 
things that Kant has criticized, that he has ‘smashed’, all say the one thing, again and 
again. This is that something subjective, namely, the form – which possesses validity 
only in relation to a matching content, and fulfils any sort of objectivizing function only 
in relation to this content – that this subjective element claims to be objective. We might 
say that this is the pattern of the amphibolies, the pattern of the confusion on which all 
the fallacies of reason are based.167 
 
The a priori categories are not guilty of any of these problems so long as they are not claimed 
to yield knowledge independently.168 None of this should be taken to mean that Adorno does 
not also find invariance problematic. Invariant structures can falsify historical reality and 
potentially curtail our experience. But we should not let Adorno’s concern with this 
overshadow his attempt to draw out other problems. Hypostatization not only cuts us off from 
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the world in certain ways, but also justifies the world. This is done by bestowing concepts 
with an existence independent of what they should refer to, and thus making existence of the 
nature of the concept or reason.  
 
2.2 Kant and Adorno on transcendental illusion and hypostatization  
 
Now that some potential ambiguities have been addressed and a clearer idea of what is 
philosophically at stake in the issue of hypostatization, for Adorno, a little more detail of the 
nature of this form of identification can be given. Here Adorno has in mind something similar 
to how Kant uses the term hypostatization when diagnosing the illusions which reason 
necessarily succumbs to when it believes itself to have gotten hold of a transcendent object 
through ‘dialectical inferences’.169 Three key features of Kant’s account of illusion can be 
specified which are echoed in Adorno’s account. These three features regard: (i) the source of 
illusion, (ii) the means through which this illusion takes hold in philosophy, and (iii) the 
hypostatized result of the illusion.170 On each point there is overlap in Adorno’s and Kant’ 
account: (i) Both hold the source of the illusion to entail that it is inevitable; that it is 
thought’s own tendency to succumb to illusion, not imposed by something alien to thought.171 
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(ii) Kant172 and Adorno173 claim that illusion is ordained by philosophy via a set of errors. 
(iii) They both hold that the result is that something which is dependent upon something else 
for knowledge is made self-subsistent. Kant articulates this in the following way: ‘All illusion 
may be said to consist in treating the subjective condition of thinking as being knowledge of 
the object.’ 174  The subjective condition is dependent upon something given in order to 
produce knowledge. But transcendent metaphysics claims knowledge through this condition 
alone and therefore treats it as independent or self-subsistent. Adorno echoes this early in 
Negative Dialectics when he warns against being seduced into confusing the necessity of 
conceptualization as a condition for knowledge with ‘what it is in itself’ and thereby 
bestowing an ‘illusion of being-in-itself [Schein des Ansichseienden]’ upon the concept.175 
With this shared ground in view we can now further illuminate Adorno’s position by looking 
to the parts where he diverges from Kant. 
2.2.1 Source of illusion  
 
For Kant, the inevitability of illusion is due to the faculty of reason. The vocation of reason – 
as the ‘faculty of inferring’ – necessarily leads it to think of the unconditioned and eventually 
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to form ‘transcendental ideas’ or ‘pure concepts of reason.’176 These ideas do not contribute 
to knowledge, but they do allow us to think (or conceive) beyond the limits of our 
knowledge.177 Because we necessarily have these ideas, we are ‘incited’ to put them to use 
for knowledge. For Adorno, on the other hand, this compulsion to identify part of ourselves 
(for Kant, our ideas of the unconditioned; for Adorno, any thinking not directed at the 
heterogeneous) with the whole is not due to the nature of a specific faculty. Rather, it is 
because of the nature of the subject as such. As Adorno puts it: 
 
Still transparent, however, is the reason for the illusion that is transcendental far beyond 
Kant: why our thinking in the intentio obliqua will inescapably keep coming back to its 
own primacy, to the hypostasis of the subject. For while in the history of nominalism 
ever since Aristotle’s critique of Plato the subject has been rebuked for its mistake of 
reifying abstraction, abstraction itself is the principle whereby the subject comes to be a 
subject at all. Abstraction is the subject’s essence. This is why going back to what it is 
not must impress the subject as external and violent. To the subject, what convicts it of 
its own arbitrariness—and convicts its prius of aposteriority—will sound like a 
transcendent dogma.178   
 
For Kant, it is primarily the seduction to gain – or claim – knowledge about transcendent 
objects which impels us to hypostatize concepts (i.e. subjective conditions). For Adorno, 
there is a more basic force underlying this seduction. It is the compulsion to reject anything 
outside our reach. Although the modality of the drive to illusion is the same (it has necessity 
in both Kant and Adorno), its scope is larger because even those that have inoculated 
themselves against doing transcendent metaphysics can still be seduced into affirming the 
illusion on Adorno’s account. The subject is led to illusion not because it wants to go beyond 
itself, but because it wants to make sure there is nothing beyond it.  
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2.2.2 Philosophical ordination of illusion  
 
Regarding the way philosophy ordains illusions, Adorno follows Kant’s critical procedure of 
uncovering certain errors. Where he departs from Kant is on the question of what the critical 
philosopher must do to guard against such errors. Neither thinker believes these errors are of 
the kind which could simply be dissolved through an especially vigilant eye for missteps in 
reasoning. The errors rest upon a more fundamental blindness. This is Adorno’s account: 
 
To think means to think something. By itself, the logically abstract form of 
“something,” something that is meant or judged, does not claim to posit a being; and 
yet, surviving in it—indelible for a thinking that would delete it—is that which is not 
identical with thinking, which is not thinking at all. The ratio becomes irrational where 
it forgets this, where it runs counter to the meaning of thought by hypostatizing its 
products, the abstractions. The commandment of its autarky condemns thinking to 
emptiness, and finally to stupidity and primitivity.179 
 
For Adorno, then, it is through negligence of the fact that thought or the concept requires 
reference to its other (the heterogeneous or nonidentical) in order to be genuine thought that 
errors can take hold of philosophy unnoticed. 180  The task of battling this negligence is 
thematized in Negative Dialectics as ‘self-reflection’ (Selbstreflexion).181 Kant prescribes a 
similar activity, but instead of the nonconceptual nature of the concept as such, it is the 
proper location of the conceptual and nonconceptual respectively which Kant claims is the 
object of the critical philosopher’s vigilance—namely, the allocation of representations to the 
faculties to which they properly belong.182 In short, without the insight of transcendental 
idealism, for Kant, the philosopher is always susceptible to errors, no matter how 
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sophisticated their reasoning. It is important to note that both Adorno and Kant thus elaborate 
a theory of proper cognition as a standpoint from which illusions can be perceived. As will be 
shown later, Adorno needs to assume this account of proper cognition in order for his 
criticism of the Logic to work—thus undermining his claim to immanence. However, it will 
also be shown that Adorno need not assume this account in order to provide a successful 
immanent diagnosis when his criticism is aimed at other aspects of Hegel’s philosophy 
(namely, Hegel’s attempt to secure the standpoint of science through an argument for 
complete conceptual mediation).  
So, the difference between Kant and Adorno here is subtle. But whether the philosophical 
errors rest on forgetting the nonconceptual or on an ignorance of the proper location of 
representations is significant.  
 
2.2.3 Hypostatized result of illusion  
 
Finally, with regards to the hypostatized result, Kant and Adorno place a different accent on 
the way in which a thought or concept is made into a thing. As noted above, where Kant and 
Adorno overlap is in their characterisation of hypostatization as self-sufficiency. Where they 
differ is in what precisely is entailed by becoming self-sufficient. For Kant an important 
aspect of this transformation of a thought into something self-sufficient is that it has the 
character of being ‘outside’ the transcendental subject.183 Adorno places no such emphasis 
upon the externality of the hypostatized thought. For Adorno the illusion which philosophers 
succumb to when they believe themselves to have the concept purified of any reference to 
nonconceptuality does not necessarily involve transforming such a concept into an object—
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which would be known in opposition to our thought of it. In fact, one of Adorno’s favourite 
examples of hypostatization is the attempt of many 20th century philosophers to know 
something which is neither an object outside us, nor merely the subjective contribution to 
knowledge.184 Adorno actually agrees that we cannot reduce everything to either subject or 
object, but he objects to the way this insight is treated. But rather than the mistreatment being 
due to transforming it into an object, it is due to thinking that the excess of the subject-object 
relation is independent of that relation (making it into a ‘third’, as he often puts it). 
To see what Adorno has in mind here, we can look briefly to a particular example of this 
form of hypostatization in Heidegger account of being.185 Heidegger’s ‘being’ is neither the 
subject nor the object. Adorno praises this much, agreeing that neither the subject nor the 
object can be the ultimate. If the subject were the source of being then we would have 
subjective idealism; if the object were the source of being we would have positivism.186 
Philosophy can indeed reflect on this fact and be aware that there is something “more” to the 
subject-object relation, but, for Adorno, we are only able to say that this more is a result of 
the entwinement of subject and object. We are not able to say that this more forms its own 
moment independent and beyond the subject-object relation. 
 
Because “is” is neither a merely subjective function nor a thing, an entity—because to 
our traditional way of thinking it is no objectivity—Heidegger calls it “Being,” that 
nonsubjective, nonobjective third. […] The insight that “is” can be neither a mere 
thought nor a mere entity does not permit its transfiguration into something 
transcendent in relation to those two definitions.187  
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Being is here not an object outside us; rather, it is a kind of condition of the subject-object 
relation, but one not located in the subject (as it is for Kant). Thus, on Adorno’s 
reconstruction of Heidegger’s account of being, we attain knowledge of something which is 
not an entity (or an ultimately large set of entities), nor merely our contribution, but a “third” 
beyond this relation. Thus the excess of the subject-object relation is hypostatized in the 
sense of being made into an independent moment, not by being made into an object or 
entity.188  
So, there are three core point which differentiates Adorno’s account of illusion from 
Kant’s: (1) the drive to illusion is found in the nature of subjectivity itself rather than simply 
the faculty of reason; (2) philosophical errors rest on the purification of the concept as such 
rather than only being due to the misuse of them; and (3) the hypostatized product need not 
be assumed to be an object outside us (transcendent to us, in Kant’s terms), but anything that 
is made independent of its nonconceptual conditions. It will be noticed that Adorno’s points 
of departure from Kant on these issues are closely related. They all come down to Adorno’s 
extension of the criticism  of illusion beyond the targets of ‘pre-critical’ or transcendent 
metaphysics. Whether Adorno can make a criticism  of illusion work in this way will only be 
seen through an extended discussion of one particular example (to be seen in this chapter). 
But what this does establish is that, unlike Kant’s account, this has a warrant to criticism  
philosophies which self-consciously avoid falling into the trap of pre-critical metaphysics.  
 
2.3 The charge of hypostatization I: Hegel’s Logic 
 
Of the three features of hypostatization outlined above, it is the second which is the focus of 
Adorno’s criticism of the beginning of the Logic—namely, the errors which facilitate 
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hypostatization. There is an important reason for this: in principle, exposing an error 
undermines a claim without needing to take on the burden of proof required to overturn a 
claim with an opposing one.189 In the lectures Adorno emphasises this by stating that he does 
not want to oppose idealism with materialism, but to provide an immanent criticism of 
idealism.190  The purpose of this section is to see if Adorno can successfully undermine 
Hegel’s idealism in an immanent fashion. 
 
2.3.1 The ‘linguistic slippage’  
 
Adorno focuses his critical attention on the very first moment of the Logic: the 
characterisation of pure being. Hegel’s more detailed account of pure being offered in the 
third remark, following the exposition of the transition from being to nothing to becoming, is 
the main object of Adorno’s analysis. Adorno quotes the following passage from the third 
remark. 
 
They [i.e. the thoughts of pure space, pure time, pure consciousness, or pure being] are 
the results of abstraction; they are expressly determined as indeterminate and this – to 
go back to its simplest form – is being. But it is this very indeterminateness which 
constitutes its determinateness; for indeterminateness is opposed to determinateness; 
hence, as so opposed, it is itself determinate or the negative, and the pure, quite abstract 
negative. It is this indeterminateness or abstract negation which thus has being present 
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within it, which reflection, both outer and inner, enunciates when it equates it with 
nothing, declares it to be an empty product of thought, to be nothing.191 
 
Adorno draws our attention to the subtle differences in Hegel’s characterisation of pure being 
here. First, being is said to be ‘indeterminate’ (unbestimmt); this is then replaced by the term 
‘indeterminateness’ (Unbestimmtheit). This change in the characterisation of being could be 
easily missed. Even if noticed, it would be understandable to dismiss the inconsistency as 
nothing more than a mere accident or laxness of expression.192 Adorno claims that the change 
in terminology – or ‘linguistic slippage’ – is of the highest significance.  
Adorno points out the contrary meanings of each term. When being is said to be 
indeterminate there is reference to something substantial (sachhaltige)—a something that is 
described as being indeterminate; whereas when we say that being is indeterminateness, we 
elevate the lack of determinations into a self-standing quality so that we are now referring to 
this hypostatised quality in itself, independent of anything which might be so predicated. As 
Adorno puts it: 
 
when Hegel substitutes 'indeterminateness' for this [the indeterminate], the concept, 
namely, the absence of determinateness as such takes the place of what is undetermined 
– through what Kant would have called a 'subreption', that is, a misrepresentation. The 
purely linguistic slippage from 'the indeterminate', the term that denotes what is 
underlying [Substratausdruck], to indeterminateness is itself the turn to the concept. 
And it is only this conceptual abstraction that is equated with being through this 
manoeuvre – that is, basically we have here a primal act of identification that eliminates 
the element of being that is, that is to say, that is not indeterminateness but merely 
something that has not been determined193 
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Here we find a specific analysis of the hypostatization which was outlined in its general 
features in the previous section.194 Adorno uncovers an error and shows how this leads to 
hypostatization. The error is an illicit substitution of one term for another—or, following 
Kant, Adorno calls this a ‘subreption.’ Through this substitution Hegel manages to advance a 
thought of being cleansed of any reference to something outside of this thought.195 In other 
words, Hegel has forgotten the trace of the nonconceptual in the concept and has thus 
unknowingly perpetrated a subreption which affirms the purity of the concept. 
 
2.3.2 Externality of Adorno’s criticism of the Logic 
 
Now, Adorno faces a difficulty in making this charge stick. As noted, in the lectures Adorno 
does not want to take on the burden of proving that Hegel’s claim to yield knowledge in the 
realm of pure thought (in Adorno’s terms, to have hold of the hypostatized concept) is wrong 
by positing the opposed claim that knowledge must occur outside of pure thinking (i.e. that 
knowledge proper requires the nonconceptual as well as the conceptual). Rather, he wants to 
show how Hegel’s method of attaining that claim is illegitimate and thus force the 
abandonment of that claim. But the Hegelian can argue they have not attained this claim by 
illegitimate means and further that the only thing Adorno’s detailed linguistic analysis shows 
is that Hegel was not as attentive to nuances of connotation as he might have been. A central 
reason this line of defence is plausible is because Hegel is not attempting to offer an 
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argument for the move from being qua indeterminate something to being qua concept of 
indeterminateness; rather, the Logic begins with the claim that pure being cannot be 
conceived as a ‘something’ which is indeterminate, as opposed to indeterminateness as such. 
In the first remark to the opening section on the move from being to becoming Hegel argues 
that ‘the being of something is already determinate and is distinguished from another 
something’ 196 ; the implication is that, if being were a something it could not be truly 
indeterminate and therefore not meet Hegel’s demand to begin with a completely immediate 
and indeterminate point.197 Without a commitment to a distinction between something and 
concept in pure being the beginning of the Logic leaves no room for an immanent diagnosis 
of hypostatization.  
 Adorno seems to be aware of this difficulty. He is careful to note that pure being is 
indeterminate and, as such, cannot contain any distinctions within it. To say that pure being is 
a concept or a thing (Sache) at this stage would be to forget that it is indeterminate. Adorno 
follows this concession with the apparently contradictory claim that pure being ‘in this 
absence of differentiation appropriate to it…does possess both: both the concept and the thing 
that is undetermined.’198 This is a perplexing claim. What would it mean to both admit that 
pure being is indeterminate and assert that it does in fact ‘possess’ the determinations of 
concept and thing (Sache)? This is certainly not something Hegel would ascent to; nor does 
Adorno give us sufficient reasons in the lectures for why Hegel must be committed to this 
view.199  
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So, how does Adorno justify this claim? I think it can be clarified by reminding ourselves 
of what Adorno believes is the philosopher’s role in guarding against hypostatization 
(detailed in the comparison with Kant on the issue of how philosophy ordains illusions with 
fallacies, 2.2.2). Through a reconstruction from various fragments I showed that Adorno 
elaborates a theory of what constitutes genuine thought – namely, that the concept requires 
reference to the nonconceptual in order to produce knowledge – and that this often informs – 
albeit usually implicitly – his critical claims to uncover illicit philosophical moves. Although 
Adorno does not inform his audience in the lectures, I think this background to Adorno’s 
criticism of hypostatization shows that the claim about the thought of pure being (i.e. that it 
possesses both concept and thing) performs the same function as the claim about genuine 
knowledge: to provide a perspective from which fallacies can be exposed. In this particular 
case, without supposing that pure being did ‘possess’ distinct determinations, the terms ‘the 
indeterminate’ and ‘indeterminateness’ would not be able to pick out either a thing or a 
concept and thus a slippage between the terms would be harmless. 
So, Adorno cannot provide an immanent criticism of the identity thesis found in the 
beginning of the Logic. If Adorno is to specifically target the beginning of the Logic then he 
either needs to find an argument that can be tested for fallacious reasoning which Hegel does 
use to set us the identity thesis or else abandon the immanent approach and instead advance 
independent argumentation for an opposed thesis (a nonidentity thesis, as it were—i.e. that 
being is a something which exceeds thought). There is another option available, however. As 
noted, Adorno diagnoses hypostatization in a multiplicity of places. Unsurprisingly, then, 
Adorno does not claim to find hypostatization only in the beginning of the Logic, but 
throughout Hegel’s work. I now argue that Adorno can only succeed in an immanent 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
some determinate content from out of absolute indeterminacies like pure consciousness or pure time. The point 
is that when purity is taken consistently it makes no difference what it is that is supposed to be pure (e.g. pure 
consciousness, pure time, etc) since the purity guarantees that we are dealing with abstractions. And, 
importantly, this holds as much for ‘the indeterminate’ as it does for ‘indeterminateness’. 
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criticism if he targets Hegel’s philosophical strategy for establishing the collapse of the 
subject-object distinction (what Hegel calls the ‘opposition of consciousness’) rather than 
targeting Hegel’s treatment of being after he has claimed to achieve this. In this way Adorno 
does not need to presuppose a theory of proper cognition or of what constitutes the thought of 
being because Hegel is committed to provisionally accept the nonidentity of being and 
thought in his attempt to show that any position which subscribes to this nonidentity will 
necessarily collapse and yield the standpoint of science.  
 
2.4 The charge of hypostatization II: Hegel’s argument for mediation 
 
There is no shortage of examples to be found in Negative Dialectics of the accusation that 
Hegel establishes idealism through hypostatization. Unfortunately, we have already seen 
Adorno’s most substantial textual support for his criticism. Elsewhere Adorno makes only 
passing hints as to where we can find these errors occurring in Hegel’s texts. What makes this 
even more difficult is that those passing textual references usually only illustrate one aspect 
of the hypostatization process (namely, (iii) from the outline offered in 2.1). For example, 
Adorno claims that Hegel hypostatizes the particular by substituting for it ‘the general 
concept of particularization pure and simple—of “Existenz,” for instance, in which the 
particular is not particular any more.’200 We see the same structure here as in the criticism of 
the beginning of the Logic: a concept of something (e.g. the concept of something that is 
indeterminate or particular) is replaced with a hypostatized concept of that something (e.g. 
the concept of the quality of indeterminateness or particularization, independent of anything 
that might have these qualities). In these cases Adorno fails to specify a passage in Hegel 
which convincingly shows that this movement from one term to another is performed 
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fallaciously. In the case of the Logic Adorno simply imposes the distinction between concept 
and thing onto Hegel’s text through an insufficient linguistic analysis; in the case of 
‘particularization’ an attempt to show that Hegel is committed to this distinction is omitted 
entirely. This is not to say that Adorno avoids the work of analysing an argument to show that 
he is correct in diagnosing a fallacy. It is only to say that he does not clearly indicate where in 
Hegel this argument is to be found.  
Instead, Adorno presents a reconstructed account of an idealist argument which he claims 
Hegel utilises. In short, this idealist argument is presented by Adorno as follows: the use of 
concepts entails mediation;201 cognition of immediacy results in its mediation; therefore, both 
mediation and immediacy are within the concept and, as such, nothing lies outside conceptual 
mediation.202  Adorno does not dispute either of the premises.203  What is disputed is the 
conclusion. Adorno argues that there is an equivocation between the meaning of mediation in 
the first and second premise; and that it is only because of this equivocation that conceptual 
mediation can be claimed to be total and therefore establish the idealist claim that nothing is 
out of the reach of the conceptual. Mediation in the first premise refers to the mediation 
which is essential to the concept in virtue of the fact that concepts imply other concepts in 
attaining meaning and thus mediation is “total” in this sphere. Mediation in the second 
premise refers to a mediation which is not essential to the immediate in the way that it is for 
the concept. The immediate is not mediated in the same way as the concept since mediation 
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does not exhaust immediacy in the same way that it does the concept. For immediacy 
mediation is only one way immediacy can be dealt with as opposed to its very nature. This is 
only an abstract sketch of how Adorno understands the elements of an equivocation in 
Hegel’s argument for idealism; more detail will now be provided by locating and analysing a 
specific argument in Hegel’s texts which illustrates Adorno’s criticism.  
 
2.4.1 Hegel’s argument against Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’  
 
One of the most distinctive arguments Hegel provides for his idealism is generated in his 
answer to Kant’s dualism—or any position that sets ultimate limitations to thought or reason. 
This argument is of the same form as the one outlined above. In its most general form this 
argument goes something like this: The moment we try to reach outside the sphere of 
conceptual mediation to grasp something which is supposedly exempt from this sphere (i.e. is 
immediate) we necessarily bring it into the sphere of conceptual mediation (or else banish it 
into empty meaninglessness). 204  This argument, in one form or another, is pervasive in 
Hegel’s opus,205 from his earliest published works, such as Faith and Knowledge,206 to his 
most mature, like the Encyclopaedia Logic. 207  I start by considering a version of this 
argument in the Logic before considering its analogue in the Encyclopaedia Logic.  
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The section of the Logic which I focus upon is chapter 2, determinate being (Dasein), 
specifically the section on ‘Something and Other’ within ‘B. Finitude.’ Here Hegel unfolds 
the determination of ‘something’, eventually reaching the claim that it is the unity of being-
in-itself and being-for-other. This is an important moment in the Logic since establishing that 
what is ‘in-itself’ is not divorced from what is ‘for-other’ we already have the seed of the 
overcoming of all limitation—i.e. that there is nothing that can outreach our grasp. Hegel 
himself hints at the decisiveness of this point when he points out that this identity (of being-
in-itself and being-for-other), though already present in determinate being, is shown ‘more 
expressly in the consideration of essence and of the relation of inner and outer, and most 
precisely in the consideration of the Idea as the unity of the Notion and actuality.’208 Now 
that the general context of this specific moment of the dialectic in the Logic has been 
outlined, we can go into more detail. 
Hegel takes the opportunity to criticise Kant (though he does not mention him by name). 
Hegel claims that his account of finitude as ‘something’ undermines a certain conception of 
the ‘thing-in-itself.’  
 
Things are called ‘in themselves’ in so far as abstraction is made from all being-for-
other, which means simply, in so far as they are thought devoid of all determination, as 
nothings. In this sense, it is of course impossible to know what the thing-in-itself is. For 
the question: what? demands that determinations be assigned; but since the things of 
which they are to be assigned are at the same time supposed to be things in-themselves, 
which means, in effect, to be without any determination, the question is thoughtlessly 
made impossible to answer, or else only an absurd answer is given. The thing-in-itself is 
the same as that absolute of which we know nothing except that in it all is one. What is 
in these things-in-themselves, therefore, we know quite well; they are as such nothing 
but truthless, empty abstractions. What, however, the thing-in-itself is in truth, what 
truly is in itself, of this logic is the exposition, in which however something better than 
an abstraction is understood by ‘in-itself’, namely, what something is in its concept; but 
the concept is concrete within itself, is comprehensible simply as concept, and as 
determined within itself and the connected whole of its determinations, is cognizable.209 
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The first point Hegel makes here is that the thing-in-itself is specifically the thought of 
something which is “abstracted” from conceptual mediation. For Hegel, determination is only 
brought about through the concept; so, we cannot say what determination the thing-in-itself 
has since it designates what is outside conceptual mediation (or, as Hegel puts it, it is 
abstracted ‘from all being-for-other’). Nevertheless, Hegel proceeds to tell us what the thing-
in-itself is for conceptual mediation (indicated by asking ‘what?’ the thing-in-itself is): an 
empty abstraction.210 Moreover, Hegel claims that his logic aims to provide an exposition of 
the ‘in-itself’. But with this announcement Hegel has done little more than changed the topic. 
We are told that this exposition is of the concept and its concrete determinations and that, in 
virtue of this nature of the concept, it is better than the in-itself which lacks conceptual 
determinations within itself. But to say that the in-itself conceived as the concept meets the 
standard of conceptual determination, whereas the in-itself conceived as marking what is 
outside conceptual determination does not meet this standard, begs the question and tells us 
nothing about whether there is an in-itself outside conceptual mediation.  
Now, Adorno signs up to the Hegelian idea that determinacy only comes about through 
conceptualization. He also takes Hegel to be right that the thing-in-itself, as the placeholder 
for what is outside conceptual mediation (determination), can be defined, that is, can be given 
the determination of being abstract, by conceptualizing it. But this does not mean that we 
have thereby successfully reassured ourselves that the in-itself really is equal to thought. All 
that has been established is that the in-itself can be defined as what is abstract—that is, 
mediated by the concept in a specific sense. What has not been shown – but needs to be, if 
Hegel is to get the result he wants – is that this way of mediating the in-itself is the same as 
the mediation which is native to the concept.  
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It could be objected that Hegel does not have to accept that things-in-themselves indicate 
something beyond the concept in the first place. On the contrary, it could be maintained that 
the thought of a thing-in-itself is nothing more than a concept and therefore Hegel has no 
duty to provide an explanation why mediation of this is the same as mediation of the concept, 
since, on Hegel’s terms, it is self-evident that mediation is the same in both cases. In this way 
it seems that we have again run into the roadblock which the criticism of the beginning of the 
Logic faced: there is no room for an immanent criticism because the diagnosis of an illicit 
move (e.g. an equivocation or subreption) only works if Hegel subscribes to the same terms. 
But there are reasons to think that Hegel does accept that the thing-in-itself is more than a 
determination of the concept.  
 
2.4.2 Hegel’s argument against Jacobi’s ‘immediate knowing’ 
 
It is the case that Hegel introduces the ‘in-itself’ in the Logic explicitly as a determination of 
the concept, specifically, as a form of finitude qua something. But Hegel also recognises that 
it has a meaning outside his science that needs to be shown to be wrong in order for his Logic 
to take the status of the authoritative account of the in-itself. Although the quote above is 
from the body of the Logic (i.e. where scientific exposition is to take place), it has the tenor 
of a remark (i.e. an historical aside not strictly part of the deduction). More specifically, it has 
the same aim and target as a passage in the preliminaries to the Encyclopaedia Logic. There, 
Hegel is trying to argue that the different ‘positions of thought with respect to objectivity’, 
which ultimately uphold the opposition of thought and being, are incoherent and necessarily 
lead to a more advanced position—eventually ending in the standpoint of science where 
concrete content is reducible to thought-determinations.211 But before Hegel can get to this 
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standpoint (and therefore his account of the in-itself) he needs to show that the position which 
does hold things-in-themselves to be opposed to, or outside, thought-determinations is wrong 
to do so. In this way Hegel is committed to dealing with the thing-in-itself qua immediacy 
(i.e. outside conceptual mediation) in a way he was not committed to dealing with being qua 
thing in the beginning of the Logic.  
This point becomes more explicit when Hegel addresses a similar issue in Jacobi. For 
Hegel, Jacobi’s ‘immediate knowing’ represents a higher stage than Kant’s in the 
development of the positions of thought in relation to objectivity. This is because Jacobi 
restores our relationship to the absolute which was barred by Kant. What this means in 
Hegel’s narrative – which leads towards the standpoint of science – is that it is one step closer 
to realising that thought is the truth of being—i.e. to the collapse of the opposition between 
consciousness and objectivity. Nevertheless, Jacobi is still chided for limiting our access to 
the absolute to immediacy, rather than through the mediations of reason. Jacobi’s immediate 
knowing of the absolute (or God) leaves this outside the concept and therefore – much like 
Kant’s think-in-itself – as deprived of conceptual determination. 
 
Finally, the immediate knowing of God is only supposed to extend to that God is, not 
what God is [daß Gott ist, nicht was Gott ist]; for the latter would be a cognition and 
would lead to mediated knowing. Hence God, as the ob-ject of religion, is expressly 
restricted to God in general, to the indeterminate supersensible, and the content of 
religion is reduced to a minimum.212  
 
So, Hegel recognises that thinking the thing-in-itself is initially a thought of what is outside 
‘mediated knowing’—the thought of the that, as opposed to the what, as Hegel puts it. This 
means that to mediate this immediacy involves something different than it does to mediate 
what is intrinsically the concept already. It is not clear that Hegel realises the implications of 
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this point. If he did, he would surely have to admit that, although the ‘content’ or the what of 
something immediate (e.g. thing-in-itself or immediate knowing of God) can be given, this 
still does not exhaust the that of the immediate.  
Of course, Hegel has a category up his sleeve to yet again reabsorb this remainder. But to 
offer this answer to the problem is to move too quickly. Hegel thinks he can show that the 
Kantian – or Jacobian – attempt to think the thing-in-itself (or the immediate) will have to 
admit its conceptuality, even by their own lights. It will not do, then, for Hegel to merely 
assert his category as a replacement. The point is that the way Hegel attempts to reduce 
immediacy to mediacy in his argument against Kant and Jacobi exploits an equivocation 
between different forms of mediation. Thus Adorno is correct to point out that Hegel 
hypostatizes the nonconceptual as conceptual through surreptitious means.213  As Adorno 
summarises: 
 
As long as philosophers employ the concepts “immediate” and “mediate”—concepts 
they cannot forgo for the time being—their language will bear witness to the facts 
denied by the idealist version of dialectics. That this version ignores the seemingly 
minimal difference serves to make it plausible. The triumphant finding that immediacy 
is wholly mediated rides roughshod over the mediated and blithely ends up with the 
totality of the concept, which nothing nonconceptual can stop any more. It ends up with 
the absolute rule of the subject. In dialectics, however, it is not total identification that 
has the last word, because dialectics lets us recognize the difference that has been 
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spirited away. Dialectics can break the spell of identification without dogmatically, 
from without, contrasting it with an allegedly realistic thesis.214 
 
This immanent (i.e. non-dogmatic) criticism is possible because Hegel accepts a contrast 
between immediate and mediate before trying to show that immediacy is only a moment of 
mediation.215 
There are two significant defences a Hegelian might want to take at this point. The first is 
in response to the force of Adorno’s criticism. The very strategy of disputing a claim by 
exposing the illegitimacy of the argument offered for it has the limitation that the claim itself 
is not necessarily defeated—another argument could take the place of the one exposed as 
illegitimate.216 Although I have not provided an exhaustive analysis of Hegel’s arguments for 
the identity thesis, the one which was analysed was shown to be just one instance of a general 
idealist strategy utilised by Hegel. Due to the pervasiveness of this strategy in Hegel’s 
thought – noted above – I think there are strong grounds to take Adorno’s diagnosis of 
hypostatization seriously. If a Hegelian wanted to avoid the attack by producing an 
alternative strategy to back up the identity thesis, they would still need to do substantial work 
to (i) show that such a strategy is distinctively Hegelian (as the one discussed here is), and (ii) 
say why Hegel put so much stock in a surreptitious approach if a legitimate alternative was 
available.  
The second defence would consist not in finding a replacement argumentative strategy for 
Hegel’s idealism, but in deflating Hegel’s philosophy so as to avoid the critical attentions of 
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point—thus Adorno was foolish to try to target this aspect of Hegel’s philosophical project and not where he 
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thinkers antagonistic to the apparent metaphysical excesses of Hegel’s thought. If such an 
interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy is plausible then it would seem to make Adorno’s 
criticism redundant. I turn to this now in the final section of this chapter.  
 
2.5 The ‘non-metaphysical’ defence of Hegel 
 
There is a prominent strand of 20th century Hegel-interpretation which attempts to rescue 
Hegel from obscurity or straightforward dismissal by claiming that his philosophy is not 
objectionably metaphysical.217 This approach downplays the metaphysical commitments of 
Hegel’s philosophy whilst emphasising the Kantian or transcendental aspects. Rather than 
dispute these interpreters, I argue that the “non-metaphysical” Hegel is still guilty of holding 
the identity thesis. Thus, despite the admirable defence of Hegel against some of the more 
extravagant perceptions of his philosophy, there is still an objectionable metaphysical 
commitment – in short, that being is rational – which Adorno exposes and reveals to be 
illegitimate.  
Non-metaphysical interpretations rightly point out that Hegel’s philosophy cannot be 
accused of the following metaphysical enterprises: (i) pre-critical speculation of transcendent 
objects (i.e. ‘special metaphysics’), (ii) reducing existence to the mental (either in the sense 
of positing the mind-dependence of existence or making existence a mental substance, e.g. 
panpsychism), (iii) yielding exhaustive knowledge of entities through reason alone (what 
Klaus Hartmann refers to as making ‘existence claims’).218 As mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, Adorno does not actually think Hegel held any of those fantastical views. Thus 
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the non-metaphysical reading does not in principle exempt Hegel from Adorno’s criticism. It 
might be thought, however, that, since the non-metaphysical reading stresses the 
transcendental aspect of Hegel’s thought – that his Logic, for example, is a ‘theory of 
categories’219 – this would also ensure that Hegel is not open to Adorno’s criticism of the 
identity thesis. After all, if Hegel’s philosophy is primarily about displaying the categorial 
structure of thought, surely he is not committed to making claims beyond this sphere.  
But the difficulty which the transcendental or non-metaphysical interpreters face is that, if 
they are to promote a distinctively Hegelian transcendental philosophy, they need to address 
its difference from Kant’s transcendental philosophy. In particular, they must make sense of 
Hegel’s frequent claims to have overcome Kant’s supposed subjectivism—that is, to 
overcome the sceptical worry that we do not know if Kant’s categories actually meet up with 
the real. Hegel’s argumentative strategy for dealing with the limit on truth which Kant’s 
thing-in-itself posed was outlined above (2.4.1). Interestingly, we find the non-metaphysical 
interpreters make use of this very same strategy in order to retain the distinctively Hegelian 
twist to transcendental (or ‘speculative’) philosophy. For instance, Klaus Hartmann promotes 
Hegel’s practice of ‘placing’ nonconceptualities (what Hartmann refers to as ‘irreducibles’) 
within categories and claims that Hegel has thereby achieved the identity of being and 
thought (even if he remains silent on knowledge of ‘individual items’). 
 
Hegel does not “know” more than Kant when he “places” the thing-in-itself in a 
hermeneutical context while Kant denies knowing anything about it and yet talks about 
it. There need be no anchorage in existences by-passing categorization or 
understanding, in order to make ontology possible. Or, there need be no metaphysics; 
and if we are correct, there is a defensible reading of Hegel’s philosophy as a non-
metaphysical philosophy.220   
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Or, we can note Terry Pinkard’s rendition of a similar point; namely, that what concepts 
grasp is not ‘things in the cosmos’ (Hartmann’s ‘individual items’), but ‘the true natures of 
things’ (Hartmann’s ‘ontology’): 
 
In our experience, whether it be in the laboratory or of what Husserl call the life-world, 
we encounter conceptual unities, configurations of the world produced by adopting 
certain descriptive schemes. Behind or beyond this world is nothing (even the idea of a 
thing-in-itself functions as a limiting concept in our conceptual apparatus). To 
paraphrase Hegel himself, one can no more jump out of one’s system of descriptions 
than one can jump out of one’s skin.221 
 
Both suggest that Hegel overcomes Kant’s dualism by claiming that, since the thing-in-itself 
can be absorbed into our thought, we thereby bypass the worries about whether or not our 
conceptual schemes really do capture being or not. Hartmann claims that Hegel does not 
“know” more than Kant. And this is true insofar as the object of this knowledge is supposed 
to be ‘individual items.’ But Hegel clearly does claim to know more than Kant in another 
sense: he knows the structure of being itself. Pinkard similarly endorses this ‘ontological’ 
status of Hegel’s dialectic.222 I have argued above that the faith in this Hegelian procedure is 
misplaced; constituting a serious error, a hypostatization. In this way I think so-called non-
metaphysical readings are still guilty of surreptitiously advancing the – still quite 
metaphysical! – claim that being is truly captured by categories and therefore that being is 
rational.   
The non-metaphysical reading, then, may save Hegel from the accusation of holding 
some of the more fantastical metaphysical claims, but they still endorse a non-trivial, and 
certainly not self-evident, metaphysical claim regarding the identity of being and thought. 
Moreover, if Adorno is right to claim that Hegel gets this identity via hypostatization of the 
concept, then we have also revealed one of the most significant and influential trends in the 
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20th century Hegel-scholarship – which precisely aims to save Hegel from metaphysical 
excess – as succumbing to a serious metaphysical flaw.  
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3 Conclusion to part I and introduction to part II 
 
I have argued that Schelling and Adorno have provided powerful and incisive criticisms of 
Hegel’s ambitions for the concept. I claim this not just in the sense that I believe I have 
shown their arguments to be philosophically more cogent than they are usually given credit 
for; but also in the sense that shed new light on Hegel’s philosophy. In the case of Schelling, 
this was located in his uncovering of a different type of metaphysics in Hegel’s Logic. The 
debate around Hegel’s metaphysics in the 20th century was mostly animated by the question 
of whether Hegel had lapsed into a pre-critical metaphysics or not. Commentators from 
Hartmann to Pippin attempted to save Hegel from these charges by stressing the 
transcendental dimension of Hegel’s philosophy, especially in the Logic. More recently an 
intervention in this debate, most notably by Beiser, has brought attention to the ontological 
nature of the Logic – especially as it relates to Hegel’s proximity to Aristotle – and shown 
how this cuts through the opposition of ‘metaphysical’ or ‘non-metaphysical’ readings. This 
is certainly a welcome corrective, but it does not capture the whole story. Schelling’s 
exposure of the illicit animation of the concept revealed how Hegel had attempted a new kind 
of critical metaphysics which, while not a transcendent metaphysics, was still more robust 
than the ontological reading since it claims knowledge not just of the structure of being, but 
also of an existent activity (albeit one immanent to thought).  
In the case of Adorno, the new light brought to the issue of the metaphysical nature of 
Hegel’s thought was located in the uncovering of the way that Hegel’s idealistic account of 
dialectics establishes the intelligibility and rationality of being. This is a somewhat more 
familiar issue in the criticism of Hegel than the problem of – what I have called – a critical 
metaphysics. But, unlike the more common worry that Hegel’s identification of actuality and 
rationality results in the complete rationality of the world, Adorno is fully aware that actuality 
is a specific category for Hegel which does not cover everything that just happens to be the 
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case in the world. Adorno’s criticism of hypostatization in Hegel’s use of the concept was 
aimed at the way that Hegel can assure us of the basic rational structure of things. This brings 
nuance into our understanding of Adorno’s criticisms of identity philosophy (which I 
elaborate on below). The type of metaphysics Adorno has exposed in Hegel’s fallacious use 
of the concept is different to Schelling; but again, it is located somewhere between the 
ontological reading and the transcendent metaphysical reading. The object of Hegel’s 
metaphysics for Adorno is not a structure (whether of intelligibility or of being—i.e. the 
transcendental or ontological reading), nor an entity (as in the transcendent metaphysical 
reading), nor an immanent activity (as in Schelling’s reading). Rather, the object is an 
assurance—the assurance that the concept cannot encounter any resistance from something 
nonconceptual.  
It may sound odd to call an assurance a metaphysical object, but I think that we can see 
why it makes sense to say that this assurance is, at the least, a metaphysical aim of Hegel’s 
account of the concept. Hegel’s argument for complete mediation attempts to show that 
anything that appears as nonconceptual, turns out to be fundamentally conceptual. The way 
this argument goes looks to be closer to a transcendental argument than an account of being 
or of an entity (e.g. an existent supersensory object)—at least in the minimal sense that it says 
what must be the case, rather than what is the case. Hegel’s argument for complete mediation 
tries to say that what must be the case, is that existence is of the nature of the concept. Since 
existence itself is not the object here (only what existence must be) it is not a transcendent 
metaphysics. And since it is not the necessary structure of things which is the object (rather, it 
is the necessary quality of things—to be essential or of the concept), it is not a 
straightforward ontology.  
The type of metaphysics Schelling and Adorno discover in Hegel’s philosophy may be 
unfamiliar, but in both cases the worry is with the over inflation of the concept; that is, with 
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the nature of Hegel’s idealism. The preceding chapters have hopefully clarified the nature of 
Schelling’s and Adorno’s objection to Hegel—both in terms of their similarities and their 
differences. But the differences in the type of metaphysical object they find in Hegel’s 
philosophy only goes so far in revealing important differences between Schelling and 
Adorno. We not only want to know how they think the concept can overextend itself, but 
exactly what it is that is thereby threatened by such an overextension. In short, for Schelling 
this is pure existence (the meaning of this will be provided below), and for Adorno this is the 
nonconceptual (that which is supposed to be brought into philosophy through negative 
dialectics). This abstract statement does not tell us much. For this reason I now unpack this 
indirectly by defending Schelling’s and Adorno’s criticisms against the possible worry that 
their concern with what is outside the concept is either unwarranted or beside the point—at 
least from the perspective of Hegel’s philosophical aims. In the course of defending Schelling 
and Adorno on this score the details of their respective accounts of what should be outside the 
concept will be provided. 
 
3.1 How extensive is the pretention of Hegel’s concept? 
 
Adorno and Schelling often put their objection to Hegel in terms of the idealist dialectic 
disallowing anything outside the concept. But we need to be careful with these kinds of 
formulations. If we take them very literally then we will miss the point. Moreover, Hegelians 
can easily respond that there is something outside the concept and even point out that the 
Hegelian system requires there to be something which is not conceptual.223 When Adorno and 
Schelling claim that Hegel has extended the concept, reason, or thought to engulf everything, 
we should add the qualification, ‘in effect’: Hegel has extended the concept to, in effect, 
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engulf everything. Both Adorno’s and Schelling’s criticisms are not diminished by 
acknowledging that Hegel’s system does not pretend to be exhaustive in its knowledge of the 
world, and thus does not absorb the nonconceptual wholesale; the crucial point is exactly 
what role the nonconceptual plays in Hegel’s thought.  
 
3.1.1 Schelling’s account 
 
‘Hegel is so little inclined to recognise his philosophy as the merely negative philosophy that 
he asserts instead that it is the philosophy which leaves absolutely nothing outside itself.’224 
Alan White has taken this kind of objection to express the worry that Hegel’s sciences stop 
short before the rich empirical detail of the world.  
 
…Hegel’s doctrine of truth teaches that judgments reporting only what happens to be are 
at best merely correct; they cannot express the truth with which the philosopher is 
concerned. The philosopher therefore does not focus on what is or what happens as such. 
[…] In Hegel’s view, those who value the knowledge of what merely takes place as the 
most important philosophical knowledge remain fixated at the standpoint that should 
have been overcome through Kant’s “Copernican revolution”: they continue to view the 
object, rather than the determinations of thought, as the ground of truth. For Hegel, 
philosophy tests reality to determine the extent to which it is true; reality is incapable of 
testing truths of philosophy.225 
 
Schelling’s complaint is not that Hegel has failed to achieve a ‘quantitative all-
inclusiveness.’226 The reason why White can present Schelling’s worry in such a way is 
because of an assumed dichotomy regarding knowledge: on the one hand, ‘what is or what 
happens’ is said to be the exclusive concern of empirical judgments, and, on the other hand, 
the truth that the philosopher is concerned with is said to be purely occupied with the truth of 
thought-determinations. This dichotomy does not hold for Schelling. Moreover, his criticism 
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of Hegel precisely involves the rejection of such a dichotomy. Schelling does not think that 
freedom is the kind of thing that can be proved through concepts—this was seen in his 
criticism of the Logic. But neither does he think freedom can be proved through the 
empirical. More detail regarding how Schelling does think philosophy can grasp freedom will 
be the focus of chapter 4. Here I would like to first note an important aspect in the history of 
philosophy which already indicates why Schelling rejects the limitation of philosophy to 
either purely conceptual analysis or empirical judgments. 
An important part of the development of German thought after Kant was indebted to a 
basic insight, usually said to begin with J. C. F. Hölderlin – who attended the Tübingen 
seminary where Hegel and Schelling also studied – and traced through the work of the 
‘German romantics,’ including Schelling.227 The basic thought goes as follows. The knowing 
relation between subject and object could not exist without a ground of that relation (i.e. if 
there was nothing shared between them it would be a mystery as to how they come into a 
genuine relation in the first place). Such a ground cannot already contain a split between 
subject and object otherwise it would not be the ground of such a split (Hölderlin calls this 
the ground ‘absolute Being,’ which cannot be equated with the ‘Identity’ between subject and 
object228). Any attempt to make this ground an object of cognition treats it as an object 
opposed to the subject and thus must falsify it. Following Hölderlin’s lead, the young 
Schelling thought that we could find a way past this problem through intellectual intuition.229 
The extent to which the later Schelling’s answer to this problem is continuous with his earlier 
answer is debatable; in any case, Schelling still took this to require an answer of some 
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kind.230 We will see that this ground is understood in a way not anticipated by Hölderlin’s 
path breaking remarks, but that it nevertheless elaborates on the basic insight found there.231 
It is strange that White should take Schelling’s criticism of Hegel to run along the lines of 
the distinction between empirical judgments and ontological enquiry, given this well 
established background to Schelling’s intellectual development. Hölderlin’s ‘absolute Being’ 
is clearly neither accessible through reflection on the concept or on empirical beings. The 
issue does get more complicated in Schelling’s mature thought, however. The importance of 
the ground of separation for philosophy becomes more of an ethical and theological issue 
than a straightforwardly metaphysical or epistemological one. To briefly indicate how this 
shift can occur we can consider the issue of how the separation arises in the first place. If the 
separation results of necessity, if being originally splits in an unfree manner, then the 
formation of a determinate world looks to be hostile to our hopes for freedom and meaning. 
But if a free act was behind the original split, then our hopes for the hospitality of this world 
might be more secure. The way that a quite abstract metaphysical issue, with seemingly little 
ethical significance, can be imbued with such practical importance might strike us as rather 
idiosyncratic. But something homologous is at the heart of Hegel’s system. The question of 
the self-determination of the concept can be understood in plainly metaphysical or 
epistemological terms, but – as I have argued in the chapter 1 – becomes central to Hegel’s 
ethical and theological ambitions, namely the freedom of historical development and the 
knowledge of God. For Schelling, knowledge regarding these ethical and theological matters 
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is not to be found in an enquiry into the concept – as it is for Hegel – but neither is it to be 
found in empirical judgments.  
It is important to point out that the investigation that Schelling has in mind does not 
neglect the negative part of philosophy completely. Schelling thinks that reason, of itself, can 
tell us about this ground. As we saw in Schelling’s criticism of Descartes’ ontological proof 
of the existence of God (1.1.1), Schelling argues that this argument establishes the modality 
of God, but not the existence of God. Later Schelling would argue more explicitly that this 
provides us with the proof of the existence of this ground of relation as that which necessarily 
exists.232 But this is not yet to prove the existence of God. ‘I cannot…proceed from the 
concept of God to prove the existence of God, but I can proceed from the concept of that 
which indubitably exists and conversely prove the divinity of that which indubitably 
exists.’233 Ultimately, for Schelling, to prove that the ground of the subject-object relation is 
God amounts to proving that the world is fundamentally free or purposeful (i.e. divine).234  
Thus we see that Hegel and Schelling are both concerned with the problem of whether the 
world is fundamentally free, purposely, or divine. But whereas Hegel thinks philosophy can 
pursue this concern from within pure thought, Schelling thinks that we need to leave pure 
thought and investigate that ‘absolute Being’ which Hölderlin brought to our attention. 
 
…positive philosophy starts out just as little from something that occurs merely in 
thought (for then it would fall back into the negative philosophy) as it starts out from 
some being that is present in experience. If it does not start out from something that 
occurs in thought, and, thus, in no way from pure thought, then it will start out from that 
which is before and external to all thought, consequently from being, not from an 
empirical being.235 
 
In the first chapter the distinction between the Was and the Daß was drawn where the former 
referred to conceptual content and the latter to existence. At that point it was not necessary to 
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further specify that existence can mean either the existence of empirical things or the 
existence of the being which is the ground before all separation of concept and object, the 
being which is ‘before and external to all thought.’ Schelling uses a variety of terms to 
designate this: ‘that which purely is’ (das rein Seyende), ‘that which just exists’ (bloß 
Existirende), pure thatness (reine Daß).236 It is this non-empirical being – which I will refer 
to as pure existence – that Schelling claims Hegel fails to consider.237 So, his complaint to 
Hegel cannot be that the Logic fails to be acquainted with the multiplicity of empirical things; 
or, as White puts it, with an abundance of ‘merely correct’ judgments.  
Now, it could be the case that one reason White misunderstands the target of Schelling’s 
criticism of Hegel is that Schelling frequently says that positive philosophy has ‘actual 
happening [Geschehen]’ as its object.238 Schelling’s emphasis on what happens could lead to 
the suspicion that it is what happens in the empirical realm only which Schelling believes 
Hegel to be crucially ignorant of. Moreover, it might not be clear how the concern with the 
ground could be a matter of seeing what happens. It is true that, if the ground turns out not to 
be fundamentally free (divine), then nothing would ‘happen’ there in Schelling’s 
understanding of that term. Happening is associated with act, will, and freedom for Schelling. 
If the ground does turn out to be divine, then the development of a world of differences from 
that ground will have been the result of an act.239 By attributing an act to the concept, Hegel 
had absorbed that ground into the play of dialectical movement in the Logic.   
It is in this way that the concept in effect engulfs everything. The concept does not pretend 
to contain the wealth of empirical content, but it does pretend to contain knowledge about the 
freedom or divinity of existence. Insofar as the nonconceptual is considered only as the 
wealth of empirical material available for making judgements reporting the existence of this 
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or that finite object, Hegel’s concept does not engulf everything. But insofar as the 
nonconceptual is considered as the realm of freedom Hegel does engulf everything. It should 
be pointed out that in a certain sense this is merely to restate the conflict between Hegel and 
Schelling. For Hegel, the philosopher should not look to the nonconceptual here because free 
development precisely is characterised as the self-determination of the concept.240 However, I 
argued in the first chapter that Schelling has the resources to show this view to be mistaken. 
Thus now we can see that this gives us grounds to claim that Hegel has in fact illegitimately 
excluded the nonconceptual. And by doing so he has allowed the science of reason to take on 
the task of justifying existence. 
At this point I need to note an issue regarding Schelling’s intellectual development. The 
criticism of Hegel presented here is found in the Spätphilosophie. As noted, at this final stage 
in Schelling’s development he is concerned to find out whether pure existence can be 
understood as free or not. In the Freiheitsschrift the rough equivalent to pure existence is 
presented in the terms ‘indifference’ or the ‘unground.’241 These play a relatively minor role 
in the Freiheitsschrift, but what Schelling there refers to as the unground carries the same 
theological and ethical importance: it is supposed to guarantee the meaningful unity of the 
separations in the world (which Schelling characterises as ‘love’).242 If this unground were to 
be swallowed up in the play of dialectical relations, according to Schelling, then it would also 
be deprived of this role. 
The main difference between the Freiheitsschrift and the Spätphilosophie is the emphasis 
on human freedom as what a science of reason cannot grasp within itself. Human freedom is 
akin to the ground insofar as it is also properly seen as an act or deed. But the fact of human 
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freedom does not itself already justify the meaning of purposefulness of the world in itself 
(whereas, if the ground were found to be free, existence would be meaningful). This is partly 
because human freedom can bring evil into the world. On this account, then, Hegel’s 
limitation to the concept not only means he cannot grasp the justifiability of the world (i.e. its 
divinity), but he also could not grasp if the world was unjustifiable. These issues will be 
important for the following chapter. For now, we just need to note that the threat which the 
concept poses to pure existence is also posed to human freedom.  
 
3.1.2 Adorno’s account 
 
When Adorno accuses Hegel of promoting the ‘primacy of the subject’ or of establishing the 
world as a ‘mental totality’ we can be forgiven for thinking that the charge being made is 
something like Hegel’s philosophy ends up as an extreme subjective idealism where 
everything is dissolved into consciousness.243 But this is not what Adorno has in mind. As we 
saw, hypostatization does its work on concepts, not on things—the entities of the world are 
outside the scope of this operation. It is not existing things, then, that are supposed to have 
been consumed by the concept. So what kind of identity can hypostatization have set up? To 
answer this question we need to return to the discussion of the nature of hypostatization. 
First of all, it will be remembered that the concepts which Adorno tries to defend from 
hypostatization are quite general and abstract ones: immediacy, indeterminacy, particularity, 
and so on. These concepts pick out precious little of the concrete detail of specific entities in 
the world; so we know that the concern is not that such concepts might be further deprived of 
empirical detail. What these concepts do pick out is the very fact that there is something 
substantial (Sachhaltig), or a substrate (Substrat), which our concepts refer to; for example, 
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something which is indeterminate or something which is particular. This might seem like an 
obvious or trivial point, but it is a point which Adorno thinks philosophers frequently 
overlook to damaging effect. It is just this very minimal recognition of a substrate – rather 
than specific objects – which needs to be secured in this instance.  
 
There is no Being without entities. “Something”—as a cogitatively indispensable 
substrate [denknotwendiges Substrat] of any concept, including the concept of Being—is 
the utmost abstraction of the subject-matter [Sachhaltigen] that is not identical with 
thinking, an abstraction not to be abolished by any further thought process. Without 
“something” there is no thinkable logic, and there is no way to cleanse this logic of its 
metalogical rudiment. The supposition of an absolute form, of “something at large” that 
might enable our thinking to shake off that subject-matter, is illusionary. Constitutive for 
the form of “subject-matter at large” [Sachhaltiges überhaupt] is the substantive 
experience of subject-matter.244 
 
The real problem comes, however, not with ignorance of the substrate, but with the 
transfiguration of the concept of this substrate (e.g. the concept ‘something’ which is the most 
abstract reference to there being a substrate) into something wholly conceptual, thereby 
eliminating the part that is not identical to the concept. This abstract and high-altitude sketch 
can perhaps be clarified if we return to one of Adorno’s specific engagements. 
Adorno is not the most sensitive reader of Heidegger, but the reflections that result from 
his critical engagements often allow insight into the details of Adorno’s thought. Heidegger’s 
‘Dasein’ is treated by Adorno as another example of a concept of a substrate – or, in other 
words, a concept that necessarily refers to the nonconceptual245 – which, like the concept of 
‘something,’ can easily be mistreated by the philosopher.  
 
The concept of the ontological cannot be attached to a substrate [Substrat], as if 
ontological were its predicate. To be a fact is no predicate which can attach itself to a 
concept; and, since Kant’s criticism of the ontological proof of the existence of God, any 
philosophy should be careful not to affirm this. The same holds true for the nonfacticity 
of concepts, their essentiality. This essentiality is localized in the relation of the concept 
to the facticity that is synthesized in it—and never belongs to it, as Heidegger suggests, 
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as a quality of it itself. To say that Dasein “is ontic or ontological,” can, strictly speaking, 
not be judged at all, for what is meant by existence is a substrate [Substrat].246  
 
This is a complex passage, but if we read it in the light of the previous one I think we can 
unpack what is going on here. Perhaps the most confusing part is the claim that ‘what is 
meant by existence is a substrate.’ As we have seen, in Negative Dialectics substrate is 
defined not as a specific object, but as a kind of place holder indicating ‘the subject-matter 
that is not identical with thinking.’ In this way the substrate looks to do similar work as the 
thing in itself does for Kant. But it should be remembered that the substrate is not supposed to 
indicate the wealth of what is experienced by the subject.247 As Adorno puts it, the substrate 
is the ‘abstraction of the subject-matter…not to be abolished by any further thought process.’ 
It is a concept which explicitly points to nonconceptuality.  
Now, we might ask, if we are dealing with a concept, what mischief could it possibly 
suffer in the philosopher’s hands? In short, this concept can be purged of its inherent 
reference beyond itself. Adorno does not object to the use of concepts to pick out ‘what 
essentially belongs to something that is’ (the what in Schelling’s language, or the 
determination in Hegel’s language)—he claims it is ‘obvious’ that such use is 
‘ontological.’248 The philosopher does not damage the substrate by doing ontology in this 
sense. It is when the concept ‘unnoticeably [becomes] the ontological essence of the existent 
in itself’ that we get into trouble. To understand this we can think about Adorno’s inventive 
twist on Kant’s criticism of the ontological proof of the existence of God: just as we cannot 
say that something exists just because we think about it, we cannot say that something is 
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essential (i.e. ‘the nonfacticity of the concept,’ or the conceptual part of the concept) just 
because we think about it. If the concept of ‘existence,’ the ‘indeterminate,’ the ‘thing in 
itself,’ or simply ‘something’ is said to be conceptual through and through, then what these 
concepts refer to is simply the concept again.249 In this way the substrate has been given the 
quality of being essential. 
Now, Adorno’s claim is not that philosophers, such as Hegel and Heidegger, bring a 
substrate into existence merely by thinking it (Adorno’s nod to Kant’s criticism of the 
ontological proof should not throw us off here). Nor is Adorno’s point that this operation 
makes all of existence knowable from within philosophy. The point is that, however we find 
the world, we know in advance that it is as it should be because no matter what happens in 
the world it cannot challenge the philosopher’s conviction that, with the concept, they do not 
simply know the essence of things, but know that things are of the essence. The ‘rule of the 
subject’ in this instance is not about the mastery of all things, but the indifference to things; it 
is the ‘totality of the concept, [in] which nothing nonconceptual can stop any more.’250 Thus 
Hegel has not engulfed all of existence with the concept, but has only in effect engulfed 
everything by predetermining the substrate as essential and thus making the nonconceptual 
impotent against this essence. As Hegel himself affirms, any content that our thought can 
attain is from the categories alone (thought-determinations or the essence of things), not from 
‘sensible material’; and this is the case even for the philosophy of nature and spirit.251  
We now hopefully have a better picture of the manner in which the nonconceptual is 
treated in the hypostatization of the concept. But it is not evident why Adorno claims this 
operation results in the a priori justification of the world. In concluding his discussion of 
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Heidegger’s hypostatization of the substrate ‘existence,’ Adorno says: ‘It vindicates without 
authority and without theology, maintaining that what is of essence is real, and, by the same 
token, that the existent is essential, meaningful, and justified.’252 First of all, it is striking how 
this contrasts with Schelling’s criticism. Schelling precisely did find a theological 
justification (albeit a very minimal theology). It is fairly straightforward to see how the proof 
of a living force in the concept can underwrite a justification of the world (although not as 
straightforward as a more robust account of creation, as we saw in 1.2). But how can the 
conceptuality of existence be said to guarantee its meaningfulness or justification? Adorno is 
not terribly helpful on this point, despite it being central to many of his critical claims. 
Sometimes he suggests that saying anything about the world, and history more specifically, 
which goes beyond mere facts, is already to bestow meaning.253 But he goes on to say that his 
own attempt to formulate a philosophy of history goes beyond the mere facts and yet is able 
‘to understand it as something meaningless.’254 We will go into this in more detail in chapter 
five. For now we just need to note that, prima facia, Adorno is committed to the thought that 
constructing a history beyond the facts does not necessarily entail bestowing a meaning on 
history or affirming it.  
Another clue comes with Adorno’s suggestion that what ultimately stops us from 
affirming history is the antagonistic course it has taken.255 In short, where the universal (i.e. 
rationality) and the particular (i.e. individuals) cannot reciprocally affect each other,256 and 
the universal suppresses the particular.257 In this case, the particular would bear the brunt of 
the antagonistic (or unreconciled) relationship it has with the universal, and history would be 
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nothing more than ‘blind fate.’258 A confusing aspect to call attention to here is the fact that 
Adorno’s remarks must be understood at two different levels. As noted previously, Adorno 
thinks Hegel’s philosophy is both true and untrue simultaneously: true in virtue of reflecting 
the real situation, untrue in virtue of transfiguring that situation into a rational appearance. 
According to Adorno, Hegel privileges the universal over the particular in his account of 
history. But, rather than presenting the privileging of the universal as revealing the 
unreconciled relationship to the particular, Hegel presents it as reconciliation. The illusion of 
reconciliation provided by hypostatization grounds the conviction that history is meaningful 
because all conflicts are guaranteed to never seriously threaten the primacy of the concept. 
 
3.2 Tensions 
 
In both Schelling’s and Adorno’s accounts, then, what is outside the concept cannot change 
our convictions about whether the world is justified or not. In Schelling’s case this is because 
Hegel has claimed to have knowledge of the existence of a self-determining activity from 
within reason alone; and in Adorno’s case this is because Hegel has guaranteed a harmony 
between the concept and the nonconceptual by ensuring that the latter cannot upset the 
former. Now, although both Schelling and Adorno object to Hegel for illegitimately reducing 
to thought that which is not identical to it, we need to be careful not to too quickly assimilate 
their respective understandings of the non-identical. I now consider the divergence of 
Schelling’s and Adorno’s account of the non-identical and then note some of the 
consequences of this divergence for their views of history. 
 
3.2.1 Immediacy: inside or outside the subject-object relation? 
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A recent example of this kind of assimilation is found in an article by Franck Fischbach.259 
Fischbach claims that Adorno’s philosophy is directed to the same object as Schelling’s 
positive philosophy, namely the pure existence which is external and prior to all thought.260 
As I have shown in this chapter, this cannot be the case. Adorno is not after pure existence, 
but simply the nonconceptual referent of the concept. The latter cannot be equivalent to the 
former for numerous reasons. Firstly, pure existence must precede all separation between 
concept and nonconcept. Secondly, Adorno does not credit the nonconceptual – which Hegel 
reduces to the concept – with the quality of freedom or will. Finally, Adorno repeatedly 
claims that we cannot cognise something beyond the subject-object relation. Indeed, his 
criticism of hypostatization targets precisely the claim that philosophy makes to know 
something like a ‘third’ beyond the subject-object relation. The distortions and confusions in 
Fischbach’s comparison of Schelling and Adorno are encapsulated in his misrepresentation of 
the point just noted, that Adorno refuses a standpoint beyond the subject-object relation. 
Fischbach quotes Adorno’s claim that it is impossible for thought to transcend the separation 
of subject and object, only to completely miss the point of this claim.261 Fischbach interprets 
this to mean that Adorno believes there to be a standpoint beyond the opposition between 
subject and object, but simply that it is not accessible for thought.262 Adorno is assimilated to 
Schelling’s position by claiming that Adorno believed such a position to be accessible 
through will rather than thinking. It is hard to believe Adorno could be so badly 
misunderstood. This is especially the case since the quote cited by Fischbach is situated 
precisely within Adorno’s accusation that Heidegger’s attempt to attain a standpoint beyond 
the subject-object relation is irrationalist.  
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  The relation between Schelling and Adorno here has been more accurately represented 
by Andrew Bowie.263  Bowie tells a similar story to the one told above about Hölderlin 
(3.1.1), but with the aid of the romantic philosophy of Friedrich Schlegel.264 Bowie also 
claims that, despite the development of Schelling’s thought, the point about the being which 
is the ground of the separation between subject and object traverses the early and late 
Schelling.265 Adorno’s resistance to this romantic position is correctly noted.266 Bowie then 
goes on to say that Schelling’s position vis-à-vis Hegel’s idealism is superior to Adorno’s. 
The central reasons offered for this conclusion are: that Adorno merely inverts Hegel and that 
Adorno fails to find an immediacy which could be saved from the devouring concept. 
 
The fact is that Adorno inverts Hegel’s logic of reflection. Whereas Hegel invalidly 
makes the immediacy of being into a subjectively mediated moment of the dialectic, in 
order to dissolve it into our knowledge of it, Adorno invalidly makes the mediated object 
into something immediate, so that it can be shown to be prior to the subject. The only 
defensible form of such immediacy, though—which Adorno, like Derrida, would not 
countenance—is the immediacy of being, as the nonreflexive ground of the difference of 
subject and object that emerges via the failure of reflection to ground itself.267   
 
I will now argue that Bowie is wrong to say that Adorno merely inverts Hegel, and I question 
Bowie’s suggestion that we need to maintain the immediacy of a nonreflexive ground in 
order to challenge Hegel. 
The first problem in Bowie’s account is that he claims that both Schelling and Adorno 
think that ‘immediacy is the way out of the narcissistic trap of Hegelian reflection.’268 Even 
though Bowie has already noted that Adorno is well aware of the romantic option (to defend 
an immediate nonreflexive being), the suggestion here is that Adorno nevertheless wants 
something similar. The evidence offered for this is the following quote: ‘Immediacy itself, 
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however, stands for a moment which does not need cognition, mediation, in the way that 
cognition does need the immediate.’269 As we saw in the reconstruction of Adorno’s criticism 
of Hegel’s hypostatization of immediacy, what Adorno means here is not that there is 
something which is wholly unmediated, but that the way or mode of mediation found in that 
which is cognised is not the same way or mode of mediation found in concepts themselves 
(see 2.4). Adorno is thus quite open about the fact that the immediacy he wants to save from 
Hegel’s idealism is mediated, just not completely absorbed in that mediation. Although 
Bowie is wrong to suggest that Adorno is after a pure immediacy, he is obviously right to say 
that Adorno’s mediated immediacy falls short of the immediacy of Schelling’s nonreflexive 
being. But with this result we can see why it is incorrect to claim that Adorno merely inverts 
Hegel: Adorno does not make the ‘mediated object into something immediate,’ but simply 
shows that the mediated object is not mediated to its core. If Adorno were to invert Hegel 
then he would need to reduce mediation to immediacy in the way that Hegel reduced 
immediacy to mediation; but, as we have just seen, Adorno does not do this. 
But Bowie need not have introduced this rhetorical flourish to his argument – i.e. claiming 
the mere inversion of Hegel in Adorno – since it seems that his real concern is to argue that, 
by refusing to take the romantic position, Adorno has failed to escape the framework of the 
subject-object relation. It is true that Adorno refuses to go outside the subject-object frame-
work, but Bowie does not give clear reasons as to why this makes Adorno less able to show 
that Hegel is wrong to completely absorb the immediate into mediation. Instead we get an 
assortment of criticisms of Adorno: from the failure of materialist accounts of subjectivity to 
the conflation of social and philosophical problems.270 I cannot address all these worries, but 
I have argued that Adorno can successfully criticise Hegel’s misuse of the concept without 
having to take Schelling’s strategy. Further, the clarification of the difference between 
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Adorno and Schelling should help future debates over the potentials for non-idealist 
philosophies.   
 
3.2.2 Justifiability of history: purposiveness or reconciliation?   
 
The difference between Schelling’s and Adorno’s responses to Hegel also gives us insight 
into the standard each believes would have to be reached in order for the world and human 
history to be considered either meaningful or justified. As we have seen, Schelling has a very 
high standard: the world must have originated with a free creation and be purposely 
structured. Adorno’s standard is much lower: reconciliation between universal and particular. 
I now consider how these two accounts might relate to one another.  
In the opening of Schelling’s Berlin lectures he presents the case that, even on the 
assumption of the freedom of the will in human beings, we would still be none the wiser 
about the meaning or purpose of the world. 
 
All of nature toils and is engaged in unceasing labor. Man for his part also does not rest, 
and it is as an old book says: although everything under the sun is so full of toil and 
labor, one nonetheless does not see that anything is improved or that something is truly 
accomplished in which one might truly believe. A generation passes away, and another 
arises to itself again pass away. In vain we expect that something new will happen in 
which this turmoil will finally find its goal; everything that happens happens only so that 
something else again can happen, which itself in turn becomes the past to something else. 
Ultimately, everything happens in vain, and there is in every deed, in all the toil and 
labor of man himself nothing but vanity: everything is vain, for vanity is everything that 
lacks a true purpose. Thus far from man and his endeavors making the world 
comprehensible, it is man himself that is the most incomprehensible and who inexorably 
drives me to the belief in the wretchedness of all being, a belief that makes itself known 
in so many bitter pronouncements from both ancient and recent times. It is precisely man 
that drives me to the final desperate question: Why is there anything at all? Why is there 
not nothing?—271 
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Parts of this passage resonate with Adorno’s concern that history has taken a repetitive or 
cyclical course. But, whereas for Adorno it would seem to be enough to put a stop to this 
cyclical nature of the time of history so far in order to redeem existence (at least to some 
extent), for Schelling we need to have some confidence for thinking that there was a purpose 
at the basis of this history in first place. In other words, Schelling thinks that history can only 
be meaningful if the source of the world is divine or free.   
This already anticipates what we will discover in the following chapter: that the 
Freiheitsschrift will provide more insight into the potentials for the problems of history than 
the Spätphilosophie. This is because the Freiheitsschrift will show that it is not just a lack of 
purposiveness to the world which might cause us concern, but the introduction of a hostile 
purpose into the world (i.e. not just the lack of purpose), namely evil. The Spätphilosophie 
does still have a place for the problem ‘the fall’ and therefore seems to match the 
Freiheitsschrift on this score.272 But, as I argue in the next chapter, Schelling’s primary aim 
in the Spätphilosophie is to provide an a posteriori proof (erweisen) of God which 
consequently is incapable of countenancing history as being unfree or compulsive (see 4.1.3).  
Similarly to the Freiheitsschrift, Adorno thinks that the problems facing us are greater 
than a lack of purpose. Adorno is worried about the historical forms of domination which do 
not just deprive us of meaning, but create suffering and unfreedom also. We will see this in 
more detail in chapter 5. For now we can note that the kind of freedom which would result 
from a genuine relation between universal and particular – which would amount to a 
reconciliation between them which was not the coerced, false reconciliation which Hegel 
achieves through the primacy of the concept.   
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PART II PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AFTER HEGEL: 
FREEDOM AND COMPULSION  
 
 
4. Schelling’s mature philosophy of history  
 
The first chapter established the failure of Hegel’s Logic to generate extra-logical content 
from out of the exposition of the concept in pure thought. Schelling is not the only 
philosopher to have made such arguments, but he is one of the few to attempt to still pursue 
the philosophy of history, and do so from within a philosophical system. The purpose of this 
chapter is to see how successful Schelling is in this task. 
A core aim of the Freiheitsschrift is to show that philosophy can grasp those parts of the 
world which exceed the grasp of an overly rationalistic form of reason (including Hegel’s), 
including freedom and history, without thereby reducing or doing ill justice to them. This 
work is pivotal in Schelling’s development because of the centrality it gives to human 
freedom and the radical questioning of idealist philosophies – including his own earlier works 
– to achieve this aim. In this way, although the Freiheitsschrift predates the Munich lectures 
– which contain the criticisms of Hegel mobilised in the first chapter of this thesis – it is still 
a relevant place to start for Schelling’s alternative to Hegel’s philosophy of history. Schelling 
attempts to make reason compatible with freedom and history by showing how there is a 
genuine unity of system and freedom. Very briefly, the main strands of Schelling’s strategy 
can be outlined. Firstly, he reformulates pantheism so as to make sense of some elements of 
contingency and purposiveness in nature. In this way Schelling manages to bring freedom 
into necessity, or, as it were, soften necessity. Going in the other direction – i.e. to bring 
systematicity into (human) freedom – is a much more challenging task. Three moments to 
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this task can be specified: (1) an a priori exposition of the possibility of human freedom; (2) 
an account of human freedom as neither voluntary nor compelled, but as an intelligible and 
atemportal act; (3) the subsumption of the actuality of human freedom under the necessary 
process of God’s self-revelation. I argue that, ultimately, the Freiheitsschrift deprives history 
of its historical character—i.e. of its mutable dimension. The official story in the 
Freiheitsschrift is that history is ultimately a revelation of God (the unfolding of the 
unconditioned ground). Moreover, in the latter account this history of revelation is held to be 
the case independent of empirical interpretation of the course of events. Given this 
unpromising start it might be wondered why the Freiheitsschrift should command our 
attention at all; especially since other aspects of Schelling’s philosophy appear more 
promising. In order to answer this question I give a brief account of these other aspects and 
why I think they reveal the need to turn back to the Freiheitsschrift.   
In Schelling’s philosophy from 1827 onwards – the so-called Spätphilosophie – he looks 
to have two important advantages over the Freiheitsschrift: (1) it holds open the possibility 
that history could fail to provide evidence for a free origin to the world273; and (2) that the 
ongoing confirmation of freedom is based a posteriori. The Spätphilosophie approaches the 
philosophy of history via a hermeneutical guide. It proceeds on the hypothesis that the world 
is free, but in such a way that we are always open to the possibility that experience might 
contradict our hope or expectation of finding freedom. This is one way in which we could 
understand Adorno’s formulation for the philosophy of history: ‘universal history must be 
construed and denied.’274 This has many appealing features, not least is that it would be a 
productive position to place in dialogue with contemporary critical theory.275 Despite these 
desirable features, I think this does not go far enough in understanding the ways in which 
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history could go wrong. More specifically, the only way that unfreedom or necessity can be 
said to be the material of history is if it was so from eternity. The Spätphilosophie is 
committed to this because of the exclusivity of the options it pursues in the interpretation of 
history. If, on the one hand, history is to be understood as compulsive, then it is because there 
is no God – no free creator of the world – and if, on the other hand, history is to be 
understood as being created by God, then history must be fundamentally free. In short, there 
is no way to understand history as compelled in any important respect which is not 
metaphysically necessitated (i.e. that the cosmos is constituted as unfree).  
Despite the epistemic modesty of this approach to the philosophy of history, then, it still 
rules out the possibility of understanding history as having gone wrong (i.e. not 
metaphysically grounded, but contingently occurring), even when the possibility of the 
world’s origin in necessity (i.e. metaphysically grounded necessity: nihilism or the lack of 
God) is retained as a constraint on its attempt to prove otherwise. In other words, the positive 
philosophy is a posteriori but limited to the ongoing attempt to prove the existence of God; I 
want to say that the positive philosophy should be able to understand history as – following 
terms of the Freiheitsschrift – the product of an ‘inverted God.’276 This would be a history 
which we assume to have been generated from out of some kind of freedom and therefore 
would not be nihilistic in the sense of assuming that the world is necessarily determined in a 
fatalistic way. This would provide the basis for an alternative interpretation of the previously 
cited epithet from Adorno – ‘universal history must be construed and denied.’ Rather than 
opening up a universal history of freedom to potential falsification through an increased 
epistemic modesty (i.e. so that universal history is construed in the sense of letting our 
interpretation be guided, but denied in the sense of allowing it to be falsified), our universal 
history is construed in the sense that a compulsive or necessary movement of history is 
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claimed to be at work, but denied in the sense that this necessity is not itself necessary—or, it 
is contingently necessary, but not logically necessary. From this starting point the account 
does not get drawn into certain foundational metaphysical debates about the existence or non-
existence of spirit, will, ideality, mentality, or whatever you want to call it. In order to 
question the dogmatic proponent of the existence of God we do not challenge the existence of 
the ideal wholesale (in the manner, say, of the reductionist physicalist—or, in our terms, the 
nihilist). Rather, granting the existence of freedom, we argue that it has been perverted. The 
threat to the existence of the will is not provided by its other (mechanistic being), but by 
will’s own self-undermining.  
First, I spell out the problem with Hegel’s philosophy of history in terms of optimism 
(4.1). Before arguing that Schelling’s Spätphilosophie fails to adequately escape unwarranted 
optimism, I also consider the contemporary attempt to reconstruct Hegel’s philosophy of 
history to also avoid optimistic excess in the interpretation of history. Then I elaborate on 
how the Freiheitsschrift elaborates the idea of evil which provides the basis for an account of 
unfreedom which avoids unwarranted pessimism as much as unwarranted optimism (4.2). 
Finally, I look at how Schelling attempts to unite this account with his systematic ambitions 
(4.3 and 4.4). Ultimately, I argue that Schelling's account of history in the Freiheitsschrift 
fails to provide a sufficient alternative to Hegel's, but that the thought of an ontological 
perversion found in Schelling's idea of evil provides the ground for thinking a proper 
alternative. In short, this offers the philosophical resources to understand how history has 
contingently manifested unfreedom, as distinct from understanding history as necessarily 
manifesting freedom (Hegel), or as only possibly manifesting freedom (Hegelian 
reconstructions and the Spätphilosophie). 
 
4.1 The problem of optimism  
132 
 
 
In order to draw out the unique contribution of the Freiheitsschrift to the continuing struggle 
to philosophically interpret history, I present two important competitors: Firstly, a 
contemporary reconstruction of a Hegelian philosophy of history, and secondly, Schelling’s 
own attempts to interpret history in the Spätphilosophie. These are chosen because they both 
represent significant attempts to formulate a philosophy of history that avoids the danger of 
promoting an unwarranted optimism. I argue that both succeed in this aim, but that they do so 
only to a limited degree; that is, they avoid the problems of, what is call, ‘strong optimism,’ 
but they still promote a ‘moderate optimism,’ and a ‘weak optimism,’ respectively.  
 
4.1.1. Strong optimism  
 
Schelling and Adorno exposed the illegitimate way that Hegel expanded the concept beyond 
its limits. The result of which was that Hegel closed off his philosophy to the nonconceptual. 
A further result was that this enabled Hegel to provide an a priori justification of the world. I 
now argue that this kind of a priori justification accords with ‘strong optimism,’ where this 
means something like the view that this world is optimal or best.277 Of course, Hegel does not 
make judgments about the concrete world (or anything else which could be considered a 
referent of our discourse) in the Logic, nor advance static – or, as Hegel would call them, 
‘presupposed’ – principles which would underwrite such judgments. Instead he offers an 
exposition of the concept. But, as we have seen, this exposition aims to show that freedom 
and rationality are guaranteed, and, as a result, there is nothing in principle that can 
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undermine this result. Thus, although the analysis of pure thought does not make direct 
claims about the existing world, it does guarantee how the world will unfold.  
If this is an accurate account of Hegel then his philosophy of history has severe limitations 
from the start. But it should be noted that contemporary commentators and followers of 
Hegel have themselves responded to this challenge.278 They largely turn away from the Logic 
and go directly to the philosophy of history or other areas of the Realphilosophie.279 As I will 
show in relation to a specific example, this move is usually made in the belief that Hegel can 
be saved from strong optimism (and the historical closure it entails) by curbing or softening 
the necessity involved in the realisation of freedom or rationality.280 To anticipate somewhat, 
the strategy can be briefly sketched. The contingency and particularity of empirical existence 
is given a more prominent role, to the point where it can block or hinder the realisation of the 
concept in the world—that is, to the point where the manifestation of freedom is precarious. 
In this reconstructed Hegel, then, manifest freedom is not guaranteed or necessary and thus 
can only be known to exist a posteriori. But, as I will show, the capacity or ability for the 
exercise of freedom is assumed to be an ever present condition and thus latent freedom is still 
known a priori. The lack of a guarantee of the realisation or manifestation of freedom clearly 
distances this position from strong optimism. However, the assumed existence of latent 
freedom means that there is still a confidence or hope that freedom will manifest. For this 
reason I place this position under the title ‘moderate optimism.’281 In order to fill out and 
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substantiate these points I now consider how contemporary Hegelians account for history 
along these lines.  
 
4.1.2 Moderate Optimism  
 
Iain Macdonald presents a reconstruction of Hegel’s account of ‘conceptual history’ in an 
attempt to show that the universal or necessary aspects of reason are adequately reconciled 
with the contingencies and particularities of history. 282  Macdonald admits that some of 
Hegel’s remarks give the impression that there is a heavy asymmetry in favour of the 
universal in history. Two passages from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History 
in particular claim that philosophy interprets history by ‘look[ing] for a general design’ and 
assuring us that its progressive course is not threatened – it is ‘untouched and unharmed’ – by 
the vicissitudes of individual’s actions in history.283 Macdonald believes a more balanced 
account of the relation of universal and particular in history can be found in Hegel’s concept 
of ‘experience’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit.284 Experience, in this sense, denotes a very 
specific kind of activity which, when successfully realised, manifests the freedom distinctive 
of consciousness. This activity is realised, and freedom is manifested, when an individual 
exercises her critical capacity to find the world wanting in some respect and remedy it—or, in 
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Macdonald’s terms, when she successfully enacts ‘rational self-correction.’285 The important 
point is that there are two conditions of success: first, that there is the rationality found in 
universal consciousness qua capacity – a ‘necessary possibility of reason’286 – and, secondly, 
that is the realisation of this capacity in actual (i.e. embodied) consciousness of historical 
agents. I take it that this dual conditionality of success is expressed in Macdonald’s following 
remark: ‘reason only “happens” when the mere possibility of self-correction becomes a 
reality for and by historical consciousness.’287 By clearly demarking these two conditions a 
space is opened up for the contingencies of history to influence the realisation of 
consciousness’s rational capacity and thus curtail our assurance that reason will necessarily 
drive history forward.  
However, the existence of this rational capacity itself is never exposed to the threat of 
contingency in the way that that the exercise of this capacity is. Macdonald is forthright about 
this issue. He admits that ‘nothing in principle can bring a halt to the self-corrective activity 
of reason.’288 Although a particular historical individual – or set of historical individuals – 
may not succeed in manifesting reason, the capacity will always find a way since, as long as 
there is a world which can be improved, ‘in principle some individual consciousness will be 
able to confront it and undertake to negate it’.289 It is not immediately clear whether this 
reconstruction is an example of strong optimism or moderate optimism, as defined above. On 
the one hand, manifest freedom (i.e. enacted rational capacity) is deprived the universal status 
accorded to latent freedom (i.e. the necessary possibility of enacting this capacity). On the 
other hand, it seems that the empirical world can never put up enough resistance to obstruct 
the realisation of reason. This ambiguity is reflected in the fact that Macdonald wavers on 
exactly the degree to which the strongly optimistic outlook is softened. He claims to have 
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avoided being ‘unequivocally optimistic about the power of reason’, but concedes that there 
is still a ‘certain optimism’ at work here.290 Whether or not Macdonald fails to reconstruct 
Hegel in a manner which avoids strong optimism need not be decided here. What I want to 
highlight is that the basic requirements of any Hegelian philosophy of history means that, no 
matter how much emphasis is placed on contingency or particularity, history is based on the 
assumed existence of latent freedom.  
For instance, if the contemporary strategy is taken to its limit, then particularity can be 
granted the power to not only temporarily obstruct progress, but also to bring the 
development of reason to a standstill or even undo its progress—via some pervasive paralysis 
or deformation of our ability to use our inherent rational capacity.291 It is true that in this case 
the assurance that freedom will manifest is minimal, and thus offers less security than an 
optimism in which the possibility for an indefinite interruption of the realisation of freedom is 
not on the table. But this is not a difference in kind; only a difference in degree. For whether 
manifest freedom is believed to be on the ascent, stagnating or in decline, latent freedom is 
always assumed to be ready and waiting to get to work. But this criticism could be met with a 
shrug since it seems that a philosophy of history that can account for failures or lapses in the 
realisation of freedom is as open to negativity as is needed, or wanted. Anything more 
negative than this would be dismissed as pessimism or nihilism. If history were so terrible as 
to forestall the possibility of anything getting better there would not be much point to a 
philosophy of history in the first place. In fact, if there were a complete absence of freedom 
or meaning in the world, then it is not clear that we could even make sense out of the idea 
that there is history at all. This kind of response moves too quickly. The point of objecting to 
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the assumed existence of latent freedom is not to posit its opposite—an assumed non-
existence of latent freedom.292 Rather, the point is to say that the existence of latent freedom 
needs to be confirmed a posteriori as much as manifest freedom does if we do not want to 
assume that the substance of history is freedom and therefore predetermine how we can 
understand history. For the Hegelian, the greatest accumulation of irrationality, unreason, or 
horror could, at most, only indicate a deficit of (manifest) freedom, never doubt that history’s 
meaning is the realisation of freedom. 
 
4.1.3 Weak optimism  
 
The challenge, then, is to avoid a priori justification altogether; or, expressed positively, to 
justify our belief in the existence of manifest and latent freedom through only a posteriori 
means. It is one of the major strengths of Schelling’s Spätphilosophie to have formulated and 
pursued precisely this task. Schelling has not previously convinced himself of the existence 
of a free activity—of which we then need only turn to reality to see how well it has 
manifested. Rather than an a priori assurance, the beginning is made with a ‘wanting’ 
(Wollen) for there to be something like this at the root of things.293 I say “something like this” 
because Schelling does not think that the freedom characteristic of the world – if, indeed, the 
world can be so characterised – would be due to a rational structure unfolding itself in human 
action.294 Rather, it must be due to the fact that the world itself is a result of a free act. Now, 
these different conceptions of freedom fundamentally separate the late Schelling and Hegel. 
As important as this is, I only flag it to avoid confusion about their respective projects. What 
matters for the current question – about the receptiveness of a philosophy of history – is the 
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divergence in how they try to prove freedom. To return to the point then, since there is not 
even the minimal assurance that freedom exists in an undeveloped state, our hope for 
assurance is entirely dependent upon the empirical.  
Schelling recognises that this is an unusual thought. For freedom is an example of 
something not merely empirical in nature; it goes beyond the finite relations of the 
empirical. 295  So how are we supposed to know freedom purely through the empirical? 
Schelling draws an analogy with our knowledge of the freedom of individual agents.  
 
It is incorrect to reduce empiricism in general to mere sensation as if it had only this as 
its object, since an intelligence of free will and action, of which each and every one of us 
is, does not as such fall under the purview of the senses and yet this is something 
empirical and indeed something that can only be known empirically. For no one knows 
what exists within a person until that person expresses himself. His intellectual and moral 
character exists only a posteriori, which is to say that it is discernible only through his 
statements and actions. Now suppose that the discussion was about an intelligence in the 
world, assumed to have a free will for action—this intelligence would likewise not be 
knowable a priori, but only through its deeds that occur in experience. Although a 
supersensible being, it will nonetheless be something that can only be known 
commensurate with experience. Empiricism as such, therefore, hardly excludes all 
knowledge of the supersensible, as one customarily assumes, and even Hegel 
presupposes.296  
 
So, in Schelling’s example, we never directly perceive the freedom of agents, but only take 
their actions to give us reason to think they are free. Schelling has some difficulties, however, 
in making sense of this kind of empirical approach since he claims it cannot be a form of 
inference.297 In which case he would have rejected both: the attempt to know God through 
reason alone (in the way that Hegel had done) and the attempt to know God through sensible 
experience (i.e. through induction). Schelling tries to get around this dilemma by refining 
what he means by a posteriori knowledge.298 In any case, we need not dwell on this issue here 
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since our concern is with the degree to which Schelling’s philosophy can remain open to the 
possibility that freedom does not exist.  
One of the consequences of Schelling making the philosophical investigation into freedom 
a matter of a posteriori knowledge is that the investigation is never finished. His version of 
the proof (erweisen) of the existence of God is provisional because, since it is never finished, 
there could always be some evidence found which threatens the belief in the free source of 
the world. We can never be sure that the world is not deterministic and purposeless, so we 
must keep looking to the world for the indications of an intelligence and freedom. This is the 
reason Schelling calls his proof ‘progressive,’ and refers to this type of philosophy as ‘an 
always advancing knowledge.’299  
The epistemic modesty of this approach – based on an a posteriori and continuing proof of 
freedom – means that we cannot assure ourselves, a priori, of even a minimal freedom (e.g. 
an inbuilt capacity for rational self-correction as the ever-present potential for the realisation 
of freedom in history, as in Macdonald’s reconstruction). It is for this reason that I take this 
position to not to be a form of modest optimism: i.e. conditionality is not only applied to the 
conviction that things will turn out as they should, but also to the conviction that there was 
potential for things to turn out right in the first place. In other words, the freedom of creation 
and creator – development and beginning of the world – are made provisional. But with this 
advantage comes a disadvantage. Despite the fact that this approach never reaches complete 
certainty of God’s existence, it is not clear how this approach could ever seriously come to 
doubt God’s existence. Edward Allen Beach has struggled in particular with how it could be 
that some a posteriori evidence could ever come to ‘contradict’ (Widerspruch) the guiding 
hypothesis that God exists.300 Beach argues that the root of the problem is the nature of the 
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object of the proof: if we found evidence for the existence of God in history, then it is 
difficult to see how subsequent evidence could contradict the previous confirmation.301  
But this problem runs even deeper than Beach suspects. The inability for the positive 
philosophy to provide something like a disproof of God (or a provisional disproof) is due to 
the fundamental disposition that the positive philosopher takes up. The continuing proof 
cannot be codified into a universally communicable demonstration. 
 
…even this proof is only a proof for those who want to think and move forward, and, 
thus, only for the wise. It is not like a proof of geometry, with which one can coerce 
those of even the most limited abilities, and even the dumb, whereas I can coerce no one 
to become wise through experience if he does not want to302 
 
The proof, then, can only be freely taken up, not accepted upon coercion. As noted at the 
beginning of this section, the positive philosopher begins with a ‘wanting’ (Wollen). The 
search for freedom is an expression of freedom. In this way it makes little sense for the 
positive philosopher to search for evidence for the unfreedom of existence; they would 
thereby undermine their own activity.303  The upshot is that, though there is no a priori 
assurance of the existence of freedom, the interpretation of history must always be guided by 
the search for signs of freedom. If history had actually been guided by unfreedom, this could 
not be known to the positive philosopher. It is for this reason that I refer to this as weak 
optimism.  
 
4.2 Overcoming optimism: ontological inversion in the Freiheitsschrift 
 
I now want to show that Schelling’s philosophy from his middle period – more specifically 
the Freiheitsschrift – has the resources needed to overcome the forms of philosophical 
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optimism just considered. The resources are located in Schelling’s account of evil. The 
problem with even weak optimism is that it could not countenance the possibility of a kind of 
compulsion which would actively threaten an interpretation of history as a free or divine 
process—the most it could do is bring uncertainty to this interpretation. Evil, on Schelling’s 
account, is a positively opposed force to the good (this is the focus of 4.2.1). If it were a mere 
lack of the good, the proliferation of evil could only ever give the philosopher of history 
cause to say that the world is not good. This is structurally equivalent to weak optimism—
there is only a negation or limitation of the optimum, never an opposed force. The virtue of 
this account is that it has the power to overcome the limitations of optimism without 
becoming pessimism. This is because evil is not said to exist necessarily: evil is the result of 
human freedom. The difficulty in understanding how human freedom can be the source of a 
kind of compulsion will be the focus of 4.2.2. Understanding a form of compulsion or 
unfreedom via human freedom means that it is not simply a natural necessity. We could, then, 
call this a spiritual (geistig) unfreedom. In virtue of this, this form of unfreedom would be 
both positive (not a mere lack of Geist) and it would be non-necessary. In this way we would 
have the ability to understand history as neither divine (the result of the freedom or God) nor 
nihilistic (the result of an unfree necessity of a world not created by a free being), but as 
having gone wrong.304  
 
4.2.1 The positivity of evil 
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In order to understand how the account of evil in the Freiheitsschrift provides insight into the 
possibility of a compulsive force (a pervasive unfreedom) structuring history – rather than 
being a mere distraction from the main narrative of the development of freedom – we first 
need to understand the ‘positivity’ of evil. What is meant by evil being positive is that it has 
its own nature, force, or power, rather than being defined as a mere lack or privation of 
another nature, force, or power. Schelling devotes a lot of space to showing how the various 
representatives of the latter, negative account of evil fail to grasp the phenomenon of evil. 
Schelling’s motivation for addressing inadequate accounts of evil is manifold. On the most 
basic level he simply does not want to be deluded about ourselves—that is, he does not want 
to be part of the contemporary ‘philanthropism’ which makes of evil little more than a 
regrettable lapse or weakness and thus denies evil proper.305 He wants us to recognise the true 
dimension of horror that evil possesses.306 It might seem strange to be occupied by the task of 
uncovering an extreme manifestation of humanity. And this strangeness might, in turn, 
explain why more recognisably philosophical issues are often thought to be the real goal, to 
which the investigation of evil is a mere means. The supposed main event, so to say, varies 
from one commentator to the next: a theodicy,307  a correctly understood pantheism,308  a 
cogent moral psychology,309 a new metaphysics310—to name a few. I’m not sure any one 
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philosophical issue can be said to be the goal of the Freiheitsschrift, but I do not contest the 
diversity of philosophical issues found therein. It is also the case that, without some 
philosophical motivation, such an insistence on accounting for human depravity (as opposed 
to mere animality) might seem a morbid exercise. That said, if we do not take seriously 
Schelling’s emphasis on grasping the positivity of something which actively opposes the 
proper development of our potential, we will miss important insights.311  
One of the representatives of a merely privative conception of evil, according to Schelling, 
is Kantianism. 312  Of the different representatives Schelling considers – including Neo-
Platonist and Leibnizian – it is particularly helpful to focus on this one since its proximity to 
Schelling’s own account provides the opportunity to place each of them in relief and, in the 
process, clarify some of the more obscure points of Schelling’s position. The proximity I 
refer to is found in the fact that both approach the question of good and evil in terms of dual 
principles—intelligible and sensible, rational and irrational, ideal and real, and so on. 
Schelling does not think good or evil can be equated with one principle or the other; it is only 
in a coordination of both principles in different ways that can achieve either (this will be 
covered in more detail later; see 4.3.2). Schelling claims that the Kantian position is ignorant 
of this point. Schelling presents the Kantian position thus: evil results from the domination of 
the intelligent principle by the sensual principle, and good results from the domination of the 
sensual principle by the intelligent principle. The problem Schelling detects here is that, 
although there appears to be different ways in which the agent acts – the agent either wills to 
be good or wills to be evil – there is actually only one way of willing. That is, the good is the 
only object of will, which can be achieved in greater or lesser proportion. 
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For while the weakness or inefficacy of the intelligent principle can be a ground for 
deficiency in good and virtuous actions, it cannot be a ground for positively evil actions 
and those contrary to virtue. Assuming, however, that sensuality or passive behaviour 
towards external impression would produce evil actions with a kind of necessity, then 
man himself would be only passive in doing them, i.e., evil would have no meaning with 
respect to himself, that is subjectively; and since what results from natural determination 
cannot be objectively evil either, it would have no meaning whatsoever. But to say that 
the reasonable principle is ineffective in evil also provides no ground. For why does it 
not exercise its power? If it wills to be ineffective, then the ground of evil lies in this 
willing and not in sensuality. Or if it can in nowise overcome the power of sensuality, 
then mere weakness and deficiency are here, but nowhere evil. Hence according to this 
explanation there is only one will (if it can be so called), and no twofold will.313 
 
What is shown here is that, even if the Kantian can contort the resources of her theory to 
include space for something which is called evil, there is still only one will which either 
intentionally (i.e. decides not to exercise its will) or unintentionally (i.e. sensuality is too 
powerful or intelligence is not powerful enough) fails to meet the good. Schelling claims that 
the will must be able to actively will evil as well as good rather than evil simply resulting 
from a lack of the will to good. There are different ways to understand why Schelling 
considers an account evil as the lack of will troubling. Two of the ways to understand this 
are: (1) that Schelling needs evil to result from a will to evil in order to secure human 
freedom and moral responsibility; and (2) that Schelling needs evil to result from a unity of 
wills in order to secure awareness of the unique and terrible force of evil. Both are 
compatible, but I would like to stress the latter. I now unpack each in turn.  
The first way to interpret Schelling’s worry here is perhaps the most accessible. Schelling 
was dissatisfied with Kant’s (and Fichte’s) attempt to understand how there is a moral choice 
for evil. That is, how it is possible for an agent to freely choose evil (i.e. not be merely be evil 
in virtue of being heteronomously determined) and therefore be responsible. Not only can we 
find many statements throughout the Freiheitsschrift which foreground the concern with 
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moral responsibility, 314  but even in the passage quoted above Schelling addresses the 
limitation to our moral activity when evil is considered privatively (we ‘would be only 
passive’ and thus ‘have no meaning’). Moreover, just before the passage quoted, Schelling 
states that evil is annulled when it is equated with sensuality because there is no freedom for 
evil on the Kantian account. However, the fact that this issue does not exhaust Schelling’s 
concern with the Kantian account can already be seen in the hypothetical line of questioning 
addressed to the Kantian. Even though Schelling believes that the Kantian account annuls 
evil, he considers, for the sake of argument, the consequences that a Kantian view of evil 
would have. First he considers what would be the case if sensuality were sufficient for evil 
(‘Assuming, however, that sensuality or passive behaviour towards external impression 
would produce evil actions’) and then he considers what would be the case if reason – in its 
refusal to work – were sufficient for evil (‘If it wills to be ineffective, then the ground of evil 
lies in this willing and not in sensuality’). That is, Schelling hypothesizes on both the 
passivity and the activity of the agent in producing evil on the Kantian account. Even though 
in the latter case the agent would not be merely passive – and therefore evil would 
presumably have subjective meaning for the agent – and would be acting independently, this 
would still not capture the true dimension of evil. Thus Schelling cannot be solely motivated 
by the problem of moral responsibility in the Kantian account of evil.   
As suggested, I do not want to dismiss the concern with moral responsibility, only 
highlight the role of a different aspect. This other aspect is the recognition of the reality and 
true nature of evil. Up until now it seemed that what made Schelling’s account of evil distinct 
from other accounts – i.e. what makes it positive, as opposed to privative – was the 
involvement of the individual agent in the genesis of evil. But, as we have just seen, 
Schelling’s hypothetical investigation of an evil which results directly from the agent’s 
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activity shows that what makes evil positive is not the ability to hold someone responsible. 
Although the will is effective or active in producing evil on the assumption that the will can 
decide to let sensuality determine us, evil would still be equivalent to mere ‘animality,’ albeit 
an animality with the added advocacy of reason. Neither pole genuinely interacts with its 
opposite and thus both are left unaltered in their fundamental character—the only variations 
available are quantitative rearrangements, not qualitative influence. In Schelling’s terms, they 
do not form a unity.315  
Hopefully this has established the importance for Schelling to provide a philosophy which 
can give a model of the nature of evil which is not merely a lack of the good. In other words, 
to be able to interpret human actions and history outside of a “less-or-more-good” scale, as it 
were (i.e. in weak or moderate optimistic terms). Moreover, the positive model of evil is not 
susceptible to pessimistic excess since it is not necessarily present in the world. Because it 
results from human freedom, its possibility to be realised is, in principle, the same as that of 
good. An important question to ask at this point, however, is: if evil results from human 
freedom, how can evil itself be a kind of unfreedom? Schelling gives few details. The general 
way that he distinguishes good and evil is in terms of the type of unity they form between two 
principles. In the case of the good, the universal will and the particular will form a proper 
unity via the former putting the latter to use (rather than simply supressing it, as Kant’s model 
was accused of doing). In the case of evil, the particular will appropriates the universal will in 
order to raise its particularity to universality. Schelling calls this a ‘false unity.’316  
The only substantial account Schelling gives in the Freiheitsschrift is where he announces 
his aim to give a description of evil in ‘its appearance in man’ (Erscheinung im Menschen) as 
opposed to the presentation of evil in its ‘actualization in the individual man’ 
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(Wirklichwerdung im einzelnen Menschen). 317  The account of the becoming actual, or 
actualization, of evil (or good) is occupied with the issue of how the choice for good or evil is 
made (see 4.3.2). As we will see later, this choice is, for Schelling, purely intelligible or 
eternal—it never occurs in our conscious experience. The account of the appearance of good 
or evil describes the effect these intelligible choices have for our conscious lives. Schelling’s 
remarks here are complex, but I interpret them to be centred on the idea that the difference 
between good and evil in our conscious lives is marked by the different empirical experiences 
they yield: the experience of freedom in the case of good and the experience of unfreedom in 
the case of evil.  
 
4.2.2 The unfreedom of evil 
 
To account for the asymmetry between good and evil in terms of the freedom accruing to 
each, I distinguish between intelligible (or atemporal) and empirical (or temporal) freedom. 
In terms of their intelligible freedom, they remain symmetrical; but in terms of their empirical 
freedom, they become asymmetrical. Although Schelling does not present it in this fashion, I 
think that we can see it at work in the movement of his claims and arguments. That a 
distinction between the intelligible and the empirical in relation to human action is in play has 
already been seen in Schelling’s separating the question of the actualization of evil (itself a 
result of an intelligible essence or deed318) and the appearance of evil (which, presumably, is 
not intelligible). Schelling reaffirms the symmetry between good and evil in terms of their 
intelligibility when he reminds us of the kind of inner necessity involved in intelligible acts—
he claims that ‘voluntary good is as impossible as voluntary evil.’319  But just as he reminds 
us of a shared necessity in good and evil, he indicates that there is a divergence in necessity 
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also. Good and evil are now differentiated in terms of the ways in which people are 
necessitated by the kind of knowledge they possess and how this relates to acting and 
judging, which only happens in our conscious experience.  
In the good, our judgments and action are characterised by ‘the immediate presence of 
being in knowledge and consciousness,’ ‘conscientiousness,’ and ‘religiosity.’ The kind of 
immediacy and truth involved here is best understood through the second of these 
designations. In conscientiousness one acts in accordance with one’s knowledge of the right 
without any doubt or need of weighing up options.320 The agent is under a kind of necessity 
here – dubbed by Schelling a ‘holy necessity’ – but one where we do not feel hounded by our 
necessity, but can freely affirm it. In other words, having chosen to subordinate our particular 
selfhood to universal understanding within the intelligible realm, our activity in the empirical 
realm finds a reliable guide.  
In evil, our judgements and actions are characterised as ‘the acceptance of non-being 
into…imagination,’ ‘false imagination,’ and ‘sin.’321 These designations are perhaps even 
more obscure than those offered for the good. It might help to first translate some of the new 
terminology into the terminology Schelling more commonly uses; namely, the talk of an 
orientation towards non-being rather than being. So, this is equivalent to the claim that we 
elevate selfhood in evil and turn our attention to particularity rather than universality; or, we 
turn to the relative or partial being of particularity (non-being, as Schelling calls it) rather 
than the absolute being of universality. But we do not just want to merely affirm our selfhood 
or non-being. As Schelling puts it, the evil person desires to be ‘the creating ground and to 
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rule over all things’ and succumbs to the ‘pride to be all things.’322 Whether we believe 
ourselves to be the origin of all things, the master of all things, or to be all things, the point is 
that we elevate ourselves to universality. The problem is that, although the intelligible deed in 
evil elevates the particular to the universal, we never succeed once and for all in becoming all 
things in the empirical realm. But since we have the pretension to truth or universality, we are 
restlessly in search of a way to present our particularity as universality.  
In contrast to conscientiousness then, it could be said that, rather than be guided by our 
faith or be open to our immediate knowledge of truth, we need to fabricate the truth. What I 
have called the fabrication of truth – the activity of presenting our particularity or non-being 
as universality or being – is equivalent to what Schelling means by ‘lying.’ Lying is the 
passing off of something for true which is not; or, in Schelling’s language, presenting non-
being as being through our imagination. The structure of inversion found in evil is on display 
here. A related point is made in the Stuttgart lectures: ‘error is not merely a privation of truth. 
Rather it is something intrinsically positive, not a deficiency in spirit but an inversion of it. 
Consequently, error may well prove highly ingenious, and yet it is an error.’323 If evil is our 
intelligible character, then we are drawn to the empirical task of presenting our particularity 
as universality—that is, of lying. This is how I understand the complex claim with which we 
began this section. 
 
We have seen how through false imagination and through knowledge directed towards 
non-being man’s spirit opens itself to the spirit of lying and falsehood, and, soon 
fascinated by it, loses its initial freedom.324  
 
The unfreedom of evil lies in being fascinated or mesmerised (fascinirt) by lying, in being 
drawn into the infinite task of trying to pass off our particularity as universality. The 
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necessity experienced by evil persons is fuelled by a desperate search to bring particular and 
universal together with only the power of the particular, whereas the necessity experienced by 
good persons is provided by the decisiveness to act in the way which successfully brings 
particular and universal together. With this we have a model of positive evil or unfreedom. 
There is not simply a lack of freedom (e.g. being driven by sensible impulse) but a spiritual 
compulsion. 
The remaining difficulty Schelling’s account faces is how to take this model of a 
compulsive force and apply it to the interpretation of history. In the case of individuals, the 
choice for good or evil is unpredictable—whichever choice is made, it could always have 
turned out differently. But if we remain at this level we must remain silent about history. In 
other words, we could not locate trends or patterns if the philosopher holds that all choices 
for good or evil are equally open throughout history. Now, Schelling does try to account for 
historical shifts in the Freiheitsschrift. In the remainder of this chapter I argue that this 
attempt fails and that, ultimately, this is due to Schelling’s desire to retain systematicity in his 
account. In order to do this I present an account of how Schelling tries to keep a unity 
between system and freedom in the Freiheitsschrift and how he ultimately privileges the 
former at the expense of the latter. I do not start from the assumption that system and freedom 
are incompatible. For some it is enough just to identify system in an authors work to bring it 
into disrepute (like the orthodox Marxist that need do no more than uncover a philosophy as 
“bourgeois” in order to disregard it). The Freiheitsschrift presents a very sophisticated 
attempt to do systematic philosophy without reducing everything to system. It thus requires 
careful analysis to see if it succeeds or not. 
 
4.3 System and Freedom  
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The primary challenge Schelling sees himself as facing is how philosophy can remain a 
rational system whilst not obliterating freedom.325 Some difficulties face the reader of the 
Freiheitsschrift when trying to grasp this. The main difficulty, I believe, is that Schelling 
deals with two very different types of freedom, each of which requires very different 
approaches to establishing their compatibility with system or reason. The first type of 
freedom – sometimes called ‘formal freedom’ by Schelling – is a certain capacity for self-
determination. Schelling associates this type of freedom with idealism, by which he seems to 
have in mind Kant as much as later idealist developments.  
 
…it will forever remain a curiosity that Kant, after he had first only negatively 
differentiated things-in-themselves from appearances by making them independent of 
time, and later, in the metaphysical discussion of his Critique of Practical Reason, 
actually had treated freedom and independence of time as correlative concepts, did not 
proceed to think of transferring this solely positive concept of In-itself to things, whereby 
he immediately would have risen to a higher point of view, above the negativity 
characteristic of his theoretical philosophy.326  
 
Schelling recognises that self-determination is not how Kant characterises freedom, but 
suggests that this is implicit in his system (at least as regards the first and second Critique)—
hence, it is ‘curious’ that Kant did not draw this conclusion. As Schelling must be aware, he 
has paved over some distinction Kant felt important to his understanding of freedom, namely, 
the distinction between will (Wille) and the capacity or power for choice (Willkür).327 Indeed, 
Schelling notes that the characterisation of freedom as a self-determination which can be 
attributed to all of nature ends up losing grip on what is specific to human freedom. I cannot 
settle here whether Schelling does uncover what is really happening in Kant’s philosophy (or 
if it merely amounts to a misrepresentation). What matters for the current task is to note that 
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how Schelling understands the ‘idealist’ conception of freedom (formal freedom). Now, 
Schelling does not think it is too difficult to reconcile this kind of freedom with system. He 
sets about the more familiar German idealist strategy of showing its compatibility with 
system to the extent that system itself is not conceived mechanistically but rather as ‘living,’ 
‘dynamic,’ or ‘creative.’328  
The second type of freedom – referred to as human freedom – is distinct from the idealist 
or formal type of freedom in at least two important respects which can be seen most clearly 
by looking at the limitations Schelling identified in the idealist type of freedom. The latter is 
too general and only formal: too general because it applies to all of nature; and only formal in 
the sense that it is not directed towards a decision or choice (the content of freedom), but 
merely towards the independence (selbständigkeit) from external determinism or fatalism.329 
Human freedom introduces a certain break in the dynamical or creative process of nature 
through its decision for good or evil (what these decisions amount to will be discussed in 
more detail later). The way of making this type of freedom compatible with system is much 
more complicated (three of the approaches to this task found in the Freiheitsschrift were 
outlined in the introduction).  
The reason these approaches do not seem to sit well together is that Schelling specifically 
advances the latter due to the deficiencies of the former. Although the first approach succeeds 
in uniting system and freedom, the conception of freedom involved is not sufficient for the 
task of understanding how things could turn out otherwise—that is, of understanding human 
freedom and the unpredictable aspect of the world and history. The latter type of freedom is 
clearly much more difficult to make compatible with systematic reason. And if Schelling can 
pull this off, then it would seem superfluous for him go to the effort of establishing the 
compatibility of formal freedom with system. We need to investigate both if we are to get a 
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reliable picture of the merits of the Freiheitsschrift for understanding freedom and history. 
But how does Schelling make sense of dealing with both? We will now attempt to answer 
that question  
 
4.3.1 The place of the idealist conception of freedom in the Freiheitsschrift 
 
Schelling has many reasons to establish the compatibility of formal freedom with system 
independently of its relation to the establishing of the compatibility of human freedom with 
system. One set of reasons relates to motivations external to the text and another set relates to 
issues internal to the text (although there is overlap). Regarding the former, Schelling 
endorses the idealist model of freedom most unequivocally in those parts of the text where 
his concern is the reception and reputation of his own earlier philosophy. This is done by 
affirming the innovations made in his Naturphilosophie and showing how those innovations 
are defensible from the attacks made against pantheism and all systematic philosophy that 
attempts to grasp freedom.330  One of Schelling’s principle innovations was to avoid the 
opposed poles of either Kant’s dualism or Fichte’s subjectivism. The overcoming of the split 
between knowledge and the object of knowledge – without straightforwardly reducing the 
latter to the former – was to be achieved by recognising that spirit (Geist) was not isolated in 
knowing consciousness, but animating nature also. Or, in the influential terms in which 
Schelling put it, the subject is conscious spirit and nature unconscious spirit. That Schelling is 
still on board with this is evident already in the forward to the Freiheitsschrift where he 
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proclaims that the opposition between spirit and nature has already been ‘torn up’ and 
continues to be invalidated by the progress of knowledge.331  
Although Schelling’s tone here is somewhat dismissive – he seems to be advising us to 
forget about that old concern and focus on something more important, namely, the opposition 
between necessity and freedom – he rehearses his formulation of an improved idealism 
(which extends spirit to nature and gives us access to a ‘higher realism’) in contrast to 
Fichte’s subjective idealism. Fichte established freedom to be what is truly actual, but we also 
need to hold ‘that all actuality (nature, the world of things) has activity, life and freedom as 
its ground, or in Fichte’s words, that not only is the I all, but conversely, all is I as well.’332 
So, despite the fact that Schelling will ultimately claim that – with regard to the core aim of 
understanding freedom ‘more precisely’ – idealism ‘leaves us perplexed,’ he still finds it 
important to use the occasion of the Freiheitsschrift to preserve the place of his objective 
idealism in the history of philosophy. Though these contextual insights are helpful, I would 
now like to argue that the retention of the idealist model of freedom is not simply an 
attachment to a now redundant view, but plays an important role in how Schelling articulates 
his improved conception of freedom.  
There are several textual or internal reasons for Schelling to retain the idealist conception 
of freedom. We already know that it serves to show how one way of unifying system and 
freedom is possible. This unity is what is established via Schelling’s defence of a qualified 
account of pantheism.333 This version of pantheism is put to use to solve various issues that 
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had occupied him in his previous philosophical works. One such issue is that of how the 
finite world originates and develops. Previously Schelling had been content to trace a 
continuous process of the generation of the forms of nature from out of an absolute starting 
point and display ever refining determinations. Schelling increasingly becomes dissatisfied 
with this for many reasons, but a worry that is in the background of the Freiheitsschrift – and 
already anticipated in the 1804 work Philosophy and Religion334  – is that, if the source of 
creation simply functions as a mechanical push in relation to the created world, then we could 
not understand this source as God.   
 
However one might think of the manner of consecution [Folge] of beings from God, it 
can never be mechanical, never a mere effecting of positing, where what is effected is 
nothing for itself. Nor can it any more be emanation, in which case what flows out 
remains the same as that from which it flowed, and thus is nothing of its own, nothing 
autonomous [selbstandigkeit]. The consecution of things from God is a self-revelation of 
God. God can reveal himself only in what is like him, in free beings that act by 
themselves…335 
 
This is an interesting passage for current purposes. It brings to a head one of the motivations 
Schelling has for retaining formal freedom: it allows us to understand a necessary 
consecution of things without annulling (formal) freedom. But it also already hints at the 
need for a more emphatic freedom to arise. Although Schelling only talks of formal freedom 
here (acting independently), he points to the need for the process of the world’s unfolding (its 
revelation) to manifest something which echoes or realizes the kind of force that instigated 
the process. Further into the essay it becomes clear that this means God’s moral freedom in 
creating the world needs to generate a being with moral freedom also. This pinpoints the 
crucial issue that now needs to be addressed. Some of the reasons for Schelling’s continuing 
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interest in formal freedom have been explored, but now we need to see how this is to fit with 
Schelling’s insistence on the need for human freedom. The way of fitting these together – 
which, I believe, shows the least risk of doing damage to human freedom – is found in 
Schelling’s strategy of making the idealist model to do only some of the work of explaining 
the non-idealist model of freedom. Despite this rough manner of speaking, the work that the 
idealist model does is very specific: it explains the ontological structure of human beings and 
how this is a condition for the possibility to act for the good or to act for evil.  
 
4.3.2 The role of idealism in explaining the possibility of human freedom  
 
Schelling divides his account of human freedom into an analysis of the possibility of the 
choice for good or evil and an analysis of the actuality of the choice for good or evil.336 This 
distinction is methodologically very important even though Schelling does not stress this 
point in the Freiheitsschrift. 337  Evil is possible due to the way that human beings are 
constituted, as distinct from any other type of being. And, since this constitution is deduced 
from the necessary structure of the world, the method is therefore a priori.338 But such a 
rational construction cannot yet tell us that evil is actually chosen by free beings. Uncovering 
how or why evil is actually chosen is therefore, at least in part, an a posteriori task. It is 
important to highlight that Schelling’s investigation into human freedom requires both 
methods. For the purposes of this study it is important to highlight this because it shows how 
Schelling combines the idealist and non-idealist approaches to human freedom. But it is also 
important because of the way this distinction between the possibility and the actuality of 
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freedom – including its methodological implications – anticipates and contrasts with the 
distinction which Schelling will make fundamental to his Spätphilosophie, namely, the 
distinction between negative philosophy and positive philosophy.  
Both in the Freiheitsschrift and in the Spätphilosophie, Schelling takes the possibility of 
things to be known a priori (the realm of negative philosophy) and the existence of things to 
be known a posteriori (the realm of positive philosophy).339 As Manfred Frank has argued, 
the increasing centrality of this distinction in Schelling’s thought accompanies a return to 
Kant.340 I raise this partly as contextual clarification, but primarily for the purpose of putting 
on the table the issue of both the convergence and divergence of these different periods in 
Schelling’s thought. For now we need only note that the idealist conception of freedom is at 
work in Schelling’s a priori science of how things are constituted (the self-development of the 
absolute, or self-revelation of God), including human beings, and this constitution explains 
the possibility of human freedom (i.e. the ontological structure in agents needed for them to 
be the kinds of things that are characterised as free). And when he comes to describe the 
actuality of human freedom is when he departs from the idealist conception of freedom.  
As noted, the idealist conception which Schelling advances shows how nature can develop 
in an ongoing process without being said to be determined mechanistically. The way that 
Schelling’s version of this idea of a self-determination of the absolute proceeds is by showing 
how we can understand everything as a product of two fundamental wills—or, rather, one 
twofold will.341 Being, for Schelling, is most adequately understood as will rather than any 
inert substance.342 But this will spits into two: these could be referred to as real and ideal or 
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irrational and rational. Depending on which stage in the development of nature (or the 
revelation of God) we are at, the name Schelling gives for each pole changes. The real pole 
appears as: ‘being insofar as it is the ground of existence,’ the dark principle, blind will, self-
will, and so on. The ideal pole appears as: ‘being insofar as it exists,’ the principle of light, 
will of the understanding, universal will, and so on. The real principle strives to particularity 
or creatureliness. The ideal principle strives to communication or articulation. These are not 
independent of each other; rather, they require each other in order to actually be what they 
are. The striving or willing to particularity would fail to affirm itself without the aid of the 
universal will to bring its desires into sharpness. The striving or willing of universality would 
fail to bring order and distinction to things without that ground of particularity to work upon. 
These wills come together in varying ways to produce the diversity of forms in nature.  
This is quite abstract and difficult to imagine. However, Schelling offers many different 
images which might help the reader think about the way these twin forces work together to 
create something. Perhaps one of the more accessible images Schelling uses is that of the 
difficulty faced when we are feeling confused by our ‘chaotic jumble’ of thoughts and 
struggle to realise them.343 When faced with these confused thoughts they are not yet fully 
formed and are mere hunches (referred to as ‘the dark longing’). Not really aware of where 
they are finally heading, we are nevertheless driven to get to their unknown destination. But 
we can be struck by the worry that we are heading down a wrong road, that our attempts to 
articulate these thoughts are actually departing from the original inspiration and in risk of 
losing sight of what first motivated us. If paralysed by this fear we cling to their immediate 
and embryonic shape and they never arrive.344 Conversely, without that original impulse, 
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articulation or communication would have nothing to work upon. So, although each will pulls 
in a different direction, both are needed to create something distinct (in this case, a coherent 
thought).  
For Schelling this is true of everything, but the configuration is unique in human beings. In 
all other finite natures the wills are always in a reactionary relation to each other because they 
are not yet fully differentiated—they overlap and are forced to confront one another and thus 
are bound by the developmental process of nature. With human beings the particular will and 
the universal will are not held together in reciprocal interdependence; they have become fully 
separated and are now held together by something above them: spirit (Geist). The relationship 
these two poles can have to each other is no longer part of an ongoing process of creation, but 
freely chosen by human beings as spirit. At this point the process constructed in reason 
ends—no new forms appear through the interaction of the two principles.  
The last thing that can be known through reason alone is the two fundamental ways these 
principles can be configured in human beings. In terms of our moral disposition, it is not a 
matter of one principle dominating the other, but a matter of one principle being at the service 
of the other.345 If self-will is kept at the service of the universal will, then the passions or 
forces of the individual’s selfhood remain in ‘divine measure and equilibrium’346  whilst 
providing the distinctness and effectiveness of life for the good.347 But if this relationship is 
inverted and the individual elevates her self-will in order to take control, then those same 
forces of selfhood become chaotic and enraged.348 Which relationship the two principles take 
is not dictated by a dynamism or tension between them (as it was in the development of 
nature), but on the free deed of the agent. With this we can see how Schelling retains an 
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idealist conception of the free self-development of nature – knowable a priori – in his account 
of the possibility of human freedom. Freedom and system are united up to this point without 
degrading freedom. But with the transition to Schelling’s account of the actuality of human 
freedom he cannot continue with the idealist model. 349  So, now we need to see how 
successful Schelling is at grasping (actual) human freedom within reason without doing 
damage to it.  
 
4.4 Explaining the actuality of human freedom: individual and historical 
 
The centrepiece of Schelling’s attempt to show the unity of actual human freedom and system 
is his account of free action as resulting from the intelligible within us.350 Schelling is quite 
explicit on this point. 
 
Intelligible essence can act only in accordance with its own inner nature just as certainly 
as it acts completely freely and absolutely […] this necessity must not be mistaken, as 
still happens, for empirical necessity based on compulsion (itself only disguised 
accidentalness). But what is this inner necessity of essence itself? Here is the point at 
which necessity and freedom must be united, if they can be united at all. If this essence 
were dead being and with respect to man something merely given to hum, then since the 
act can proceed from him only by necessity, responsibility and all freedom would be 
annulled. But precisely this inner necessity is itself freedom; man’s essence is essentially 
his own deed; necessity and freedom are interrelated as one being which appears as one 
or the other only when viewed from different aspects: in itself it is freedom, formally it is 
necessity.351 
 
This claim for the inner necessity of our own intelligible deed is a remarkable way to 
overcome the opposition of freedom and necessity within individual action. This also allows 
Schelling to establish a harmony between the world more generally (i.e. creation) and our 
intelligible freedom. 352  Whatever merits or deficiencies this answer may have for 
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understanding the issues of human freedom from the perspective of moral philosophy, the 
philosophy of action, and so on, is not my concern here.353 The main reason for this is that, 
even if we believe Schelling has succeeded in uniting actual human freedom with reason 
here, this unity only grasps part of the actuality of human freedom—the part that is 
exclusively related to the individuality of human freedom. The part that causes more trouble 
for Schelling – and which speaks to the issue of history – is the part that deals with the trans-
individual element of human freedom. What I mean by this is those elements which account 
for the tendencies or patterns of human freedom—that is, whether good or evil is prevalent in 
the actual world.  
Schelling not only addresses this trans-individual aspect in terms of the conditions which 
precipitate or solicit human freedom one way or another, but even makes it a central question. 
That is, this aspect is not a supererogatory addition or simply a matter of Schelling 
conscientiously fleshing out his view for the sake of completeness. Detailing the solicitation 
to evil is required because it is not sufficient to explain the becoming actual of evil through 
individuals alone; what is also needed is to explain evil’s ‘universal effectiveness, or how it 
was able to burst forth from creation as an unmistakable general [allgemeiner] principle, 
battling everywhere the good.’354 One problem of focusing exclusively on the actuality of evil 
in individuals alone is because this would detach the question of the actuality of evil from 
historical reality. What is meant by this is that, if the predominance of evil in the world – 
assuming that it does predominate – is explained only in terms of the deed of individuals we 
are left without a response to the large-scale presence of evil in the actual world. At its 
extreme this means that we also cannot explain why evil came to prevalence in the first place 
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and if evil could ever come to an end. These are all important questions for Schelling. The 
ethical and theological import in particular is evident in the Freiheitsschrift.  
 
4.4.1 ‘General evil’ and solicitation to actual evil 
 
For Schelling, the question of ‘how evil first arose in the creature’ cannot be answered by 
appeal to a sufficient condition (e.g. an evil principle or an evil spirit) because we would have 
only pushed the question back a stage—we would then need to explain how this principle or 
spirit, in turn, itself came into being. But, even though no discrete object or principle – or 
something similar – can be the sufficient condition of the actuality of evil, there can still be 
such a source for a ‘temptation’ to evil. If there is such a temptation, Schelling reflects, then it 
would make sense to locate it in something like ‘Platonic matter,’ by which he means a 
medium in which creation can emerge, but which nevertheless is recalcitrant to that creation 
in some sense. In short, what resists God. Given this thought, it might seem reasonable to see 
in the will of the ground something similar to Platonic matter in the sense that ‘the irrational 
principle…resists the understanding, or unity and order’. 355  As we know, this principle 
cannot be evil in itself. Since evil is defined as a perverted relation between two distinct 
principles – by selfhood elevating itself through appropriation of the universal will – evil can 
never be found in a self-standing element.356 That said, Schelling goes on to show how the 
will of the ground becomes the soliciting component of evil in human beings insofar as it 
develops into an intensified form of the self-attracting impulse of the ground in selfhood. 
 
The same principle that was the ground in the first creation is here again the germ and 
seed, but in a higher form, from which a higher world is developed. For evil is nothing 
other than the original ground of existence, insofar as it strives towards actualization in 
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created beings, and thus is, in fact, only a higher potential of the ground at work in 
nature.357 
 
As is the case with much of the Freiheitsschrift, care needs to be taken with terminological 
variants. Since the evil Schelling speaks of in this passage only ‘strives towards actualization’ 
it is not yet the evil which results from human freedom; it is only a potential evil or a ‘general 
evil.’358 This general evil is a drive to affirm particularity in opposition to the will which aims 
to universalize. This particularizing will is what accounts for the ‘universal effectiveness’ of 
actual evil; that is, of the ‘general necessity’ which incites individuals to elevate their 
particularity to universality.   
How are we to understand this general – unrealized – evil that creates the tendency for evil 
to actualize itself? Is it a tendency that can be changed so as to liberate ourselves from a 
world predisposed to evil? Is it intrinsic to the kind of being we are and therefore 
unchangeable? More generally, is this universal temptation to evil a contingent or necessary 
feature? Schelling suggests that it is necessary. When Schelling claims that general evil is a 
‘higher potential of the ground at work in nature’ he gives it a role homologous to the 
dialectical place ground has in relation to existence in the development of nature: ‘the same 
periods of creation found in the latter are also in the former, and the one is the likeness and 
explanation of the other.’359 At this point Schelling provides a curious account of history in 
terms of these ‘periods of creation’ where general evil reacts to a counterpoised, correlate 
force of the good. These forces never bring forth good or evil on their own – only when they 
are fully distinct form one another and then synthesised in a certain manner can this be 
achieved – but, as opposed particular and universal forces striving to realized themselves 
against each other, they generate situations with different combinations of their relative 
forces. For instance, an earlier age of the ‘omnipotence of nature’ is marked by the 
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dominance of the principle of the ground. The understanding is only at work here to the 
extent that knowledge, art, and science are drawn out of the force of nature. This 
configuration necessarily gives way to another; and with each subsequent stage the attracting 
or particularizing force of general evil becomes more distinct from the expanding or 
universalizing force until each force no longer appear alloyed, but become fully opposed. 
With the complete dispersion of these forces they no longer work together to produce a 
certain form of life, but now explicitly conflict with each other. Schelling claims there is a 
radical break from the previous historical continuity at this point, referring to this as a 
‘second creation.’ Schelling’s condensed and high-altitude history ends abruptly here. This 
conflict of forces is said to mark the ‘present time’ and, although we are not told what may 
come after this time, it is suggested that the next historical stage will see an end to this 
conflict.  
 
4.4.2 The necessity of evil for God’s revelation  
 
This abridged sketch of Schelling’s account of certain historical developments shows that 
general evil is part of the generation of the world, that is, a cosmogony. And, insofar as God 
achieves full realization through manifestation – or revelation – in the world, the historical 
movement driven by the intensified force of the ground is also a theogony.360 Schelling is 
explicit about the necessity of general evil at various points. One way Schelling explains this 
necessity is in relation to what is needed for human freedom. For human freedom to have a 
choice between good and evil the principles which can be made into either a proper unity (i.e. 
self-will subordinated to universal will) or a ‘false unity’ (i.e. universal will subordinated to 
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self-will) must themselves become completely distinct. As we saw, this becoming distinct is 
what happens in Schelling’s history. Now, the fact that human freedom must choose either 
good or evil – and therefore, must entail the existence of general evil to enable this choice – 
does not establish that general evil is necessary of itself. For this we also need to know that 
human beings must choose, that is, that they cannot remain in indecision. Schelling argues 
that this is the case.  
 
Man is placed on the pinnacle where he has the source of self-movement towards good 
and evil equally within him; the bond of principles within him is not a necessary but a 
free one. He stands at the junction; whatever he chooses, that will be his deed. But he 
cannot remain in indecision, because God must necessarily reveal himself and because in 
creation nothing whatsoever can remain ambiguous.361  
 
The world, including general evil, is necessarily created because the creator must be revealed. 
Thus, though actual evil is only realized through free human deeds, the prevalence of human 
deeds towards evil is necessary. Of course, Schelling is quick to point out that this is not a 
mere ‘logical’ or ‘geometrical’ necessity, but a dynamic one which is ultimately based on 
‘mind, spirit, and will.’362 Indeed, Schelling goes as far to say that ‘creation is not an event, 
but an act.’363 In which case the course history takes may be unavoidable, but the act that 
launches nature and history in the first place seems to not be. But Schelling goes on to say 
that God is revealed through a moral necessity and that ‘things follow from divine nature 
with absolute necessity, that all things possible by virtue of the divine nature must also be 
actual’.364  
With this Schelling has found a kind of necessity, not just in individual acts of freedom, 
but also in large scale or trans-individual acts of freedom. Thus he has again secured a unity 
of freedom and system—but at what cost? The tendencies of human freedom in history have 
                                                          
361
 FS 250 
362
 FS 268 
363
 FS 268 
364
 FS 269 
166 
 
been reconciled with reason but only by reducing history to its anticipatable features. In other 
words, everything about history can be understood from its possibility, leaving no space for 
its actuality to diverge. To use terms from Schelling’s later philosophy, it looks as though the 
prevalence of actual evil is the object of negative philosophy, not positive philosophy. 
Schelling confirms this point when he adds to this account of the commencement of the 
prevalence of evil his account of the eventual cessation of evil. As we know, the only thing 
that Schelling truly allows to be undetermined by the necessity of revelation is human 
freedom. And this can ultimately have no effect on the outcome of history since evil is 
necessarily brought to an end on Schelling’s account: evil will be deprived of its force by 
being reduced to a subordinate role in creation (‘cast out eternally into non-being’) since this 
is ‘the final intent of creation’.365 It seems, then, that the factors involved in influencing both 
the commencement and the cessation of prevalent evil are subsumed into the necessity of 
self-revelation and, therefore, there is no realm in which human deeds can intervene when it 
comes to the tendency and shape of history.  
 
4.4.3 A posteriori factors influencing the manifestation of good and evil 
 
This conclusion meets a complication, however, in Schelling’s effort to answer the worry that 
his conception of human freedom disallows the possibility for individuals to change from 
being evil to being good. Here Schelling seems to give some weight to empirical existence 
for understanding how the actual world manifests good or evil. Although we are responsible 
for our good or evil because it results from our own decision, and is not simply pre-given to 
us in some way (e.g. just a property of the being we are), this deed cannot be located in time 
as a choice we make at some point, to which we could then be persuaded to change our mind. 
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Our deed is, according to Schelling, eternal—it happens outside of any temporal experience 
we may have.366 If this is the case, Schelling concedes, it looks as though no sense can be 
made of the phenomenon of conversion (which must happen in time). To this he responds 
that any aid which may move us to the good is only effective if we allow this aid to work on 
us. And this allowing is only a result of our eternal deed; that is, only if we are already good – 
albeit in a dormant state367 – can we be persuaded to be good. Schelling gives a strong 
priority to our disposition here: although the empirical (temporal) world can effect a 
conversion, it is only effective if there is a non-temporal condition which allows it to do so. It 
follows, then, that this non-temporal condition – the eternal deed which only allows the 
empirical world influence insofar as it agrees with itself – is not itself open to such influence. 
It is because of this feature of Schelling’s account that I believe he cannot be saved from the 
conclusion that the temporal world’s effects on actual good and evil is limited to transient 
manifestations and not the fundamental dispositions of individuals.368 
The limited role Schelling allows for empirical or temporal factors to play in the 
appearance of good or evil in the world does not look to make a significant impact on the 
historical actuality of evil. Moreover, it should be noted that even this minimal role is 
questionable on Schelling’s own terms in the Freiheitsschrift. In Schelling’s account of 
conversion he implicitly relies upon a distinction between the individual qua her 
fundamentally good disposition – her ‘inner voice’ – and the individual qua her evil state – 
how she ‘now is’ in contrast to her ‘own and better…essence’.369 This implies that either the 
individual is simultaneously good and evil or else she is good in one respect and evil in 
another. Simultaneity must be ruled out since good and evil – insofar as they are actual and 
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not potential or general – are exclusive alternatives for human freedom. But the other option 
looks no better. If an individual is good through her eternal deed, in what other regard can she 
be evil? It seems that we must be able to perform evil in the empirical (or temporal) world 
while our intelligible (or eternal) deed is good. Apart from the paradoxical moral dimension, 
this situation is incompatible with Schelling’s ontology of evil. Evil cannot belong to an 
individual qua temporal or empirical being – in addition to their non-temporal goodness – 
since evil is not achieved in its actuality through empirical acts alone.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
Schelling faces many difficulties in trying to show how the genuinely open part of his 
account of human freedom can inform a philosophy of history. The ontological inversion that 
occurs in evil can only be located at the individual level. It is only the intelligible deed of an 
individual agent that can bring about the elevation of particularity to universality—the 
deformation of our intelligent or spiritual nature to a mere means for self-affirmation. 
Schelling dedicated a significant portion of the Freiheitsschrift to showing how it is that the 
free choice for good or evil can be inclined towards evil. But this inclination remains an 
existential constant (the anxiety faced by all individuals at all times). When Schelling does 
indicate how this situation might change, it is indexed to a necessary theogonic process. Even 
if Schelling did not do so, it does not seem likely that he could account for historical 
variance. If this were possible within Schelling’s framework then the principle way that this 
would be done would be through an account of how human action could produce conditions 
which produce macro-level influences for the choice for good or evil. The most obvious 
example of this would be in terms of political or social institutions.  
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Indeed, in a series of private lectures given in Stuttgart the year following the publication 
of the Freiheitsschrift, Schelling included a discussion of two central institutions, the modern 
state and the Church.370 Schelling argues that the modern state is a large scale attempt to 
secure a non-divine unity between universal and particular. To understand what this means 
we should recall that earlier it was pointed out that Schelling takes the unfreedom of evil to 
be characterised by our empirical attempts to make good on the ‘false unity’ advanced in evil. 
Once we elevate the particular to the universal in our intelligible deed, we are compelled to 
achieve this in our conscious lives (see 4.2.2). Schelling gives a structurally equivalent 
description of this in terms of the ‘temporal and finite bond’ which is struggled to be attained 
in the modern state.371 The modern state is presented as little more than an epiphenomenon of 
a prevalent evil in the world, rather than being a genuine historical condition upon the choice 
for evil. Schelling refers to the modern state as ‘a consequence of the curse that has been 
placed on humanity.’372 Similarly, the Church seems to be allocated the status of a response 
to the situation of humanity rather than an historical variation introduced by human action. 
The Church, as an institution, is obviously the work of human action, but, on Schelling’s 
account, its possibility is based upon a ‘second revelation.’373 The ‘depraved condition of the 
world’ is such that humans, being part of this condition, cannot effect a fundamental change 
in human disposition form evil to good (in Schelling’s terms, ‘redemption’).374 God needs to 
intervene in order for the Church to be established. This might be obvious, but it also means 
that Schelling has not provided an account of how large scale changes can originate from 
within the non-divine world. Schelling’s comments about institutions are brief in the Stuttgart 
private lectures, so the success or failure of Schelling’s mature philosophy to cope with the 
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problem of historical variation cannot be established on these alone. Nevertheless, the 
prospects do not look good.  
The other route that Schelling might want to take is to attribute an ontological inversion to 
the institutional level or macro-scale itself. This would certainly introduce a historical force 
which would overwhelm the trans-historical influence of our existential anxiety. But it is 
difficult to imagine what such a social ontological inversion would look like, even if it would 
make sense to attribute the requisite freedom to the macro-scale needed for Schelling’s 
philosophical account of evil to work at this level. With these difficulties in mind, I now want 
to suggest that Adorno’s philosophy of history is more promising for understanding the non-
necessary occurrence of unfreedom or compulsion on a historical scale.  
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5 Adorno’s philosophy of history 
 
In this chapter I reconstruct Adorno’s philosophy of history and argue that this can be done in 
such a way as to meet the demands on the philosophy of history that I have advanced in the 
preceding chapter – primarily being the need to grasp a compulsive force in history without 
metaphysical grounding – and answers to some of the core worries often found in response to 
Adorno—most notably, that his philosophy of history is based on an unwarranted pessimism. 
Both these issues are connected, and are ultimately addressed through the same means, 
namely by showing that there is no a priori necessity involved in Adorno’s account of 
historical compulsion. 
The main strategy I take for this is to show that some of the most controversial claims 
made by Adorno, especially as they appear in his co-authored work, with Max Horkheimer, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, are more nuanced than they might first appear. 375  More 
specifically, that the forms of domination or compulsion found to drive history are not seen to 
be inevitable results of the kinds of beings we are, or of the kinds of relations we have with 
nature. In order to make this point I split Adorno’s philosophy of history into three different 
aspects of the consideration of the issue of compulsion. First, I address the origin of 
compulsion, most famously outlined in the account of the prehistory of the subject in the 
Dialectic (5.2). I draw upon Adorno’s later remarks regarding whether or not we can say that 
antagonism, conflict and domination necessarily result from our need to survive in nature. I 
argue that self-preservation does not make the reversion of reason to domination inevitable 
and, further, that the compulsive forms of reason Horkheimer and Adorno discuss, contra 
Habermas, are not made so through necessary entanglements of power and reason. Then I 
address the way that compulsion is understood to persist in history (5.3). I argue that not only 
is there no single principle (e.g. an anthropological principle of self-preservation entailing the 
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necessary usurpation of reason for survival) guaranteeing the reversion of reason to 
domination, but that the compulsive course of history cannot even be restricted to the 
question of reason qua faculty—thus adding a further diversity to the historical forms Adorno 
specifies. I also show how Adorno can make this diversity into a coherent historical narrative 
without falling back into the metaphysical excesses of universal history. In the process I 
argue against Herbert Schnädelbach’s suggestion that the philosophy of history cannot be 
pursued without thereby making history into a singular object and thus lapsing into an 
unjustified metaphysics. Finally, I investigate the ways in which historical compulsion might 
be thought to come to an end (5.4). I defend Adorno against Habermas’ criticism that the way 
the former can envision an end to domination is through a fanciful account of reconciliation.  
One of my aims is to show that critical theory should avail itself of a philosophy of 
history, and that Adorno’s is a good candidate towards this end. I also want to show that the 
Dialectic is can be usefully approached in light of Adorno’s later reflections on philosophy of 
history. Now, I do think that the Dialectic is not as guilty as is often thought regarding 
metaphysical excess and unwarranted pessimism. And I try to show that this is the case 
through the reconstruction offered here. However, I sometimes favour Adorno’s mature 
formulations which do not always sit well with the claims of the Dialectic. Where it may be 
worried that the account of Adorno’s philosophy of history which I reconstruct would be 
guilty of anachronism if applied to the Dialectic, I am ultimately happy to let the latter fall—
my main concern is not to defend that work as such. Nevertheless, I hope to show the 
Dialectic to be a more promising resource for a philosophy of history amenable to the aims of 
critical theory than is sometimes thought.  
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5.1 How can we do philosophy of history today? 
 
Adorno’s reflections on the philosophy of history become more explicit and more worked out 
in his later works, most prominently in the section of Negative Dialectics dedicated to dealing 
with Hegel’s philosophy of history, ‘World Spirit and Natural History,’ and in the 
corresponding lectures he gave in 1964-65 on History and Freedom.376  In this section I 
present some of the general issues which Adorno’s philosophy of history broaches and 
address some of the possible worries that this may face. In particular, I show how Adorno 
avoids the potential problems of pessimism and metaphysical excess of universal histories. 
This will provide the lens through which to consider the actual construction of a negative 
philosophy of history as it is found in both the Dialectic and in Adorno’s later works. 
 
5.1.1 The truth and untruth of Hegel’s philosophy of history 
 
Unlike Schelling, Adorno elaborates his philosophy of history in close dialogue with Hegel. 
This is because Adorno believes that Hegel’s philosophy of history is, in a qualified sense, 
true. As noted in chapter two, Adorno interprets philosophies not only in terms of the claims 
or arguments made by a philosopher, but also in terms of the way that the texts themselves 
reflect or manifest truths beyond the explicit intension of the author. Three different respects 
in which Adorno thinks Hegel’s philosophy reveals truth – even as it presents this in untrue 
or ideological form – can be specified377: (1) the identity of subject and object in Hegel’s 
idealism registers the fact that subject and object cannot be completely opposed, otherwise 
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experience would not be possible378; (2) this identity bears witness to the hope that the 
limitations of current experience might one day be overcome379; and (3) Hegel’s idealistic 
way of explaining things primarily through the subject or the universal – especially as found 
in his account of spirit – is not just a philosophical delusion, but actually reflects a primacy of 
the universal or the subject in the world, albeit of a different character than Hegel thought, 
namely, that it is not a genuine expression of freedom.380 It is the last of these claims which I 
will focus on here.  
In the third of Adorno’s lectures on History and Freedom, he addresses the issue of the 
relation between facts and trends in historical explanation.381 Adorno recalls his experience of 
having his house searched under the National Socialist regime.382 He points out that the 
immediate experience of this event is not reducible to its socio-political analysis (he gives the 
examples of the awareness of the ascent of the National Socialists and the granting of certain 
powers to the police).383 But, he argues, the real cause of this situation is due to those factors 
which stretch beyond the immediate experience. The problem with ‘false immediacy’ is that 
it takes the immediate cause (e.g. that police officers knock on the door at six a.m.) to be the 
proper explanation, rather than the ‘total historical context and its direction.’ 384  Adorno 
credits Hegel with a similar insight: ‘In Hegel we find that these ideas have at least been 
registered – in the shape of objective idealism. Because of its identification of all existence 
with spirit, objective idealism has as its object the freedom to concede to existence the actual 
power that existence has over us.’385 The insight is thus distorted by its transfiguration of 
social mediation into an apparently rational context.  
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It is here that Hegel’s philosophy becomes untrue. We saw in Adorno’s criticism of 
hypostatization that Hegel attempted to show that the nonconceptual was reducible to the 
concept because immediacy turns out to be mediated. This is where the fact of the dominance 
of mediation in the world is given legitimacy through the attempt to establish its rationality in 
a priori philosophy. But the dominance of mediation can be ideologically presented as the 
prevalence of spirit without such philosophical aids (although it will not have the same 
pretence to ironclad truth).  
 
The ideology of the idea’s being-in-itself is so powerful because it is the truth, but it is 
the negative truth; what makes it ideology is its affirmative reversal. Once men have 
learned about the preponderance of the universal, it is all but inescapable for them to 
transfigure it into a spirit, as the higher being which they must propitiate. Coercion 
acquires meaning for them. And not without all reason: for the abstract universal of the 
whole, which applies the coercion, is akin to the universality of thought, the spirit. And 
this in turn permits the spirit, in its carrier, to be reprojected on that universality as if it 
were realized therein, as if it has its own reality for itself. In the spirit, the unanimity of 
the universal has become a subject, and in society universality is maintained only 
through the medium of spirit, through the abstracting operation which it performs in 
complete reality. Both acts converge in barter, in something subjectively thought and at 
the same time objectively valid, in which the objectivity of the universal and the concrete 
definition of the individual subjects oppose each other, unreconciled, precisely by 
coming to be commensurable.386  
 
The contrast between the ideologically presented preponderance of the universal and its non-
ideological form is given more detail here. We can legitimately refer to the social totality as 
spirit because it is does have it source in human activity, in the real practice of exchange.387 
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But this practice – according to Adorno, and the Marxist tradition more generally – imposes 
its own function at the expense of the individuals to whom it was originally meant to serve. 
As Adorno puts it to another opponent (Spengler): ‘He fails to realize that institutions have 
become so independent that individuals are scarcely in a position to impinge on them.’388 
Without the genuine involvement of particular individuals in the universal, it loses its right to 
be properly called spirit. In short: ‘The world spirit is; but it is not a spirit.’389  
With this Adorno believes he now has the resources to interpret history in a way that can 
go beyond the mere facts, but without giving history a meaningful or affirmative appearance. 
He goes as far to say that his philosophy of history can understand its object as ‘meaningless’ 
due to ‘the dreadful antagonistic state of affairs’ described in this standoff between the 
universal and particular. Even if Adorno is successful in giving an account of history that 
goes beyond the mere discontinuity of facts without making history meaningful, there is still 
the question of whether or not he ends up providing a metaphysics of the meaninglessness of 
history as a mere inverse of the metaphysics of the meaningfulness of history. In other words, 
does it end up putting an unwarranted pessimism in the place of an unwarranted optimism?  
I will be arguing that Adorno is not guilty of doing this. Two ways that a philosophy of 
history could be found guilty of unwarranted pessimism are: (1) downplaying the particular 
in the account of history in favour of the (negative) universal; and (2) making 
meaninglessness or unfreedom a metaphysical necessity. I think Adorno’s philosophy of 
history avoids both these potential pitfalls. I briefly address these points generally before 
going on to the more detailed analysis of Adorno’s philosophy of history.  
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5.1.2 The relation between universal and particular  
 
Two aspects of the first issue need to be distinguished: methodological and substantive. 
Methodologically, the philosopher of history must be open to understanding the role of the 
particular or individual whilst tracing a pattern or trend. If they fail to do so their 
interpretation may well be defective because metaphysically prejudiced (i.e. imposing the 
universal on a historical situation). But we should be on guard against this methodological 
desideratum slipping unnoticeably into a substantive claim that a philosophy of history would 
be defective if it observed the real predominance of the universal over the particular in 
history. I think there is a risk of misunderstanding Adorno by seeing his arguments for the 
real predominance of the universal in history as a methodological failure of privileging the 
universal.   
Adorno is explicit on his commitment to the methodological issue when he summarises, in 
the lecture following the one describing the irreducibility of the immediacy of facts to social 
context (even where they depend on that context), the importance of interpreting the relation 
between the particular and the universal. 
 
In short you need to grasp the complexity of the pattern, by which I mean the overall 
process that asserts itself, the dependence of that global process on the specific situation, 
and then again the mediation of the specific situation by the overall process. 
Furthermore, in addition to understanding this conceptual pattern, you need to press 
forward to the concrete, historical analysis I have hinted at and that goes beyond the 
categories I have been discussing.390 
 
This methodological balance should not, however, be assumed to mean that we also need to 
say that a justified philosophy of history cannot claim that the universal and the particular are 
unbalanced in the world.  
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Along with the methodological requirement, a superficial understanding of the needs of a 
critical theory could also lead us to be suspicious of Adorno’s philosophy of history. Critical 
theory is fundamentally concerned with human emancipation and tries to discover what the 
real possibilities are for this. Now, if we thought that critical theory should primarily be 
occupied with motivating action (broadly construed) towards achieving the goal of 
emancipation, Adorno’s philosophy might be seen as lacking.391 But the aim of critical theory 
cannot simply be to motivate action, irrespective of the real possibilities for action. Adorno’s 
claims about the preponderance of the universal over the particular have the consequence that 
the options for the particular or individual are curtailed; the corresponding relative lack of 
resources in Adorno’s thought for motivating action is thus not a flaw in his critical theory, it 
is a flaw in reality. Indeed, a philosophy that, with the good intentions of motivating action, 
claimed there were more potentials than there really are would actually be oppressive.392  
 I have stressed that Adorno retains a desirable methodological balance between universal 
and particular; and that the lack of balance between them in his substantive claims about 
history is not to be regarded as a problem for a philosophy of history. A further issue that 
occurs here, however, is that the predominance of the universal does require a further 
distancing from the illegitimate appearance it has in other philosophies of history. Adorno has 
argued that the universal or trend he discovers in history is negative rather than affirmative 
(meaningless rather than meaningful) and that he follows the requisite attention to the 
particular to avoid imposing an interpretation on history. But he also needs to show that the 
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negative universal is not metaphysically necessary, for then it would be a mere inversion of 
Hegel’s philosophy of history.  
 
5.1.3 Contingency of compulsion  
 
Adorno argues that Marx and Engels were at their most idealistic in the conviction that the 
universal which forms a totality is inevitable.393 The idealism involved here is akin to the 
kind of worry about metaphysical excess in philosophy of history which we have been 
considering so far. Marx and Engels are said to have made economics prior to domination 
and with this made the conflict and suffering of that domination a necessary result of humans 
need to secure the means to sustain life. In this way a metaphysical speculation about 
humanity’s origins provides a pattern to interpret history: the philosopher must see 
antagonism as a universal feature of history. There are two problems Adorno seems to be 
highlighting here: firstly, there is the issue of metaphysical speculation as such; secondly, 
there is the issue of the content of that speculation, namely making conflict a necessary result 
of self-preservation. These two issues are complexly intertwined so I will try to deal with 
them together. 
The section of Negative Dialectics where these points are raised is titled with a question 
(in notable distinction from the more programmatic titles of most sections): ‘Antagonism 
contingent?’ Although Adorno does not think it desirable to say whether antagonism (i.e. the 
universal form of conflict in history) can be historically specified in the manner of Marx and 
Engels, he suggests that this is an important question anyway. 
 
It is not idle to speculate whether antagonism was inherited in the origin of human 
society as a principle of homo homini lupus, a piece of prolonged natural history, or 
whether it evolved θέσει—and whether, even if evolved, it followed from the necessities 
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of the survival of the species and not contingently, as it were, from archaic arbitrary acts 
of seizing power.394 
 
No definitive answer is given to the question about the origin of antagonism. Indeed, in the 
more elaborate discussion found in the lectures on History and Freedom, Adorno points out 
that it is not possible to answer it: ‘It is hardly possible to reconstruct the primitive conditions 
that form the object of this dispute.’ 395  However, it is clear that the last option – the 
contingency of conflict based on ‘archaic arbitrary acts of seizing power’ – is favoured. One 
reason is that the philosopher of history is then forced to renounce the necessity of the 
universal in history—and with this to lose metaphysical assurance about their 
interpretation.396 But there are also consequences for critical theory more broadly. 
In short, if conflict is made necessary, then there is no space for critical theory to oppose 
that conflict. Adorno elaborates:  
 
Only if things might have gone differently; if the totality is recognized as a socially 
necessary semblance, as the hypostasis of the universal pressed out of individual human 
beings; if its claim to be absolute is broken—only then will a critical social 
consciousness retain its freedom to think that things might be different some day. Theory 
cannot shift the huge weight of historic necessity unless the necessity has been 
recognized as realized appearance and historic determination is known as a metaphysical 
accident. Such cognition is frustrated by the metaphysics of history.397  
 
If we are to avoid pessimistic view of history as a necessary decent – or the optimistic view 
of history as a necessary ascent: Marx and Engels were guilty of ‘deifying history’ by making 
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the historic necessity end in revolution – we need to hold that historic necessity is not itself 
necessary—i.e. it is contingent. Modal complexities aside, this should offer some clarification 
to the suggestion in the above quote that the totality in history should not be conceived as 
absolute. Adorno’s account of social totality puts many people off precisely because it 
appears to make our situation hopeless (I address this in relation to Habermas in more detail 
below). But here Adorno is trying to retain hope by arguing that this totality is not absolute in 
the sense that it is not necessary.   
Now, in the previous section I warned against allowing requirements of critical theory to 
shape our view of the real negativity of the situation and our belief in the potentials for 
emancipation. It may look as though I have forgotten just that warning. But in the previous 
case it was a matter of how the universal overwhelms the particular in a way which can, in 
principle, be open to philosophical (and social, psychological, etc.) interrogation. But now we 
are considering the primitive conditions of humanity which is on much shakier ground. Thus 
emancipatory desideratum’s have more leeway in this case. We should keep these 
considerations in mind when considering Adorno’s own account of the role of self-
preservation and self-assertion in the philosophy of history.  
 
5.2 Origin of compulsion 
 
The claim that history forms a compulsive totality is probably known more through the 
earlier co-authored work, with Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. More 
specifically, through the summarization of the critical part of the work: ‘Myth is already 
enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology.’398 This captures a core part of the 
insight of the Dialectic, but – like all pithy summaries – it has its limits. Most notably, it 
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seems to level out the differences between enlightenment and myth. That is, if we see reason 
as the primary characteristic of enlightenment and power as the primary characteristic of 
myth, then reason and power are run together. And this in two ways: reason might seem to be 
simply reduced to expressions of power (i.e. a synchronic levelling out); and the way that 
reason and power are entwined at a specific historical moment could be thought to be 
equivalent to how they are entwined at all other historical moments (i.e. a diachronic 
levelling out). I argue that neither is the case.   
I agree with Herbert Schnädelbach that we cannot conceive of history as a ‘singular 
object,’ since this would flatten out history into a seamless totality.399 I disagree, however, 
with Schnädelbach that this means we need to abandon the philosophy of history in order to 
avoid this error. 400  I argue that the twin claim – ‘Myth is already enlightenment, and 
enlightenment reverts to mythology’ – does not pick out a singular process which the critical 
theorist finds in any phenomena she wishes to turn to. Rather, I think we need to take 
seriously Horkheimer and Adorno’s statement that this is merely a summary.401 I think this 
should already point us in the direction of recognising that this summary merely names a 
general pattern: distinct types of practices have, in fact, set up forms of compulsion. That 
history has mostly consisted in compulsion is not guaranteed by some underlying principle or 
phenomenon (e.g. self-preservation, instrumental reason, etc.). Rather, the varying forms of 
compulsion, from self-preservation and instrumental reason to technical rationality and 
exchange relations, do not have any strict necessity to form a unity. It just so happens that 
they have been connected in history. This is not to say that there is not a tendency for certain 
forms of compulsion to lead to others. But a tendency is not a necessity, and with this 
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distinction we can start to see how the account of history offered in the Dialectic can be 
understood to not impose a narrative. 
 
5.2.1 Prehistory of the Subject 
 
When used to speculate on the possible origins of humanity, the summary points us towards 
the specific way that the domination of nature helped to liberate ourselves from the 
immediacy of nature’s blind force, but also introduced a further compulsion. More 
specifically, Myth is already enlightenment in the sense that practices of ritual, rites, and 
magic were employed to combat our fear of nature and thus represent an early attempt to gain 
independence from compulsive forces. These early attempts in the prehistory of the subject 
were still in thrall to nature since the method of understanding nature and predicting 
outcomes was in fact secured by imitation; although a certain gap had been introduced 
between nature and us, we were still firmly in nature’s compulsion. It is with the refinement 
of mythic practices that, instead of sacrificing ourselves directly to nature, we sacrifice our 
own nature itself so as to pass through the rhythms and cycles of nature alive. The famous 
example is of Odysseus’ navigation and manipulation of mythic forces where a congealed 
subject properly arises in the use of ‘cunning’—and thus enlightenment is already achieved in 
myth. Odysseus only manages to preserve himself at the cost of sacrificing his bond with 
nature (he must engage in renunciation of both his impulses and even his free movement in 
order to pass through Scylla and Charybdis with his life). The compulsion of nature, which 
self-assertion was to oust, returns in the compulsive relations which the self establishes.  
 
The self wrests itself from dissolution in blind nature, whose claims are constantly 
reasserted by sacrifice. But it still remains trapped in the context of the natural, one 
living thing seeking to overcome another. Bargaining one's way out of sacrifice by 
means of self-preserving rationality is a form of exchange no less than was sacrifice 
itself. The identical, enduring self which springs from the conquest of sacrifice is itself 
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the product of a hard, petrified sacrificial ritual in which the human being, by opposing 
its consciousness to its natural context, celebrates itself.402 
 
Although the theme of exchange announced here is one of the few features that the authors 
perceive in most of the phenomena investigated in the Dialectic, we should still take this 
opportunity to point out that the character of the dialectical reversion in the pre-modern 
setting is fundamentally about the coming into existence of a substantial subject through 
more or less direct entanglements with nature. The way in which reason succumbs to blind 
domination in this setting is through the formation of the self. The faculty of knowledge just 
happens to be utilised in these early attempts to liberate ourselves from nature, but the 
complicity of reason with power here is not the source of all future forms of domination.  
This last point needs to be understood in two ways: the form of dominating reason found 
in this setting is not exhaustive of reason as such,403 but neither is this form of dominating 
reason exhaustive of historically effective domination or compulsion.404 The latter highlights 
what was said in comment to the above quote. Horkheimer and Adorno may draw a parallel 
between self-preservation and exchange, but it is just that: a parallel. The universal exchange 
relations in capital are not just self-preserving bargaining writ large. They are structurally 
similar practices which can be illuminated through the lens of the summary. But even if this 
is accepted, and we recognise that an account of the compulsive course of history can be 
provided without underwriting it with an anthological account of the complicity of reason and 
power, we might still think that this speculation on the prehistory of the subject is suspect as 
an account of the genesis of the subject.405  
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As noted above (5.1.3), Adorno comes to think that the origin of humanity is not a proper 
object for philosophy. It would be anachronistic to claim that this goes for the Dialectic also. 
But the point I want to make is that the fundamental project contained in the Dialectic is not 
dependent on such prehistorical speculations. The summary still does its work even without 
an account of the genesis of the subject. That is, in order to understand history as forming a 
compulsive course, we do not need it to be grounded in the necessary emergence of power 
from the need to preserve ourselves. In fact, maintaining a critical consciousness about 
history inclines us to the hypothesis that violence preceded our self-preserving activity—
which would mean the fusion of power and reason at this point would be contingent.  
 
5.2.2 The reflection of blind nature in reason 
 
To further illustrate the point that a compulsive form of history can be traced through distinct 
forms of domination without reducing them to a singular object of narrative (the necessity of 
reason to dominate for self-preservation), I now want to disentangle two specific claims: one 
the one hand, there is the claim about the persistence of the context of nature in the self’s 
very domination of it, on the other hand, the claim that enlightened reasoning, especially in 
bourgeois society, has largely remained in a blindness of its own, which is comparable to the 
blindness of nature. If these are conflated then it is easy to see why so many have thought that 
Horkheimer and Adorno are guilty of a pernicious pessimism about enlightenment.   
The most influential expression of this criticism is provided by Habermas. In the fifth 
lecture of the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity titled The Entwinement of Myth and 
Enlightenment, he presents an account of Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of compulsive 
forms found in the Dialectic and, crucially, reduces the significance of their position to a 
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critique of instrumental reason as such.406 He claims that the procedure there is essentially a 
form of ideology critique: this is said to consist in a ‘suspicion’ that power lies behind every 
claim to validity, that all exercise of reason actually serves a heteronomous force. This is said 
to then turn in on itself since the privileged position from which critique unmasks the 
complicity of power and validity is thought to be lacking—that is, reason has not left itself 
any secure vantage point.407 This way of reconstructing the argument of the Dialectic – as a 
self-defeating ‘suspicion of ideology [that] becomes total’ – gives us insight, according to 
Habermas, as to why the authors must necessarily ‘oversimplify its image of modernity so 
astoundingly.’ 408  Habermas’ argument is that, since they can only see the various 
manifestations of reason in modernity as instrumental, they couldn’t appreciate that with 
progressive rationalisation (or demythologisation) came also the positive effect of rational 
spheres liberated from traditional authority. Following Weber, Habermas presents us with 
different spheres that have become differentiated in cultural modernity: science, morality, and 
art. We are correctly told that new forms of rationality occur here which are not simply at the 
service of other interests (external to reason). Therefore, it would seem that Habermas is 
justified in claiming that, since there exist forms of rationality that can engage in substantial 
discrimination (rather than merely express power), Horkheimer and Adorno are guilty of a 
blindness to any possible progression due to an illegitimate totalizing critique. 
But the flaws of enlightenment rationality are not merely contained in the concept of self-
assertive subjectivity. Horkheimer and Adorno do often claim that the objectifying tendencies 
of enlightened reason is a kind of purified form of self-preservation in the form of 
calculation, but the crucial point is that the continuation of blind power in reason is not solely 
due to non-cognitive interests infiltrating the sphere of reasons, but, more importantly, that 
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where reason has lapsed into a positivistic function it has become a kind of autonomous 
power. An immediate objection, however, could be placed simply by quoting the various 
passages where Horkheimer and Adorno claim that the compulsion found in thought is in fact 
related to the compulsion of self-preservation.409 But in order to follow the argument properly 
it is not enough to lift out assertions of the existence of a link between the compulsion of 
enlightened thought and the compulsion of self-preservation. To start with, those statements 
themselves are ambiguous when lifted from the argument, not least because of the 
indeterminate and changing definition of this very link: for example, we find 
‘stems…ultimately’ 410 , ‘reflected’ 411 , ‘entanglement’ 412 , and various talk of shared 
principles, such as the principle of immanence413 and the principle of exchange. Thus the 
variability and vagueness of some of the relations expressed in these connections cannot, of 
themselves, carry the weight of such a crucial part of interpreting the Dialectic. What we 
need to look to, then, is not the claims about how thought and self-preservation are in some 
sense coextensive, but at the claims which tell us in what fashion they diverge from one 
another. For if this divergence can be established, we can even admit that the cultivation of 
reason was originally a response to the need to manipulate nature without thereby saying that 
manifestations of reason in modernity must also be so reduced.   
The following passage provides the occasion to see how, even where the theme of self-
preservation and the source of reason therewith is clearly present, the compulsion of reason 
spins free of its original function 
 
The exclusivity of logical laws stems from this obdurate adherence to function and 
ultimately from the compulsive character of self-preservation. The latter is constantly 
magnified into the choice between survival and doom, a choice which is reflected even 
in the principle that, of two contradictory propositions, only one can be true and the 
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other false. The formalism of this principle and the entire logic established around it 
stem from the opacity and entanglement of interests in a society in which the 
maintenance of forms and the preservation of individuals only fortuitously coincide.414 
 
The ultimately binary choices we face when survival is at stake is said to have been the 
source of the need for thought to perpetuate such laws. Although such an account of the 
genesis of a bivalent theory of truth is very contestable, we do not need to defend this aspect 
of the claim. This is because Horkheimer and Adorno do not go on to say that this 
‘formalism’ exerts its force by being an expression of self-assertion; in fact, the complicity of 
logical laws in the maintenance of the course of society is implicitly shown to not coincide 
with the force of self-preservation (they ‘only fortuitously coincide’). Once this has been 
established, other claims about the source of thought’s compulsion in nature can be shed of 
its illegitimate reductive or sceptical appearance. Take the following: ‘Precisely by virtue of 
its irresistible logic, thought, in whose compulsive mechanism nature is reflected and 
perpetuated, also reflects itself as a nature oblivious of itself, as a mechanism of 
compulsion.’415  We can now see that the ‘reflection’ involved here is not a relation of 
equivalence or expression, but of homology. 
 
5.3 Persistence of compulsion  
 
Not all forms of compulsion, then, can be said to be mere expressions of the need to survive. 
Thus such a drive to self-preservation cannot function as the guarantee that enlightenment 
must return to myth. We saw that the objectionable element of formalistic reason was not that 
it was an expression of power, but that it establishes a distinct form of compulsion which 
merely mirrors that of the compulsion of nature or of the domination of nature in the self-
assertion of the subject. By making this distinction I have tried to show that the claims about 
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the social totality cannot be understood to be metaphysically grounded. I would now like to 
point to a further form of compulsion not reducible to either the compulsive form of 
formalistic reasoning or self-preserving practice, before finally addressing the question of 
how these can be said to form any kind of unity. 
 
5.3.1 Irreducibility of compulsion  
 
Reason can become detached from ‘the individuals who are concerned with self-preservation’ 
which, according to Adorno, means reason ‘degenerates into unreason.’416 Up till this point I 
have tried to specify the distinctness of forms of compulsion by opposing the crude reading 
of the Dialectic—that all forms of domination are expressions of self-preservation. If we now 
turn our focus to Adorno’s lectures on History and Freedom, we can add another nuance to 
this negative philosophy of history which is not necessarily to be found in the Dialectic. 
Implied in the above quote is that the undermining of reason is not only achieved at certain 
points by being appropriated for the direct domination of nature (i.e. in the prehistory of the 
subject), but it can also be undermined through its actual separation from our needs.  
 
…on the one side, reason can liberate itself from the particularity of obdurate particular 
interest but, on the other side, fail to free itself from the no less obdurate particular 
interest of the totality. How this problem is to be resolved is a conundrum that 
philosophy has failed to answer hitherto. Even worse, it is a problem which the 
organization of the human race has also failed to solve. It is for this reason that I do not 
think I am exaggerating when I say that it is a problem of the greatest possible gravity.417 
 
Adorno does not elaborate on what he thinks the particular interests of the totality are here 
(instead he gives an historical example of ‘fascist race theory’). But we can guess that what 
he had in mind was the interest which society has in its own reproduction over and above the 
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interests that individuals have in its reproduction. In other words, the profit motive which 
demands valorisation and accumulation of capital for its own sake.  
Now, we need to be careful here. This should not be taken to mean a free floating subject 
it at work. As Adorno puts it: ‘To this day history lacks any total subject, however 
construable. Its substrate is the functional connection of real individual subjects.’418 It is only 
because humanity owes its continuation to it in some sense that it is propped up by real 
individuals. But the functional context itself cannot be exhaustively explained in terms of 
individual’s own interests. This is because the interests of the totality frequently conflict with 
those of the individual. The basic model for this is found in the Marxist analysis of wage-
labour. The worker sells their labour-power as a commodity in order to gain access to the 
means of subsistence. In this way the worker’s livelihood is secured by the purchaser of their 
labour-power (the capitalist). But this very situation is also responsible for systematic 
exploitation. This antagonistic or contradictory position is what leaves critical theory in such 
a desperate situation. 
 
The infinite weak point of every critical position (and I would like to tell you that I 
include my own here) is that, when confronted with such criticism, Hegel simply has the 
more powerful argument. This is because there is no other world than the one in which 
we live, or at least we have no reliable knowledge of any alternative despite all our radar 
screens and giant radio telescopes. So that we shall always be told: everything you are, 
everything you have, you owe, we owe to this odious totality, even though we cannot 
deny that it is an odious and abhorrent totality.419   
 
The particular interests of the totality, the formalistic calculation, and the immediate 
domination of nature all are ways that reason can be compulsive. But they do not form a 
seamless narrative; they do not follow on from one another necessarily. If they did proceed 
necessarily then all historical possibilities would not be able to depart from historical reality. 
And it is just such a conflation of possibility and reality that Adorno claims plagues idealist 
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philosophies of history, and that his aims to avoid.420 Adorno goes as far to say that, at 
different historical points, there was always the possibility of ‘doing things differently.’421  
 
5.3.2 Unity of continuity and discontinuity  
 
If it is accepted that reason can take a compulsive form without simply being a direct 
expression of our immediate need to survive, the next question to ask is: how are these 
distinct forms of compulsive reason related to each other? This question is especially 
pertinent because without some account of this relation a philosophy of history would lack 
the ability to tell a history. In one of Adorno’s most quoted passages we find an answer. 
 
Universal history must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that have 
happened, and in view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan 
for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. Not to be denied for that reason, 
however, is the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and 
phases of history—the unity of the control of nature, progressing to rule over men, and 
finally to that over men’s inner nature. No universal history leads form savagery to 
humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb. It 
ends in the menace which organized mankind poses to organized men, in the epitome of 
discontinuity. It is the horror that verifies Hegel and stands him on his head. If he 
transfigured the totality of historic suffering into the positivity of the self-realizing 
absolute, the One and All that keeps rolling on to this day—with occasional breathing 
spells—would teleologically be the absolute of suffering.422   
 
This is one of the favourite passages to call upon to confirm the suspicion that Adorno 
presents an inverted universal history every bit as necessary and teleological as Hegel’s. In 
response to the defence that Adorno insists on the possibility of breaking this history, it is 
sometimes thought that this is just a ‘utopian deus ex machina,’ thus leaving the original 
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claim in tact.423 But I think we have seen plenty of evidence to show that Adorno does not 
simply add in the possibility for an exception to a dominant course of history. Rather, he 
insists that the maintenance of this course is not guaranteed: the genesis of the subject need 
not have glued reason and violence together at the start of history; calculating reason 
produces a unique compulsion long after it finishes serving self-preservation; and the 
‘obdurate particular interests’ of the totality, though responsible for the reproduction of the 
species, is not propelled by individual’s need for survival. They each control nature in 
different ways and are thus unified in the sense of sharing this characteristic control. But, 
unfortunately, Adorno does not say much more about how this unity works, or, more 
specifically, how the discontinuity of history is supposed to precisely relate to the continuity 
of history. 
Brian O’Connor has recently addressed this issue. In order to make sense of this he 
proposes that we should keep in mind a tension between two different ‘moods’ in Adorno’s 
thought: first there is Adorno as the hermeneutically guided philosopher and then there is 
Adorno as the critical theorist preoccupied by barbarism.424 O’Connor suggests that the best 
Adorno can do to escape the excesses of universal history is to remain alert to moments 
within the historical continuity of domination which can be interpreted as exceptions to the 
narrative of universal history (and that even this results in the meaning of these exceptions 
being differentially determined by that narrative).425 But I think the reason this appears as the 
best available option is due to a too rigorously polarised account of what continuity and 
discontinuity could mean in the context of offering a philosophy of history.   
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O’Connor quotes Adorno’s claim that the unity of history is provided by ‘the unity of the 
control of nature,’ and then argues that this unity would damage the discontinuous moments 
of history by making each one ‘commensurable’ with each other.426 It is not completely clear 
what it means for each moment to be commensurable in this context. But the meaning seems 
to be that each moment is reduced to the point where its meaning is nothing more than a 
continuation of what came before or an anticipation of what is to come.427 If the control of 
nature is supposed to form this kind of extreme continuity – i.e. where each moment of 
history is just an expression of one and the same process – then Adorno would be left with an 
imposing narrative which left any account of discontinuity to be side-lined into sensitivity to 
what is not narrated, but hermeneutically attended to.  
I want to suggest that we can give an account of the trajectory of history without 
transfiguring history into a seamless continuum. I have already argued for the specificity of 
the different forms of domination and that there is no strict necessary transition from one to 
the other. This introduces a discontinuity into the narrative of history itself. We do not need 
to assume that a narrative of domination must solely be characterised as the continuity in a 
philosophy of history, and that discontinuity must be completely other to any account of 
trends, patterns, or tendencies in history. To have a non-idealistic account of history does not 
mean having to either abandon the construction of objective trends in history or offsetting 
such constructions with something completely opposed to it (i.e. abstractly discontinuous). 
Rather, what is needed is the materialistic understanding of that objective trend itself. What 
this amounts to is understanding how the trend is formed in and through the particular 
elements rather than the latter being interpreted as mere emanations of a pure concept. As 
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Adorno puts it, ‘the awareness of discontinuity goes hand in hand with the growing doubts 
about the possibility of understanding history as the unified unfolding of the idea.’ 428 
Continuity is not the problem as such, but a continuity that is interpreted as a homogenous 
continuum. To correct this we do not need to reject continuity, or abstractly oppose it to 
discontinuity, but understand continuity in a non-idealistic way: ‘we should not think in 
alternatives: we should not say history is continuity or history is discontinuity. We must say 
instead that history is highly continuous in discontinuity, in what I once referred to as the 
permanence of catastrophe.’429  
In the reconstruction I have given this would mean that the discontinuous forms of 
domination produce a continuity in that they form a trend in history—a trend of increasing 
control of nature. But this continuity is not secured a priori, and thus there is no 
metaphysically objectionable positing of a universal history beyond the realities of particular 
conflicts (though, of course, this would still be too speculative for many). And with this there 
is no unwarranted pessimism—i.e. an assumption that things must turn out badly. This goes 
against the prevailing view that the commitment to the repeated reversion of reason into 
domination – or enlightenment into myth – is necessary. Brunkhorst expresses the prevailing 
view succinctly when he claims that the thesis regarding the reversion of enlightenment to 
myth in the Dialectic understands this reversion as ‘enlightenment must decay. This thesis 
expresses an a priori necessity that enlightenment must return to mythology once it is 
developed completely. It is not clear how we can know when we have reached this state of 
negative perfection. If the second thesis is true [i.e. that enlightenment revers to mythology], 
enlightenment never has the chance to get rid of the original barbarism of history.’430 Insofar 
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as my reconstruction of Adorno’s philosophy of history can be attributed to the Dialectic, we 
can oppose the prevailing view of that work.  
Now, it might be wondered that, if there is no necessity to the continuing history of 
domination, why has it been the case that the domination of nature has continued throughout 
history? If there is no necessity, would it not be the case that history would have broken the 
chain of domination at some point? These kinds of questions can initially be assuaged by 
noting two points: firstly, there need be no necessity for history to have followed a certain 
course and the requisite weaker modality is what is indicated by terms like ‘trend’ and 
‘pattern’; secondly, Adorno argues that history could have broken off into a genuine freedom, 
but that it just so happens that humanity has not yet managed it.431 This suggests that we can 
think of an historically effective force which is not self-sufficient, that requires the support or 
at least acquiescence of the individuals through which it does its work. Early in the lectures 
on History and Freedom Adorno asserts that the spirit which Hegel’s talks of does not simply 
go ‘over the heads’ of the individuals, but that it also goes through them. Later in the same 
lectures he gives some more concrete detail as to how this might be the case by stressing the 
role that psychological mechanisms play in reproducing the conditions which give history its 
shape. Even though psychology is a secondary phenomenon compared to the ‘objective 
necessity of history,’ Adorno claims that it still has a crucial role to play.432 One phenomena 
called upon to illustrate this is a ‘particular socio-psychological mechanism’ whereby 
oppressed citizens react in a counter-intuitive way to the recognition that objective 
possibilities for social improvement are suppressed. Rather than anger being directed at the 
institutions or public figures responsible, ‘people choose to identify with the inexorable 
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course of the world as it is.’433 Now, it is true that Adorno thinks these kinds of psychological 
mechanism, which induce individuals to affirm the current state of things, have immense 
force because the course of the world has all but completely deprived us of the detachment 
from the world needed to resist such mechanisms. But it is clear that Adorno does not think 
that there is no possibility for such detachment—the very fact that the critical theorist can 
identify such mechanism indicates this much. So, the individual is needed for the universal to 
take full effect in the course of the world. There is an asymmetry in the dialectic between 
them, but the dialectic is not closed off entirely. ‘Psychology has become the cement of the 
world as it exists; it holds together the very conditions that would be seen through rationally, 
if this irrational cement did not exist.’ 434  Although this ‘cement’ is engendered by the 
objective course of history, it does not complete its role in the continuation of this compulsive 
course without some agency involved. In principle, the individual or particular can resist the 
universal.  
This is only a hint as to how a model of historical compulsion can be attained where the 
modality is less than strict necessity. This shows that Adorno’s philosophy of history can be 
committed to tracing a continuity, without falling foul of the methodological strictures 
outlined above (5.1.2) or asserting a pessimistic account of history. There is much more that 
needs to be said about how a convincing picture of the interweaving of diverse forms of 
domination have worked throughout history to form a narrative in absence of a metaphysical 
principle to underlie it. However, I believe I have at least made the possibility of this kind of 
philosophy of history more plausible than even the more sympathetic commentators will 
allow. In particular, I hope to have shown that the project of the Dialectic – namely, that the 
different forms of domination can be analysed as forming a fateful or compulsive history – 
can be followed. And thus, contra Schnädelbach, we need not ‘renounce all philosophy of 
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history and turn instead towards social theory.’ 435  It is true that the way reason or 
universality comes to be oppressive is not necessary and that this ‘only transpires under 
specific conditions.’436 But such conditionality does not mean that we must restrict the scope 
of critical theory to the social-theoretic task of ‘trying out hypothetical structures’437: that is, 
of isolating a discrete object or phenomenon (e.g. reason qua faculty) and showing that, if it 
takes on a specific form (e.g. instrument for the domination of nature), then it will be a 
principle of domination. The only alternative to this, according to Schnädelbach, is a ‘grand 
narrative’ of the kind I have been arguing against in my reconstruction of Adorno’s 
philosophy of history. This reconstruction has shown that there can be a unity to the historical 
process, but one which requires concrete conditions in order to keep reproducing itself.  
 
5.4 End of compulsion 
 
Even if it is accepted that the model of a philosophy of history I have outlined here manages 
to do justice to both the continuity and the discontinuity required of Adorno’s account, it 
might still be worried that enlightened rationality is not given a fair hearing. That is, although 
we can see that, for instance, Horkheimer and Adorno are not guilty of claiming that reason, 
qua the faculty that it is, is only ever a tool for self-assertion, it looks like the rationalisation 
that occurred in modernity is still denounced as completely in the nets of historical 
compulsion. If this is the case then all the hard work of showing that the construction of a 
negative philosophy of history can proceed without metaphysically worrying commitments 
will have been for naught since pessimism would be reintroduced.  
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5.4.1 The possibility for emancipation  
 
As Habermas puts it, it seems as though the ‘ambivalent’ content of modernity is levelled out 
due to a view of the ‘flat and faded landscape of a totally administered, calculated, and 
power-laden world’. 438  We have already shown that Horkheimer and Adorno have not 
committed themselves, in principle, to totalised critique since they do not claim that reason 
necessarily disguises power, but that certain manifestations of reason have instantiated a new 
form of compulsion. Thus they have not epistemologically paralysed themselves since it is 
possible within this framework to say that reason is not exhausted by its compulsive mode. 
This point is made more explicitly here: 
 
However, while real history is woven from real suffering, which certainly does not 
diminish in proportion to the increase in the means of abolishing it, the fulfillment of 
that prospect depends on the concept. For not only does the concept, as science, 
distance human beings from nature, but, as the self-reflection of thought—which, in the 
form of science, remains fettered to the blind economic tendency—it enables the 
distance which perpetuates injustice to be measured. Through this remembrance of 
nature within the subject, a remembrance which contains the unrecognized truth of all 
culture, enlightenment is opposed in principle to power [Herrschaft]439 
 
Reason, logic, or the concept has been at the service of a ‘blind economic tendency’, but 
there is the possibility of the ‘self-reflection of thought’ which not only can escape force or 
compulsion, but is actually ‘opposed in principle to power’. Moreover, this hope for reason is 
located firmly in the enlightenment, thus repudiating Habermas’ accusation that Adorno is 
guilty of levelling out the potentiality of modernity through ‘the diachronic comparison of 
modern forms of life with pre-modern ones.’440 The discontinuity of modern forms of life 
with pre-modern ones is clearly proposed here.  
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However, the emancipatory moment which Horkheimer and Adorno recognise as 
distinctive of modernity might still be found wanting. The emancipatory moment is 
characterised by the capacity of the concept to remember nature; that is, even though 
rationalization installs compulsive thought-forms, this process also brings the possibility that 
‘nature [is] made audible in its estrangement’.441 The worry with this account might be that it 
seems like we don’t find a genuine affirmation of the qualities of enlightenment (e.g. 
autonomy, the value of rationality as such), but only that we have stumbled across a by-
product that can help us heal nature. Thus the modernist aim of securing autonomy seems to 
be abandoned in favour of the counter-enlightenment aim of a state or experience which is in 
principle opposed to enlightened subjectivity—only now we have the token gesture that the 
self-refection of the concept can help us back to this desirable situation. This is not the case. 
First, the aim of this emancipatory moment is not to return to a lost state or to atone for a 
harm rendered (as though justice as such is desirable—this will be addressed in the next 
section) but to oppose blind force; second, nature is not idolised in this manner—the 
‘harmony’ of nature is not a better situation than the ‘diremptions’ of modernity. I will now 
substantiate these claims. 
 
5.4.1 Nature and reconciliation  
 
Nature does seem to occupy an ambiguous position in the argument of the Dialectic. It is true 
that the mythic relation to nature is said to have not yet succumbed to the alienation we find 
in bourgeois society. Horkheimer and Adorno do stress the damage done to nature by the 
strengthening of the subject, which plays a significant role in their diagnosis of our 
increasingly reified world and continues to inform Adorno’s later ethical aims of how to 
                                                          
441
 DE 31 
200 
 
avoid genocide.442 However, if the cost of a less damaged nature is a ‘weaker’ subject, the 
result would be a just as unsatisfactorily compulsive situation as in advanced technological 
society. Or, as Adorno puts in, in a slightly different context in Negative Dialectics: ‘If any 
harmony of the subject and object should have prevailed in those [past] days, it was a 
harmony like the most recent one: pressure-born and brittle.’ 443  This indicates that the 
elevation of nature, or a harmony with nature, cannot be what is supposed to be brought about 
by the ‘remembrance’ of nature. The problem brought about by the compulsive form of 
reason is not the damage done to nature qua nature, but the compulsive form as such. 
Moreover, nature is not a contrast case to the compulsion of rationalisation but is just another 
mode of it.  
 
Any attempt to break the compulsion of nature by breaking nature only succumbs more 
deeply to that compulsion. That has been the trajectory of European civilization. 
Abstraction, the instrument of enlightenment, stands in the same relationship to its 
objects as fate, whose concept it eradicates: as liquidation.444 
 
So, if there is ultimately no hierarchy proposed between a more immediate (e.g. mimetic) 
nature and the alienated nature of enlightenment – since both are blind force – then how are 
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we to understand the references to nature here. To answer this brings us to the question of 
reconciliation.  
Again, Habermas gives a very strong expression to the worry with this aspect. This time it 
is in the 1969 essay ‘Theodor Adorno: The Primal History of Subjectivity – Self-Affirmation 
Gone Wild’. 445 Here Habermas contemplates Adorno’s outline, in Negative Dialectics, of 
what the reconciled state would be. Habermas claims that appeal to reconciliation is the place 
where Adorno is forced to address the problem of how we can justify critique. Further, it is 
claimed that the model of autonomy which is anticipated in our everyday communication 
provides the content of reconciliation and is available to ground critique, but that Adorno 
chooses to remain ‘inconsistent’ (i.e. practice critique without meeting the ‘demand that the 
reasons for the right of criticism be made explicit’ 446 ) and instead cling to a more 
‘extravagant’ version.    
 
If the idea of reconciliation were to “evaporate” into the idea of maturity, of a life 
together in communication free from coercion, and if it could be unfolded in a not-yet-
determined logic of ordinary language, then this reconciliation would not be universal. 
It would not entail the demand that nature open up its eyes, that in the condition of 
reconciliation we talk with animals, plants, and rocks. Marx also fastened on this idea in 
the name of a humanizing of nature. Like him, Adorno (and also Benjamin, 
Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Bloch) entertained doubts that the emancipation of humanity 
is possible without the resurrection of nature. Could humans talk with one another 
without anxiety and repression unless at the same time they interacted with the nature 
around them as they would with brothers and sisters? The “dialectic of the 
enlightenment” remains profoundly undecided as to whether with the first act of violent 
self-assertion (which meant both the technological control of external nature and the 
repression of one’s own nature) a sympathetic bond has been torn asunder that has to be 
re-established through reconciliation, or whether universal reconciliation is not a rather 
extravagant idea.447 
 
I have already argued that what Adorno means by reconciliation cannot be a re-establishment 
of a lost sympathetic bond – and thus does not hold the extravagant view – but neither does 
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he want the moderate or tamed version. So, Habermas’ insinuation that the reason we would 
be inclined to reject his version is if we were stubbornly attached to a fanciful account should 
be rejected. Adorno need not accept this forced choice.  
To start with, the problem with the model of communicative reconciliation is not that it is 
not ‘universal’ enough but that it only aims to create a kind of fairness where every one can 
have their say. Even if this were extended to allow nature to have its say also (and become 
more ‘universal’) this would still not answer the problem which reconciliation is supposed to 
answer. Adorno does actually recognise aspects of modernity which Habermas takes to 
provide the ground with which to critique power, such as autonomy, political maturity, and 
self-reflection. 448  But, although these progressive aspects of modernity can mitigate 
manifestations of coercion in the world, they can be perfectly complicit in the repetitive 
course of the world more generally.  
But how are we to understand the difference between the form of force that is resisted in 
the modest form of reconciliation qua autonomy, and the form of force that Adorno’s 
reconciliation aims to address. As suggested, Adorno does think that securing fair exchange 
would be an admirable task but that this does not exhaust our problems. For a fair exchange 
does not, prima facie, address the power that the merely existent has over us in the 
enlightened world—the force of the status quo to maintain itself. That this expresses the 
problem Adorno is motivated by – and not the fanciful aim of talking with nature – has 
already been suggested via the argument that our immersion in the bloody force of nature 
would not be any better than the brutal domination we have; now we should also add that the 
force in question is not the force of one partner over another, but the blind force of the 
ceaseless repetition of the existent. ‘The suppression of instinct which constitutes them as 
selves and separates them from beasts was the introverted form of the repression existing 
                                                          
448
 For example, see ‘Free Time,’ in Critical models interventions and catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 167-75. 
203 
 
within the hopelessly closed cycle of nature’.449 Although I have distinguished the problem of 
the constitution of the self in prehistory from the positivistic rationality prevalent in 
bourgeois society, the point made in this quote stands: the problem is not that of the harm 
rendered when one party in the conversation imposes themselves on another (whether that 
party is nature, the self, or positivistic rationality) – and that what is needed is a correct 
balance – but that when one predominates we have a repetitious, fateful, or compulsive 
development. The overcoming of the hitherto compulsive form of history is not, then, 
achieved in a fanciful reconciled state. Rather, it would be achieved when the universal trend 
in history no longer suppressed the particular, but was responsive to it. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
I have offered a defence of Adorno’s philosophy of history in terms of its ability to construct 
an account of the role of the concept or universal in history without succumbing to either 
optimism or pessimism. The primary way this was achieved was by showing that Adorno can 
trace a continuity in history without thereby positing a ‘singular object’ which would mean 
the critical theorist is faced with the task of idealistically fitting in the facts to suit the 
metaphysical model advanced.   
Because I have limited myself to showing that this kind of philosophy of history is 
possible (or at least plausible), I have not elaborated a comprehensive interpretation of history 
on the basis of Adorno’s insights. It is obvious that this would be a large undertaking on its 
own. But there are more modest tasks that might be expected to be tackled which I have not 
had the space to pursue. Perhaps most obviously, the task of showing that there really is 
prevalent compulsion in the world which would require the philosophy of history I propose. I 
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have mainly justified the negative account of history by showing how other available 
philosophies of history are necessarily incapable of perceiving pervasive unfreedom or a 
history propelled by compulsion. That is, I have argued that if we do not want to be deluded 
about the state of human history we must, at the least, find a way of understanding history 
that can be sensitive to the possibility that history has been compulsive rather than using 
philosophical frameworks which rule out this possibility before we even get started 
interpreting the realities of history.  
Since I have also argued that the negativity which Adorno’s philosophy of history 
identifies is not metaphysically grounded, this account is open to falsification in a way that is 
not possible for Hegel’s philosophy of history; nor is this possible for the reconstructed 
Hegelian philosophies of history or for Schelling’s Spätphilosophie—although the latter case 
is more complicated because its claims for the divinity of history are epistemically open to an 
extent, but not enough to be able to perceive pervasive unfreedom. In this way, even before 
we turn to a substantive interpretation of history, Adorno’s account has the upper hand due to 
the methodological advantage of not imposing illegitimate a priori constrictions on what 
kinds of phenomena can be found.    
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Conclusion 
 
I have argued that Schelling and Adorno are insightful critics of Hegel’s idealism and that the 
results of their interrogation of the concept led them to understand the dangers of 
unwarranted optimism when philosophy turns to our historical situation. The alternative 
accounts of history Schelling and Adorno advance was seen to take seriously the problem of 
the role of the concept both in the philosophers activity of thinking history and its reality in 
the philosopher’s object, in historical reality itself. Ultimately, I have argued that Adorno’s 
conception of historical compulsion is better able to face the challenges of constructing a 
philosophy of history without metaphysical restrictions on how we can interpret the course of 
history. A more general result of this research has been to unearth the ways in which idealism 
and unwarranted optimism can covertly and persistently enter into philosophy; and to show 
the strenuous effort that is needed to uncover and oppose idealism and unwarranted 
optimism. I would like to discuss the consequences of this before turning to remaining 
questions regarding Schelling’s and Adorno’s philosophies of history and broader worries 
about the philosophy of history.  
At first sight Hegel might not seem like the best example of subtlety in this regard, but my 
reconstruction of Schelling’s and Adorno’s criticisms have hopefully shown that we should 
question this first impression. The subtlety revealed was found in the nature and scope of 
Hegel’s claims themselves, and in the way Hegel tries to get to those claims. With the aid of 
Schelling’s distinction between positive and negative philosophy we were able to see how the 
animation of the concept gives Hegel part of what he needs for his theological aims—and 
without needing a pre-critical or obviously excessive metaphysics. The subtlety of the critical 
metaphysical position which Schelling helps us identify in Hegel’s thought would still be 
considered quite robust or bold however. It is because of this that I went on to show how 
much more modest Hegelian accounts of history end up securing an unwarranted optimism 
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nearly as robust as Hegel had intended. These accounts managed to give an important role to 
the empirical, contingent, and the individual for the understanding of the development of 
history. It is precisely these kinds of concerns which Adorno claimed that Hegel was 
disinterested in, and which philosophy must turn to in order to combat idealistic prejudices.450 
Yet the manner of inclusion of these elements into the reconstructed Hegelian account was 
shown to have not escaped an a priori assurance that these elements could not fundamentally 
challenge the continuing progress of freedom. Thus we find great subtlety in the way that 
unwarranted optimism is snuck back into philosophy.  
The type of overextension of the concept Adorno grappled with was less obviously 
metaphysically excessive than the one Schelling was concerned by. The type of unwarranted 
optimism entailed by it was accordingly less robust also. Rather than the guarantee of the 
development of freedom, it was an a priori assurance that universal and particular, concept 
and nonconcept, will always have a harmonious relation. This does not already offer the 
ground for substantive claims about the development of freedom or the realisation of God, 
but it does give us the minimal reassurance that things can never get too bad. I showed how 
we do not need to sign on to many of Hegel’s most robust claims in the Logic in order to 
allow this a priori assurance infiltrate out thinking. I argued that the ‘non-metaphysical’ 
readers of Hegel even enlist the argument for compete mediation, and that this is perfectly 
compatible with the declaration to be keeping their hands clean of the most obviously 
objectionable metaphysics (for instance, the non-metaphysical readers could retain their 
neutral or agnostic stance on questions of existing entities and thus avoid many of the 
egregious metaphysical positions often attributed to Hegel—reduction of world to mind or 
the bestowal of mind-like qualities on the world). So, many contemporary Hegelian’s have 
not managed to avoid an implicit, unwarranted optimism, even where they marshal powerful 
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interpretative and reconstructive resources to establish a position free of many of the 
traditionally excessive parts of Hegel’s metaphysics.  
The subtlety was not only present in the type of claims Schelling and Adorno found in 
Hegel’s (and Hegelian’s) thought; it was in the philosophical operations utilised therein. Both 
Schelling and Adorno exposed the illicit means Hegel used to secure his claims. Schelling 
helps us see an important problem in the exposition of the concept in the Logic and has 
consequences for future research into the possibility of a presuppositionless science in the 
way that Hegel intended. Previously Schelling contribution to this area was seen as 
insignificant, but hopefully this widespread view can begin to be altered. Even though this is 
an important result, I think Adorno’s uncovering of a form of transcendental illusion in a 
fundamental mode of Hegel’s thinking as such has a much broader significance and a 
potentially greater impact on our understanding of how philosophy can perennially end up 
affirming the priority of the concept. Outside of the ambitious aim of providing an immanent 
and presuppositionless exposition of the pure concept, very few are going to make the 
mistake of surreptitiously enlisting the spit between the observer and the observed in the 
transcendental realm in order to generate movement.  
But the general error of mistaking the fact that everything known must pass through the 
subject in some fashion, for the grounding role of the subject in knowing is not so limited. 
Adorno believes most philosophy to have fallen into this error, but, famously, he specifically 
targets phenomenology and ontology—which Adorno largely treated as synonymous with 
Husserl and Heidegger. There has often been a danger of miscommunication between the 
parties of this debate; indeed, there has not been much of a debate at all.451 The polemic and 
political tenor of Adorno’s engagement here is often identified as the major barrier. This may 
be true, but I think that one way to cut through this potentially off putting aspect is to focus 
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on the substance of Adorno’s claims about the problem of the relation between the concept 
and the nonconceptual and his reinvention of Kant’s diagnosis of transcendental illusion. In 
combination with the more nuanced account I give of Adorno’s understanding of identity 
philosophy this should hopefully offer one way to stage a genuine confrontation between the 
claims of materialist philosophy and that of the ontological philosophies. In other words, this 
might give new direction to a dialogue which is not limited to comparison of these thinkers 
(i.e. pointing out their similarities and differences), but neither consigned to a stalemate 
where there is no shared ground for discussion. What I have in mind here is to drop the 
insults that Adorno levels as Heidegger – e.g. irrationalism, jargon, ‘the leader principle’ – 
and the dismissals that Heideggerians direct at Adorno – e.g. not real philosophy, mere 
sociology – and pursue an ongoing investigation into whether or not it is possible to 
meaningfully talk about something beyond the subject-object relation in philosophy without 
succumbing to illusions.452      
Hopefully this shows that Schelling’s and Adorno’s target is not as narrow as it might 
appear. I would now like to suggest that the problem with idealism and the way that 
unwarranted optimism can sneak into philosophy is even broader. Adorno was conscious of 
the fact that his relentless criticism of idealism and identity philosophy seemed to have been 
left superfluous by the progress of thought. It is worth quoting Adorno’s following remarks at 
length as he puts this issue into sharp focus. 
 
…dialectics as critique implies the criticism of any hypostatization of the mind as the 
primary thing, the thing that underpins everything else. I remember how I once explained 
all this to Brecht when we were together in exile. Brecht reacted by saying that these 
matters had all been settled long since – and what he had in mind was the materialist 
dialectic – and that there was no point in harking back to a controversy that had been 
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superseded by the unreal course of history. I am unable to agree with this. […] I 
believe…that at present a true philosophical critique of the hypostasis of mind is fully 
justified because this hypostasis is proving irresistible to philosophy, which after all 
operates in the medium of the intellect, which thrives exclusively and at all times in the 
mind. I believe that everyone who has ever learnt to appreciate what great philosophy is 
will have experienced the force of this thesis of the primacy of the spirit that is to be 
found in every so-called first philosophy. And a form of thinking that simply retreats 
from this experience instead of reacting, once it has come to be thought dubious, by 
measuring itself against it and setting it in motion with the aid of its own power, any such 
thinking will be doomed to impotence. Do not forget that the very fact that thinking takes 
place in concepts ensures that the faculty that produces concepts, namely mind, is 
manoeuvred into a kind of position of priority from the very outset; and that if you 
concede even an inch to this priority of spirit – whether in the shape of the ‘givens’ that 
present themselves to the mind in the form of sense data or in the shape of categories – if 
you concede even an inch to this principle, then there is in fact no escape from it.453 
 
Two important points come out of this passage: first, that the error of hypostatization is much 
more powerful than is usually understood; second, that the explicit orientation of a 
philosophy (e.g. empiricist or rationalist) is not enough to ward off this error. I will briefly 
elaborate on each. 
Adorno points out that hypostatization is ‘proving irresistible to philosophy,’ and he cites 
the fact that philosophy’s home is precisely in the intellect and that its native instrument is the 
concept. As I suggested in chapter 2, it makes sense to understand this as a part of a doctrine 
of transcendental illusion. Both Kant and Adorno hold that this illusion is inevitable, even if 
they propose strategies for how the philosophy can be on guard to limit the damage they can 
do. The central distinction I drew between Adorno’s and Kant’s account was that fact that, on 
Adorno’s account, hypostatization can occur even without the claim to know about a 
transcendent entity. Thus we do not need to be involved in the dubious task of claiming to 
know about certain objects which are widely held to be invalid for philosophy or any other 
discipline; in this way the illusion is not only inevitable, but its affirmation is likely to be 
affirmed with less resistance than we might think. This brings us to the second point. A 
philosophy need not even contain any of the claims or doctrines that we usually associate 
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with positions which aim to posit the primacy of mind or the identity of concept and the 
nonconceptual. Unwarranted confidence in the power and scope of thought can appear in the 
guise of its opposite. Even where a philosophy proposes doctrines which privilege matter, for 
instance, idealism can still be found in the way that this philosophy proceeds. If this 
philosophy is presented as a system where the philosopher upholds the ability of thought to 
grasp everything, the content is in effect evaporated into thought and thus ‘proceeds 
idealistically advancing any arguments for idealism.’454 Adorno also says something similar 
about philosophies which posit something as primary—i.e. first philosophy.455  
Of course, not many philosophers today would claim to be doing systematic or first 
philosophy. But, according to Adorno, just as idealistic ways of thinking are found outside of 
philosophies which promote identifiable doctrines of idealism, systematic thinking is not 
restricted to system builders.  
 
Traditional thinking, and the common-sense habits it left behind after fading out 
philosophically, demand a frame of reference in which all things have their place. Not 
too much importance is attached to the intelligibility of the frame—it may even be laid 
down in dogmatic axioms—if only each reflection can be localized, and if unframed 
thoughts are kept out. But a cognition that is to bear fruit will throw itself to the objects à 
fond perdu. The vertigo which this causes is an index veri; the shock of inconclusiveness, 
the negative as which it cannot help appearing in the frame-covered, never-changing 
realm, is untrue for untruth only.456 
 
The common sense habits Adorno highlights here are an example of the way that the 
idealistic error of identity philosophy can persist well beyond the realm of specific 
philosophical systems. Hopefully this indicates that the problems of Hegel’s idealism I have 
been dealing with are of concern to non-specialists. The problem of the illusion of making 
thought primary can extend to less obviously metaphysically excessive thinking and, with 
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this, optimism can covertly guide our interpretations without signing up to naive views about 
progress. 
There are many things I could not address in the course of this study. I would now like to 
touch upon some of the further questions raised by the results of the current research. First, 
some of the outstanding differences and tensions in Schelling’s and Adorno’s understanding 
of history will be addressed; specifically regarding the scope for understanding meaning in 
history. Then I give further consideration to the possible responses that a Hegelian could 
offer to the judgment that Hegel’s philosophy of history cannot escape unwarranted 
assumptions because of Hegel’s idealist arguments for the reach of the concept. This 
primarily entails considering the view that Hegel’s pure theoretical philosophy need not 
underwrite his practical philosophy.  
Although I have argued that Adorno’s philosophy of history shows more promise for 
opposing unwarranted optimism, the case cannot be closed quite yet. Schelling’s 
Spätphilosophie may not be able to countenance the possibility of an oppressive course of 
history, but Adorno’s philosophy cannot countenance the possibility of a meaningful history 
beyond human freedom. This might not trouble the philosopher of history that much since, if 
Adorno’s hopes for the transformation of ‘unreflecting rationality’457 into a truly reflective 
and human rationality were satisfied, it could be asked: what more do you want? As 
Schelling’s despairing remarks make clear at the beginning of the Berlin lectures, we could 
want a purposeful existence. For Schelling this means a purpose beyond free activity or self-
organising societies since meaning can only be supplied ultimately by answering the 
question: ‘Why is there anything at all? Why is there not nothing?’458 No reason can be 
offered which would finally answer this question, if by reason we mean a self-sufficient or 
self-grounded concept. Schelling ends up making a central role for revelation in his thought 
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in order to approach these overarching questions. The extent to which Schelling succeeds in 
bringing philosophy and religion into a dialogue without reducing one to the other is a 
problem for another study. But we can point out that, at the least, Schelling does not want to 
replace the authority of reason with that of revelation. Instead he claims that it is only if 
reason can appropriate revealed truths that we can have a genuine and free relation to truth. 
This indicates that there must be a dialectic between reason and revelation. But very few are 
willing to take Schelling’s theology or philosophical religion seriously today.459 Of course, it 
is not just the apparent weaknesses in Schelling’s philosophy on this score which would 
generate this response, but the fact that such topics or concerns are far outside the mainstream 
of ethical concerns in political philosophy, moral philosophy, or indeed critical theory.  
It has often been noted that theological themes are to be found in Adorno’s thought.460 But 
there can be little doubt that Adorno never signed up for the kind of philosophical religion 
Schelling proposes. Whether or not Adorno should have paid more attention to religion in his 
understanding of history is a question which ultimately converges on the question of the role 
of religion and theology in emancipatory thought as such. In order to further explore Adorno 
and Schelling on these issues, then, it would be interesting to see how they fit into the current 
prominence of political theology, partly brought into the mainstream of critical theory 
through the work of Giorgio Agamben.461  
I argued in chapter 4 that reconstructed Hegelian accounts of the philosophy of history, 
although making the concept face the empirical or contingent, still distort history by retaining 
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a residual unwarranted optimism. Moreover, I argued that this residue cannot in principle be 
exorcised without failing to be Hegelian in any recognisable sense. Now, some contemporary 
Hegelians, like Fredrick Neuhouser, argue that philosophy can gain insight into social and 
political reality through Hegel’s thought independent of the baggage that comes with the 
Logic.462 Critical responses to this line of thought have argued that this cannot be the case. 
However, for arguments sake, I would like to briefly consider what might be the upshot if 
Neuhouser is correct.  
If Hegel’s social and political thought has a claim beyond any problems that the theory of 
the concept – laid out in the Logic – might face then this is all well and good. This would 
mean that Hegel’s texts express insight beyond the idealistic machinery of the self-knowing 
concept. It will be recalled that Adorno’s held a similar hope: that Hegel’s dialectic contained 
experiences incompatible with the idealistic justification he gave to it. The question to be 
addressed then is: in what sense does the mining for these kinds of insights or experiences 
wed us to Hegel’s philosophy? Neuhouser claims to be faithful to the letter of Hegel’s 
texts.463 But this faithfulness is limited to the texts which he considers—not Hegel’s system 
as a whole. Adorno is suspicious of this kind of approach to the truth in Hegel’s thought. He 
thinks that the reason Hegel’s philosophy does express truth is precisely because of its 
idealistic excess. 
 
At the present time Hegelian philosophy, and all dialectical thought, is subject to the 
paradox that it has been rendered obsolete by science and scholarship while being at the 
same time more timely than ever in its opposition to them. This paradox must be endured 
and not concealed under a cry of "back to. . .” or an effort to divide the sheep from the 
goats within Hegel's philosophy. Whether we have only an academic renaissance of 
Hegel that it is itself long outdated or whether contemporary consciousness finds in 
Hegel a truth content whose time is due depends on whether that paradox is endured or 
not. If one wishes to avoid half-heartedly preserving what people praise as Hegel's sense 
of reality while at the same time watering down his philosophy, one has no choice but to 
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put the very moments in him that cause consternation into relation to the experiences his 
philosophy incorporates, even if those experiences are encoded within it and their truth is 
concealed.464  
 
Whether or not we accept Adorno’s point here depends on how we understand the relation 
between the pure and non-pure sides of Hegel’s philosophy. I said at the beginning of the 
introduction to this study that one of Hegel’s biggest challenges lies in explaining how these 
two sides to his philosophy relate. We could just give up on that problem all together—we 
could save the non-pure part and neglect the pure part. But this would be to assume from the 
start that Hegel’s conviction that the concept as it is in the world and as it is analysed by the 
philosopher is one and the same. Hegel’s conviction might be wrong; indeed a large part of 
the current study argues that it is. But if we assume that it is wrong we would never discover 
the truth that lay hidden in this untruth. Of course, to be worried about the latter issue is 
already to sign on to Adorno’s understanding of Hegel. In this sense I have meanly sharpened 
the different approaches we can take to Hegel. But, if I have managed to show how Schelling 
and Adorno elaborate important philosophies through their struggle with the relation between 
the pure and non-pure parts of Hegel’s philosophy, then I have at least given enough weight 
to this approach that those wanting to continue working with or through Hegel should take 
this problem seriously.  
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